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Summary
Context matters for complex human information processing. The ability to attribute in-
formation to its origin (source) is not only crucial for daily social interactions (e.g., who
told me something?) and impression formation about other people, but it is also essential
to judge the credibility of sources and validity of the received information (e.g., where did
I read something?). Even more so, failures of source attributions can have far-reaching
consequences, for instance in the distribution of fake news in the recent media debate but
also in eyewitness testimony where misattributions become even more severe (i.e., sen-
tencing innocent individuals). Retrieving the origin of an episode from memory has been
termed source monitoring (cf. M. K. Johnson et al., 1993). Alongside memory processes,
source attributions can be based on guessing processes affected by general or contingency
knowledge and plausibility or metacognitive beliefs in case a source’s characteristic cannot
be retrieved from memory (cf. M. K. Johnson et al., 1993). This thesis specifically focuses
on knowledge reliance in source guessing. That is, when people infer the source due to a
lack of memory traces, they rely on knowledge acquired prior to or during the learning
environment. While mostly memory processes were of prime research interest in the past
decades, guessing processes were given less consideration.
In this thesis, I address the underlying nature of knowledge reliance in source guess-
ing more thoroughly as part of four manuscripts, thereby contributing to put the so far
missing pieces of the source-guessing puzzle into place. In these manuscripts, I examine
knowledge reliance in source guessing with regard to its cognitive dynamics, stability, re-
source dependence, and generalization to novel stimuli to serve the overarching objective
of inferring its underlying nature. In the first manuscript, I demonstrate the utility of the
process-tracing methodology mouse tracking to unpack the influence of knowledge reliance
on source-monitoring processes. In the second manuscript, I quantify the extent to which
individual differences in knowledge reliance in source guessing are stable across time and
knowledge domains. In the third manuscript, I refine the understanding of the underlying
automatic or controlled mechanisms of knowledge reliance. In the fourth manuscript, I
expand the scope of knowledge reliance in source guessing to novel information contexts.
In sum, this thesis provides new insights into the application of knowledge structures in
judgmental processes under source uncertainty.

IX
Manuscripts
The present cumulative thesis is targeted to foster a comprehensive framework of the un-
derlying nature of knowledge-based influences on source guessing—a judgment process that
emerges whenever memory for the original context during source attributions is absent.
The reported research is conducted in the Center for Doctoral Studies in Social Sciences
(CDSS) of the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences (GESS) at the University
of Mannheim and is based on four manuscripts.
The first three manuscripts provide insights into the cognitive dynamics (Manuscript
I), the state- versus trait-like characteristic (Manuscript II), and the automatic ver-
sus controlled nature (Manuscript III) of knowledge reliance in source guessing. The
last manuscript (Manuscript IV) broadens the scope of knowledge-based influences on
source guessing by investigating a generalization to decision contexts for new information.
Manuscript I and II are published, Manuscript III has been submitted for publication, and
Manuscript IV is prepared for submission.
In the main text of this thesis, I review the overarching theoretical framework for
the four manuscripts, followed by a presentation of the joint statistical approach to
model cognitive processes involved in source monitoring. Next, I provide a summary of
each of the four manuscripts before a general discussion of the results, their strengths
and limitations, theoretical and practical implications, and prospective research ideas
complement the thesis. Empirical and analytical specificities of the distinct experiments
are outlined in the original manuscripts appended to this thesis (in the same order as
listed below).
Manuscript I
Wulff, L., & Scharf, S. E. (2020). Unpacking stereotype influences on source-monitoring
processes: What mouse tracking can tell us. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, 87, 103917. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103917
Manuscript II
Wulff, L., & Kuhlmann, B. G. (2020). Is knowledge reliance in source guessing a cognitive
trait? Examining stability across time and domain. Memory & Cognition, 48 (2),
256–276. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-019-01008-1
X Manuscripts
Manuscript III
Wulff, L., & Kuhlmann, B. G. (2020). Is knowledge reliance in source guessing automatic
or controlled? Evidence from divided attention and aging. Manuscript submitted for
publication.
Manuscript IV
Wulff, L., Bell, R., Mieth, L., & Kuhlmann, B. G. (2020). Guess what?! Different source-
guessing mechanisms for old versus new information. Manuscript in preparation.
Make it count.

11 Introduction
Searching for articles on "source guessing" in the electronic literature search engine Google
Scholar illustrates: Judgment processes in attributions about the origin of information were
far less studied in empirical research on source monitoring (143 articles) compared to source
memory (about 16,400 articles) which was the main focus of research in the past decades
(time period from 1980 to 2020; retrieved March 18, 2020).1 Oftentimes, guessing processes
in source monitoring were not of primary interest and less in the center of attention in the
scientific discourse which is why its underlying mechanisms are understudied in comparison
to memory processes in source monitoring. Yet, source guessing in itself is a fascinating
cognitive process that is worth dwelling on, not just from a naive perspective of a basic
researcher but also from an applied point of view (as source attributions can be performed
under uncertainty and distraction in everyday life). Thus, this thesis is concerned with
the underlying nature of source guessing and, in particular, the influence of pre- and peri-
experimental knowledge on this judgment process.
The theoretical distinction between memory and guessing processes in source monitoring
(M. K. Johnson et al., 1993) has been transferred to stochastic models which made the
separate measurement of cognitive processes that contribute to the performance in source
attributions possible. Disentangling memory from judgment processes has revealed that
source guessing is biased by knowledge (cf. Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016, for a review). That
is, previous research has demonstrated that people make inferences of the origin about
information based on either generic knowledge (such as stereotypes, schemas, or plausibility
beliefs) acquired prior to the test situation in (laboratory) experiments in which source
monitoring is studied (e.g., W. H. Batchelder & Batchelder, 2008; Bayen et al., 2000; Bell
et al., 2015; Kuhlmann et al., 2016; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002) or contingency knowledge
acquired during the course of encoding in the specific learning environment (e.g., Bayen
& Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann et al., 2012; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002).
The cognitive processes involved in source monitoring can be studied in a basic paradigm.
In such tasks, it is common that participants study information (e.g., words) accompa-
nied by contextual features (e.g., different faces indicating articulation). In a subsequent
memory test, participants attribute the previously-studied information (among new infor-
1As a matter of course, acknowledging that the terminology for source memory and guessing may be
manifold in the literature (e.g., "context memory", "guessing bias", ...), summarized under the term
source monitoring, and all relevant articles are not entirely covered by this literature data base, it may
nonetheless provide a first indication for the current status of research.
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mation) to the context in which the information was studied or not. Specifically, partici-
pants decide whether the information was presented before (“old”), and thereby associated
with different context features (i.e., whose face was paired with the information during
learning), or not (“new”), thereby implying that the information was not previously en-
countered. Multinomial models for categorical response data collected in such experiments
(e.g., Bayen et al., 1996) enable researchers to estimate memory and guessing processes
separately. Among other things, the application of such models revealed two essential find-
ings in terms of source guessing that are significant to the present thesis: First, knowledge
reliance in the source-guessing process itself is not as random as one may assume when in-
tuitively thinking of the concept "guessing" and, second, individuals strongly differ in their
systematic reliance on knowledge structures (e.g., Arnold et al., 2013; Spaniol & Bayen,
2002). This, in turn, raises the questions of what drives individuals’ source-guessing be-
havior and under which conditions it is most or least pronounced?
In this thesis, I take steps towards answering these questions by examining why and
to what extent individuals show biased source guessing due to knowledge reliance. By
this, I aim at supplementing the bigger picture of this judgment process in the absence
of retrieval of contextual details. That is, I raise the overarching question of which un-
derlying mechanisms characterize knowledge reliance in source guessing best? This thesis
thereby contributes to a more profound understanding on a conceptual and theoretical
level but may also serve a more applied, societal purpose at the same time. Determining
why, how, and when individuals show knowledge-based source guessing is a prerequisite
for well-constructed, precise interventions to overcome a knowledge reliance and to eval-
uate potential long-term effects of such biases. For instance, we might learn about the
consequences of biased source guessing on how we process (social) information in the first
place and, building on this, how we hereafter perceive others and form impressions about
them.
In the following, I provide a more detailed introduction to the theoretical framework of
source monitoring and its statistical implementation—followed by a review of the empirical
evidence for the nature of knowledge reliance in source guessing based on four manuscripts.
This thesis concludes with a discussion about the strengths, limitations, and implications
of the present findings, and gives an outlook on future research.
32 Theoretical Foundation: The
Source-Monitoring Framework
Source monitoring of all types is based on characteristics
of memories in combination with judgment processes.
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993)
2.1 Memory and Judgment Processes
The umbrella term source monitoring encompasses all cognitive processes involved in the
reconstructive inference process when attributing information to its origin (M. K. Johnson
et al., 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000, 2009). In their seminal review, Marcia K. Johnson
and her colleagues (1993) proposed a superordinate theoretical framework to describe the
cognitions at play during source attributions in more detail. The authors defined source
monitoring as a “[...] set of processes involved when making attributions about the origins
of memories, knowledge, and beliefs” (p. 3). According to M. K. Johnson et al. (1993),
sources refer to all features of learning episodes under which memory traces are acquired.
Sources are thereby not stored and retrieved as an abstract entity but rather based on
detailed cues from various modalities (see also Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). Among others,
this could be, for instance, perceptual, temporal, or affective information bound to the
episode in which individuals form a memory representation. But on which decision criteria
are source attributions based in case of inability to retrieve specific characteristics from
past contextual episodes?
A second integral part of source monitoring are strategic and heuristic decision compo-
nents. These are, following the theoretical source-monitoring framework (M. K. Johnson
et al., 1993), biases, metacognitive awareness, plausibility beliefs but also current moti-
vations and intentions that can have a significant impact on how source attributions are
made.
In summary, source monitoring can, thus, be broken down by two essential cognitive
operations that take place during attributions of information to its origin: (1) Memory
processes, that have their roots in the specific situation in which contextual binding was
experienced and a memory trace was acquired, and (2) judgment processes, whose evalua-
tive character constitutes a symbolic weighting function of the strategic decision criterion
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(cf. M. K. Johnson et al., 1993). The source-monitoring framework highlighted the disso-
ciation of the cognitive processes in source inference—predominantly from a theoretical
perspective. Plenty of empirical support for this dissociation of memory and judgment
processes was provided shortly thereafter and up until now.
But how can memory and judgment processes be disentangled and inferred from the
performance collected in experimental source-monitoring tasks? A closer inspection of the
data collected during source-monitoring paradigms reveals that by just looking at the
categorical responses (e.g., decision between different sources) the underlying cognitive
processes that lead to the behavior in the first place cannot be derived. The confound
of memory and judgment processes has been addressed in the mathematical modeling of
such cognitive processes involved in source monitoring as illustrated in Figure 1 and is
introduced and described in detail in Section 3.
2.2 Source Guessing at a Glance
The development of multionomial processing tree (MPT) models such as the two-high-
threshold multinomial model of source monitoring (2THSM; Bayen et al., 1996) was a
milestone towards the quantification of latent cognitive processes and enabled researchers
to perform hypothesis tests examining influencing factors specific to single memory and
judgment parameters. Oftentimes, the source-memory parameter was of particular interest
to the research community. As initially stated, a large proportion of studies mirrors that
source-monitoring research primarily focused on the memory component. Nonetheless,
judgment processes have attracted attention ever since the development of mathemati-
cal models to disentangle cognitive processes and are interesting for a variety of applied
settings, for instance for eyewitness suggestibility and the phenomenon of inducing false
memories (cf. M. K. Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). Judgment processes
comprise the more systematic components of source monitoring. The term "guessing" may,
at first sight, imply randomness in the meaning of non-strategic source attributions under
uncertainty. In fact, source guessing actually has been far from random and judgments can
rather be described as the best educated guess an individual can make based on various
cues such as what is already known about the sources in general. That is, individuals can
initiate guessing processes to infer the source based on qualitatively distinct cues such as
reasoning, plausibility beliefs, or generic knowledge (M. K. Johnson et al., 1993).
In this thesis, I will specifically focus on knowledge reliance in source guessing based on
two knowledge cues: the item-source contingency and stereotypes/schemas both of which
have been identified as crucial backup strategies in situations when individuals are not able
to retrieve the source from memory (Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016). Empirical evidence on
the multifaceted influences of knowledge cues on the source-guessing process is reviewed
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hereafter.
One cue of which individuals can make use of is the item-source contingency (referred
to as peri-experimental knowledge). In an experimental setting, the contingency is most
frequently manipulated—with material for which no prior knowledge representation exists
among participants (Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Klauer & Meiser, 2000)—by varying the
probability of certain pairings of item types and sources to occur during encoding (e.g.,
75% of the items are paired with a specific context, for instance a certain screen posi-
tion). Throughout the course of encoding, individuals can then perceive the predominant
contingency such that some items are more likely accompanied by one source as by an-
other. In an applied field setting, a contingency could be that certain information is occurs
factually-justified more often in a specific situation. This on-line perception of item-source
contingencies while learning is mirrored in source guessing during source attributions when
memory for the source is absent and, in addition, no prior knowledge is applied. In these
instances, source guessing is then biased in the direction of the contingency manipulation
demonstrating that individuals indeed learn that item types are associated with specific
source characteristics (e.g., Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005).
Another essential source-monitoring cue is prior knowledge such as stereotypes and
schemas. Compared to peri-experimental knowledge, this pre-experimental knowledge is
acquired at some point before the source-attribution process is initiated. Mental structures
such as stereotypes (i.e., beliefs about personal attributes of social groups; cf. Stroebe &
Insko, 1989) and schemas (i.e., mental structures that organize and link information based
on previous experience; cf. Alba & Hasher, 1983) are one such example and can then find
their application in source guessing to reconstruct the origin of information. In an exper-
imental setting, researchers usually present information that are inherently prototypical
for its origin (e.g., persons, situations, or scenes). An empirical example from Kuhlmann
et al. (2016) nicely illustrates the general procedure. The authors used verbal item mate-
rial (statements) that was either expected to be said by young or old adults (based on a
survey study by Kuhlmann et al., 2017). These expected-young and -old statements were
presented by two person sources one of which was introduced as a young person and the
other as a an old person (without revealing the specific assignment of the ages to the
sources during encoding). Either source presented the same number of items from each
expectancy type. This restriction in the assignment of statement to the sources ensured
that each item was to be associated with either source with an equal probability (= null
contingency). In a later memory test, participants attributed the previously-encountered
statements to the sources or classified them as new. MPT model-based analyses of their
categorical responses suggest that source guessing was biased such that individuals judged
a statement to originate from the expected, stereotype-consistent source more frequently
than simply by random chance if the origin could not be remembered—regardless that
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sources conformed with their age expectations only in half of the instances. Thus, individ-
uals reconstruct the sources based on what they know about and intuitively associate with
the sources acquired prior to the experiment (e.g., Bayen et al., 2000; Hicks & Cockman,
2003; Kuhlmann et al., 2016; Mather et al., 1999; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999).
But which source-attribution cue dominates source guessing if the predictions for the
source-guessing bias differ because of a mismatch in peri-experimental (contingency)
knowledge and pre-experimental (stereotypes and schemas) knowledge? For instance, how
do individuals attribute information to its origin in situations where information is as-
sociated with the unexpected source for most of the time and, by this, contradicting
what people typically associate? The distinction between these two different kinds of cues
individuals can make use of when inferring the source has been formalized in the theoret-
ical prediction of the probability-matching account (Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). This account
states that source guessing should be based on peri-experimental knowledge in the first
place. Whenever a situation-specific contingency of item types and sources can be perceived
during encoding, source guessing should be adjusted to and thus reflect this likelihood.
Prior, pre-experimental, knowledge should impact source guessing mostly when knowledge
about the item-source contingency is missing or cannot be perceived. The probability-
matching account found empirical support in a multitude of studies since its release (e.g.,
Arnold et al., 2013; Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Bell et al., 2020; Kuhlmann et al., 2012).
So, what experimental factors influence the supersession of pre-experimental knowledge
by peri-experimental knowledge in source guessing? The following factors have been iden-
tified in the literature (Arnold et al., 2013; Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann et al.,
2012; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002): one should (1) foster the accurate encoding of item-source
pairings by providing the differentiating, individuating source information during learning
(e.g., which specific person is young or old), and (2) raise awareness by intentionally in-
structing participants to remember the source (in addition to the items). Besides these,
the source-memory performance (Kuhlmann et al., 2016) and the subjective judgments
of item-source contingencies during learning (Arnold et al., 2013; Klauer & Meiser, 2000)
have been shown to serve as additional experimental boundary conditions that modulate
knowledge reliance in source guessing (on an individual level).
In summary, the aim of this thesis is to gain systematic insights into the nature of
knowledge reliance in source guessing. Before turning to the research conducted in the four
manuscripts, the basics of multinomial modeling are reviewed in the following chapter as
it builds the statistical foundation throughout all manuscripts.
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Figure 1: 2HTSM adapted from Bayen et al. (1996). Parameter D = probability to
remember the item, parameter d = probability to remember the source, parameter b =
probability to guess the old-new status of the item, parameter a and g = probability to
guess the source. Subscripts of the respective tree refer to the different item types used
in source-monitoring tasks—originating from source A, B, or neither source as the item is
new.

93 Statistical Approach: Cognitive
Modeling of Source-Monitoring Processes
[...] estimating hypothetical parameters that
represent the probabilities of unobservable events.
(Riefer & Batchelder, 1988)
3.1 Multinomial Processing Tree (MPT) Models
Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models are widely-used instances of measurement
models that make latent cognitive processes underlying behavior explicit. MPT models
thereby assume that the categorical responses follow a multinomial distribution; the ex-
pected probabilities for each response category are modeled by a processing tree (Erdfelder
et al., 2009; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988).
As it happens, around the same time as M. K. Johnson et al. (1993) proposed the theo-
retical framework, William H. Bachelder and his colleagues developed the idea of making
cognitive processes, one of which source monitoring is, mathematically measurable (e.g.,
W. H. Batchelder et al., 1994; W. H. Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988;
Riefer et al., 1994). The authors decisively drove the development of formalized stochastical
models to account for the confounding of memory and judgment processes in categorical
response data (as collected in source-monitoring tasks). A multinomial model for source-
monitoring data was then provided by Bayen et al. (1996). The so-called two-high-threshold
multinomial model of source monitoring (2THSM; Bayen et al., 1996) explicitly assumes
that a threshold needs to be passed in order to detect a presented item in source-monitoring
tasks as either old or new; otherwise, if the threshold is not passed, decisions are made in
a state of uncertainty. In addition, a threshold for detected-old items can only be passed
by old items and a threshold for detected-new items can only be passed by new items (cf.
Bayen et al., 1996).
Due to its relevance for the overarching research question (variants and extensions of
this model are applied to all experiments that were conducted within the scope of this
thesis), a closer inspection of the model is worthwhile. Figure 1 illustrates the general
structure: Items can either originate from one of two sources or are new. Four distinct
latent cognitive processes underlying the attributions in a source-monitoring task shape
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the response behavior. Memory processes can encompass either item memory (parameter
D) or source memory (parameter d), the same applies to judgment processes that can be
influenced either by item guessing (parameter b) or source guessing (parameter a and g).
Researchers in the area of cognitive and social psychology have used this particular model
to answer substantive research questions with regard to memory and judgment processes
in source monitoring and have thereby had the benefits of its mathematical tractability
and profound statistical properties (Calanchini et al., 2018; Erdfelder et al., 2009; Hütter
& Klauer, 2016). For the 2HTSM, model fit can easily be quantified by goodness-of-fit tests
and its (memory and guessing) parameters have been extensively validated (Bayen et al.,
1996), and adapted and applied to multiple paradigms and various research questions since
then.
The application of MPT models in psychological science has become even more power-
ful since simple hands-on software programs have become available (e.g., Moshagen, 2010;
Singmann & Kellen, 2013) implementing the standard parameter estimation algorithm
relying on the maximum likelihood (Hu & Batchelder, 1994). Recently, MPT estimation
has been optimized for extended application purposes (e.g., to model individual or item
differences, or to test single parameters and incorporate parameter correlations; cf. Hart-
mann et al., in press; Heck, Erdfelder, et al., 2018; Klauer, 2006, 2010; Klauer & Kellen,
2018; Matzke et al., 2015; Stahl & Klauer, 2007; Wickelmaier & Zeileis, 2018).
3.2 Bayesian-Hierarchical Extension of MPT Models
In recent years, researchers have identified Bayesian approaches to model cognitive pro-
cesses. Amongst others, Klauer (2010), Lee (2011, 2018), Lee and Wagenmakers (2013),
Matzke et al. (2015), and Smith and Batchelder (2010) promoted the application of
Bayesian statistics to model cognitive processes including those involved in source moni-
toring. Traditional maximum-likelihood approaches in MPT modeling (Hu & Batchelder,
1994) infer parameter estimation from aggregated categorical responses across participants
and items. This is inevitable from a mathematical point of view as parameter estimation
requires a substantial data base to be precise and powerful in terms of model fit. Nonethe-
less, inherent assumptions which coincide with this estimation algorithm can be regarded
as critical (e.g., Klauer, 2006; Smith & Batchelder, 2010)—at least when observations for
participants and items are heterogeneous and thus not identically and independently dis-
tributed (i.i.d.). The beauty of current developments of Bayesian-hierarchical estimation
within the scope of MPT modeling is the explicit account for this heterogeneity of partic-
ipants and items by the assumption of a hierarchical group-level parameter distribution
with separate estimates per individual and/or items. Parameters are based on individ-
ual and group-level information ("partial pooling"), thereby ensuring robust estimation
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(Rouder & Lu, 2005).
One of the most prominent representatives of such model classes which has been ap-
plied to source-monitoring data is the latent-trait model proposed by Klauer (2010). The
latent-trait model accounts not only for the heterogeneity but also for correlations between
parameters assuming that the vector of individual parameters (probit-transformed) follow
a multivariate normal distribution (prior) with group mean µ and variance-covariance ma-
trix Σ to be estimated from the data. A graphical illustration of the Bayesian hierarchical
model structure is provided in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Conceptual illustration of Bayesian hierarchical model structure. µ = pa-
rameter group means, Σ = parameter variance-covariance matrix, θ = parameter vector
for the i -th individual, k = categorical responses for the i -th individual, n = number of
observations per i -th individual.
This modeling approach is certainly appealing for multiple reasons: Scientists who are
interested in answering substantive research questions can benefit from it because (1)
individual differences or rare populations with only small numbers of observations (such
as patients or age groups), (2) parameter correlations, and (3) correlations of parameter
and external variables (such as age, intelligence scores, or working-memory capacity) can
be estimated. Furthermore, the latent-trait approach can be easily adapted and extended
to various model specifications and is implemented in the user-friendly software program
TreeBUGS (Heck, Arnold, et al., 2018). The statistical model that is applied throughout all
manuscripts of this thesis is a latent-trait extension of the 2HTSM (Bayen et al., 1996). The
memory and guessing parameters of the 2HTSM are estimated based on Bayesian inference
on the posterior distribution of the parameters. That is, the prior assumptions about the
parameter distributions are updated on the basis of the empirical evidence in the collected
data. With the help of Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods samples from the
posterior distribution are drawn resulting in interpretable statistics of parameter estimates
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(Heck, Arnold, et al., 2018). In addition, TreeBUGS can be considered a powerful tool to
judge the diagnosticity of the information provided by the data via parameter-recovery
simulations. Researchers can simulate categorical response data for their experimental
paradigm and quantify the extent to which the model is able to recover these values.
Thereby, the replicability of the results found in a present sample can be assessed after
the data collection (or prior to the experiment as an orientation for the planned sample
size).
In general, for the sake of comparability across experiments, we follow the same step-
by-step procedure for model-based analyses in each manuscript. The latent-trait model
(Klauer, 2010) is set up and run in TreeBUGS (Heck, Arnold, et al., 2018) with the
following specifications: three MCMC chains were sampled simultaneously with 20,000
iterations each, a thinning rate of 5, and an adaptation phase of 2,000 iterations (number
of samples to adjust MCMC sampler in JAGS, Plummer, 2003). This basic model is run
in loop until the pre-defined convergence criterion of Rˆ < 1.05 (Gelman & Rubin, 1992) is
reached. In addition, one additional sampling cycle is run to ensure convergence stability.
The sampling procedure starts from scratch if the convergence criterion is not met within
an upper bound of 10 resampling attempts. Model fit (i.e., whether the model and its
imposed parameter restrictions) is assessed with Bayesian posterior predictive p-values for
the mean (T1 statistic; difference between observed and expected mean frequencies) and
covariance structure (T2; summed difference between observed and expected covariances;
standardized by expected SD) of the categorical response data (cf. Klauer, 2010).
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4 Rethinking Source Guessing: The
Nature of Knowledge-Based Biases
What determines the amount of source bias that
people show in source-monitoring tasks?
(Spaniol & Bayen, 2002)
The focus of the research question proposed in my thesis is to inspect the nature of knowl-
edge reliance in source guessing to improve the understanding of reconstructive guessing
biases in the source-monitoring literature. To answer this research question, the statistical
tools applied to draw substantive conclusion can be best described as state of the art. By
using these methods, source guessing can be examined in more depth and, at the same
time, meet the increasing request to study individual differences and to combine cognitive
process and their predictor variables within a joint theoretical and statistical framework.
This thesis is comprised of four manuscripts that are outlined in the following sections.
Note that the emphasis of the now following manuscripts is set on specific aspects of source
guessing in the literature to derive the research question proposed in this thesis.
4.1 Cognitive Dynamics
Wulff, L., & Scharf, S. E. (2020). Unpacking stereotype influences on source-monitoring
processes: What mouse tracking can tell us. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, 87, 103917. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103917
In the first manuscript, we take an initial step in the direction of the underlying nature of
knowledge reliance in source guessing by exploring the cognitive dynamics of stereotype
influences on source monitoring. To do so, we conducted a source-monitoring task in which
participants learned and later attributed information to its origin. While being tested for
their source-monitoring performance, cursor movements were tracked—potentially reveal-
ing commitment towards or conflict between sources.
This first manuscript served as a starting point for answering the question which mecha-
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nisms may be at play and describe source-monitoring decisions more detailed. The dynamic
evolution of cognition is hardly captured by static, categorical response data but can be
mirrored in the cursor movements during decision scenarios. Hence, the process-tracing
method of mouse tracking is well suited to reflect the ongoing decision processes in real
time (cf. Hehman et al., 2015; Kieslich et al., 2019; Maldonado et al., 2019; Stillman et al.,
2018; D. U. Wulff et al., 2019). Task-specific cognitive processes are mapped to motor re-
sponses reflecting the latter (Spivey & Dale, 2006) that can be quantified and interpreted
as the activation of (competing) social information.
In a previous study, Freeman and Ambady (2009) tested participants’ gender categoriza-
tion via mouse tracking. Participants sorted faces into social categories. Precisely, they at-
tributed female and male faces to expected-feminine (e.g., caring) and expected-masculine
(e.g., aggressive) features. In typical trials, in which the facial appearance was congruent to
the associated personality description, participants showed less curved mouse movements
towards the competing response option reflecting the opposing gender than in atypical
trials. In the latter, participants were nonetheless spatially attracted towards the stereo-
typical response option. Thus, Freeman and Ambady (2009)’s findings illustrated that
pre-experimental knowledge tied to gender impacts the real-time dynamic of social cate-
gorization. Further evidence was provided by Koop and Criss (2016). The authors studied
whether mouse tracking could mirror the sensitivity and response bias in recognition-
memory processes (within the signal-detection theory framework). Participants learned
words that they later had to remember as either old or new while their cursor movements
were tracked during testing. And, in fact, the initial deviation towards one response option
indicated the response bias: If items were mostly old and previously presented, participants
adapted their response bias which was also reflected in the tendency towards old response
option.
Mouse tracking has been successfully applied in various research domains, which, among
other domains, include social cognition (e.g., Cassidy et al., 2017; Cloutier et al., 2014;
K. L. Johnson et al., 2012; Wojnowicz et al., 2009) and memory (e.g., Abney et al.,
2015; Papesh & Goldinger, 2012). While acknowledging the importance of both research
domains for this thesis, we also note that, to the best of our knowledge, no study has
focused on source monitoring and mouse tracking until now. Although highly related to
simple recognition memory, source monitoring may encompass more complex cognitive
processes that go beyond the old-new classification and that should merit attention and
are worth examining with the recently developed process-tracing measures.
In this first manuscript, we therefore inspected whether decisional uncertainty between
sources during source attributions is reflected in the dynamics of cursor movements in
a joint statistical model with source-monitoring processes and process-tracing indices as
their predictors.
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Participants performed a source-monitoring task, in which they learned everyday state-
ments as belonging either to a young or an old person (without revealing the specific
assignment of the ages to the sources during encoding). The statements were normed to
be expected for younger (“I rarely get sick.”) or older adults (“I go to church every Sun-
day.”) and both item types were paired with each of the sources equally often (inducing a
null contingency). In a later sequential memory test, participants first classified each item
among new distractor items as old or new and then assigned the items previously classified
as old to their origin while their cursor movements were continuously tracked during the
source-attribution decision as implemented with the mousetrap plug-in (Kieslich et al.,
2018) in the open-source experiment builder OpenSesame (Mathôt et al., 2012).
The inspection of source attributions and the influence of stereotypes on such via multi-
ple process-tracing indices (e.g., maximum deviation of trajectories, distributional analysis
of prototypical trajectories, reaction times) underpinned previous observations: the stereo-
typical and -atypical features reflected in both the item content and source label during
source attributions prompted participants to consider both sources during the course of
their decision as indicated by different-curved trajectories based on the typicality of the
to-be-judged item and the responses given (see Figure 3). The deviations of the cursor
trajectories from the ideal path to the selected source (as measured by the Maximum
Absolute Deviation, MAD) revealed that, indeed, the non-selected source was (at least to
some extent) still taken into account when inferring the item origin based on stereotypical
features (in line with e.g., Cassidy et al., 2017; Freeman & Ambady, 2009; Freeman et al.,
2010).
In addition, modeling source-monitoring processes and process-tracing indices in a joint
statistical framework displayed an interesting pattern: For source decisions, mouse move-
ments were substantially related to the retrieval of sources based on contextual knowledge
they had previously encoded, ρˆ = −.36 [−.58,−.09] (correlation of MAD and model based
source-memory parameter d; BCI adjusted for sampling error). That is, decisional un-
certainty between sources, measured as the maximum deviation from the idealized line
towards the selected response option, was less pronounced in case participants had actual
memory for the source and, therefore, experienced less cognitive conflict in their choice.
Mouse movements, however, were not reliably indicative of source guessing. Uncertainty
inherent to the source attribution which is based on guessing due to lacking source memory
was not mapped onto mouse movements, ρˆ = .21 [−.10, .46] (correlation of MAD and model
based source-guessing parameter g; BCI adjusted for sampling error). In sum, cognitive
conflict did not vary as a function of the strength of knowledge reliance (i.e., stereotype
application) in source guessing but did so with regard to participants’ source-memory
performance.
Beyond that, bimodality assessment of trajectories and the distribution of prototypical
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Figure 3: Manuscript I – Mouse-tracking index Maximum Absolute Deviation (MAD) as
a function of the correctness of the source attribution and consistency of the age reflected
in the item and the source’s age aggregated across items/participants. Left panel: Posi-
tive values of MAD indicate spatial attraction towards the non-selected source, 0 (dashed
line) indicates the idealized straight line towards the selected source, negative values in-
dicate spatial attraction towards the selected source. Corresponding error bars represent
standard errors (displayed in black), individual values per participant are displayed in
grey (points = age-consistent item-source combinations, triangle = age-inconsistent item-
source combinations). Right panel: Temporal dynamic of mouse trajectories based on the
horizontal and vertical cursor position (in pixels) for correct (orange) and incorrect (blue)
source attributions separate for age-consistent item-source combinations (dashed line) and
age-inconsistent item-source combinations (solid line).
trajectory shapes highlighted another striking feature of the present data. Trajectories
could be classified in two main prototypes: curved and discrete change-of-mind trajectories.
So, rather smooth or abrupt shifts in the spatial attraction shaped cursor movements
predominantly. This dual trajectory-type pattern may tentatively be interpreted as an
indicator of underlying dual processes (Freeman et al., 2008; Freeman & Dale, 2013) that
reflects consistency in the initial and later response tendency for straight trajectories and
a correction of the initial categorization for change-of-mind trajectories. Of course, the
derivation of underlying distinct process classes based on trajectory distributions needs
to be treated with caution. Nonetheless, our results provide a comprehensive picture of
stereotype influences on source monitoring in general and serve as a first indication of the
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underlying nature. Certainly, source memory is singled out as a crucial precondition for
unbiased source guessing through pre-experimental knowledge in the form of stereotypes.
This first manuscript can be considered as an essential first step to unpack the underlying
nature of knowledge reliance in source guessing and its findings provided important diag-
nostic information towards a more systematic and targeted examination of source guessing
in isolation. We demonstrated that mouse tracking is a promising avenue to follow up on in
the future if combined with recent advances in cognitive modeling (e.g., Heck, Erdfelder,
et al., 2018) and its application should be considered to augment traditional analyses in
a stimulating manner if the psychological mechanisms behind cognitive processes are of
interest.
4.2 State versus Trait
Wulff, L., & Kuhlmann, B. G. (2020). Is knowledge reliance in source guessing a cognitive
trait? Examining stability across time and domain. Memory & Cognition, 48 (2),
256–276. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-019-01008-1
In the second manuscript of this thesis, we test whether knowledge reliance in source
guessing could be characterized as a cognitive trait (cf. Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014)—
indicated by parameter stability across time and knowledge domain. Derived from the
literature on variables in judgment and decision making of trait-like nature (Glöckner &
Pachur, 2012; Odum, 2011; Scheibehenne & Pachur, 2015), stability on decision strategies
(e.g., old-new response bias) across temporal and situational contexts may be hypothesized
for source guessing as well due to the its similarity to other processes for which stability has
been reported (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014; Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016). Thus,
a considerable body of research has focused on response biases and individual differences
in the criterion sensitivity. As source guessing has been referred to as a "response bias"
in the literature as well (cf. W. H. Batchelder & Batchelder, 2008), the question arises to
what extend knowledge reliance in itself can be described as trait-like stable which has
not undergone a systematic examination yet.
In two experiments, participants therefore performed two study-test cycles of a source-
monitoring task—either separated by a certain time interval, to test stability across time
(Experiment 1), or varied in the knowledge domain depicted in the stimulus material,
to test stability across knowledge domains (Experiment 2). Both source-monitoring tasks
were comparable with regard to their general procedure.
In Experiment 1, participants performed both study-test cycles processing item and
source information based on the knowledge domain of age stereotypes. Statements (=
items) were highly comparable in terms of their expectancy ratings for either young or
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old adults (Kuhlmann et al., 2017). We manipulated between-subjects whether both tasks
needed to be performed in the same session (separated by 10 minutes) or in single sessions
held seven days apart. Using this manipulation, we were able to test the temporal stability
of knowledge reliance in source guessing across a short- and rather long-term time period.
In Experiment 2, participants performed the first study-test cycle processing item and
source information based on the knowledge domain of age stereotypes and the second
one based on gender stereotypes (separated by 10 minutes). Albeit slightly different in
the overall expectancy ratings for age groups (Kuhlmann et al., 2017) and gender groups
(statements normed in Experiment 1), both study-text cycles were nonetheless highly
comparable in terms of their stimulus material. Using this manipulation, we were able
to test the content-independent stability of knowledge reliance in source guessing across
knowledge domains.
In addition, personality traits measured with the Big-Five inventory (Danner et al.,
2016; Rammstedt et al., 2020; Soto & John, 2017), cognitive processing styles measured
with the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Epstein et al., 1996; Keller et al., 2000), and
the subjective contingency judgments assessed at the end of the experiments were incor-
porated as external variables in each experiment’s respective model-based analysis. We
thereby tested whether knowledge reliance in source guessing can be (partially) explained
by participants’ character facets.
The data were analyzed in a joint MPT model for both tasks with respective parame-
ters for each study-test cycle (i.e., model equations were duplicated) to allow for parame-
ter correlations of which the correlation of both source-guessing parameters (i.e., one for
each study-test cycle) was of most interest to test our research question. Apart from the
correlation-based definition of stability (which largely hinges on the variability in source
guessing in the total sample), a more rigid definition of stability could, furthermore, im-
ply consistency in source guessing in absolute terms (i.e., whether source guessing varied
within participants across tasks—irrespective of the overall relative group-level tendencies
as covered by parameter correlations).
The relative stability of knowledge reliance in source guessing for both experiments is
illustrated graphically in the upper panels of Figure 4, the absolute stability is displayed
in the lower panels. Correlation-based stability was not revealed by the data of both cross-
task time conditions of Experiment 1 (ρˆ < .27; BCI included 0), the absolute difference
measure, however, suggested cross-task stability (at least to some extent). A closer inspec-
tion of participants’ source-guessing biases demonstrated that the majority of individuals
relied on their pre-experimental knowledge about ages in source guessing that was some-
what comparable across time (10 minutes and seven days). In Experiment 2, a cross-task
correlation of credible but small size was obtained. This result indicated that knowledge
reliance on age stereotypes in source guessing in the first task predicted the strength of
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Figure 4: Manuscript II – Stability in source guessing (parameter g) across two study-test
cycles in two experiments. Upper panel: relative measure of stability based on parameter
correlation; lower panel: absolute measure of stability based on parameter differences. Grey
points represent individual parameter estimates, linear trend line with error bars represent
standard errors.
knowledge reliance on gender stereotypes in the second task (ρˆ = .30 [.07, .53]). The abso-
lute difference supplemented the results for the relative stability: Most participants showed
a fairly constant level of knowledge reliance on both age and gender stereotypes in source
guessing across tasks.
Both experiments uncovered, if at all, weak positive associations of knowledge reliance
across two source-monitoring tasks when measured with a correlation-based approach. The
results added more evidence in terms of stability using an absolute measure of constant
guessing behavior—regardless of the time between study-test cycles or the reflected knowl-
edge domain. But still, a substantial portion of the interindividual variance in knowledge
reliance in source guessing could not be explained by stable judgment processes across time
and knowledge domain. Other processes involved in source monitoring, most of which was
old-new item recognition (parameter b), indeed reflected stronger trait-like stability. What
is more, none of the personality traits or cognitive processing styles were related to source
guessing in a systematic manner in both experiments; the subjective contingency judgment
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partially did so (as indicated by positive correlations with source guessing). Whereas source
guessing clearly encompasses trait-like features, it could not be described as fully trait-like
as other closely related cognitive processes (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014; Michalkiewicz
& Erdfelder, 2016). It rather appears to be an adaptive tool used in specific situations and
for which knowledge reliance varies (to a certain extent) within and between individuals.
4.3 Automatic versus Controlled
Wulff, L., & Kuhlmann, B. G. (2020). Is knowledge reliance in source guessing automatic
or controlled? Evidence from divided attention and aging. Manuscript submitted for
publication.
In the third manuscript of this thesis, we consider whether knowledge reliance in source
guessing depends on cognitive resources (as an indicator of an automatic versus controlled
cognitive process; following Bargh, 1994) during source attributions. For the preregistered
experiment as described below, both types of knowledge reliance are studied more closely:
peri-experimental contingency knowledge and pre-experimental stereotype knowledge. The
automatic (i.e., resource-independent) or controlled (i.e., resource-dependent) nature of
both source cues is further examined within younger and older adults thereby obtaining a
comprehensive view of knowledge reliance in source guessing from multiple perspectives.
The question to what extent (pre-experimental) knowledge reliance in source guessing
is rather automatic or controlled has been raised and empirically tested in the past (Bayen
& Kuhlmann, 2011; Bröder et al., 2007; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Marsh et al., 2006;
Sherman et al., 2003; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). The majority of the few existing studies on
the pre-experimental knowledge reliance have characterized its nature as rather controlled
(e.g., resource-dependent and conscious strategy) but evidence from Marsh et al. (2006)
and Klauer and Ehrenberg (2005) suggest that an automatic reliance may be also likely.
Empirical evidence on the nature of stereotypes (see, for instance, Bodenhausen et al.,
1999; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994), and age stereotypes in particular (Gonsalkorale et al.,
2014; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990), underpins this assumption in
addition. Furthermore, the nature of contingency influences on source guessing has not
yet been well examined and the question whether the stereotype counteraction through
contingency knowledge is resource dependent thus remained unanswered in the past.
For these reasons, the nature of both forms of knowledge reliance as source cues were
studied. We did so by experimentally inducing cognitive load at retrieval and testing
naturally-emerging load due to cognitive declines in older age. Importantly, none of the
aforementioned studies examined the nature of knowledge reliance based on (age) stereo-
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types in both younger and older adults.
In a source-monitoring task, participants of both age groups learned age-stereotypical
statements from a young and an old person (as used in Manuscript I and II; see respec-
tive sections above). Half of the younger-participants sample (18−26 years) performed a
secondary, parallel (tone-monitoring) task during source attributions, the other half did
not. Crossed with this manipulation, the specific source information (ages) was provided
either before encoding or before testing (between-subjects) as information during encoding
facilitates contingency detection (e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann et al., 2012).
This encoding manipulation was also applied to the older-adults sample (61−80 years).
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Figure 5: Manuscript III – Estimates of source guessing (parameter g) for the following
experimental conditions: YA (younger adults) and OA (older adults) refer to the par-
ticipants’ age group, enc (encoding) and ret (retrieval) refer to the encoding-condition
manipulation (i.e., whether the specific source information was revealed before encoding
or at test), and full and div refer to the dual-task manipulation at test (i.e., whether par-
ticipants performed a parallel tone-monitoring task or not; only manipulated in younger
adults). Red dashed line = chance-level, unbiased source guessing, parameters > .50 indi-
cate stereotype-based source guessing, parameters < .50 indicate counter-stereotype-based
source guessing. Group-level parameter means are displayed as bars, individual parameter
estimates are displayed as dots. Corresponding error bars represent the 95%-BCI.
Figure 5 illustrates the model-based results for both age groups. For younger adults,
the probability-matching account (Spaniol & Bayen, 2002) was replicated: In case the
22 4 Rethinking Source Guessing: The Nature of Knowledge-Based Biases
accurate perception of item-source contingencies was prevented (i.e., specific ages of the
sources only provided at test), their source guessing was based on stereotype knowledge
whereas facilitating the detection of the contingency (specific ages of the sources already
provided at encoding) led to a reliance on contingency knowledge in source guessing. A
division of attention based on the dual-task implementation during the source-monitoring
test neither affected the strength of contingency-based source guessing (resulting from
specific source information at encoding) nor stereotype-based source guessing (resulting
from specific source information only at test). The use of a dual-task manipulation at
retrieval thereby helped to unpack the underlying automatic nature.
Whenever participants were able to perceive the item-source contingency in an accurate
manner (i.e., source ages presented already at encoding), they based their source guessing
on this contingency knowledge. Otherwise, they drew on their stereotype knowledge when
guessing the source of an item. Importantly, they applied both knowledge cues independent
of the cognitive resources available at test, implying the automatic nature of the judgment
process. Older adults, however, strongly relied on stereotype knowledge in source guessing
and were less successful in counteracting stereotype influences through contingency knowl-
edge than younger adults. Hence, older adults did not apply contingency knowledge in a
fully automatic manner to their guessing behavior when they actually could have relied
on the available source information at encoding.
With this third manuscript, we stressed the independence of knowledge reliance in source
guessing from cognitive capacities at the time of retrieval—at least in younger adults who
could make use of the item-source contingency perceived during encoding to "unbias" their
source guessing. By this, we demonstrated that stereotype reliance can be overcome by
enhancing attention to actual behaviors and attitudes of different-aged target persons (at
least in younger adults). Older adults whose general reliance on stereotype knowledge was
already more pronounced than for younger adults were not able to decrease their guessing
bias to accurate chance level based on the perceived item-source contingency. The present
findings reinforce the value of unaffected encoding of information and context for source
guessing to be reliant on individualized knowledge acquired in the moment of encoding and
not on generalized knowledge acquired prior to the experiment that, in turn, potentially
misleads the source-attribution process.
4.4 Generalization to Novel Stimuli
Wulff, L., Bell, R., Mieth, L., & Kuhlmann, B. G. (2020). Guess what?! Different source-
guessing mechanisms for old versus new information. Manuscript in preparation.
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In the fourth and last manuscript of this thesis, we investigate whether the item-source
contingency encountered during the course of encoding can be transferred to source de-
cisions for new information that has not been processed and, thus, accompanied by any
source in the course of the experiment.
Albeit Spaniol and Bayen (2002) proposed a theoretical account on the use of differ-
ent cues for source guessing—that was confirmed by empirical evidence, for instance from
Bayen and Kuhlmann (2011) and Kuhlmann et al. (2012)—up until recently, no assump-
tions were formulated and tested about source guessing for new information for which
a source needs to be inferred. Bell et al. (2020) recently proposed a theoretical exten-
sion of the probability-matching account (Spaniol & Bayen, 2002) for source guessing for
detected-new items. In their studies, Bell et al. (2020) presented face images with profes-
sion labels of a farmer or a lawyer (as items) that were associated with expected-farmer,
expected-lawyer, or unexpected behavioral statements for either profession (as sources).
The authors adapted the subsequent memory test so that participants indicated the item
status first (“old” versus “new”) followed by a source attribution for both old and new
items—irrespective of their decision about the item status. Their data modeled with an
adapted three-sources model variant of the 2HTSM (Bayen et al., 1996; Keefe et al., 2002)
with separate source-guessing parameters for detected-old and detected-new items (Bell et
al., 2020) showed that participants considered the item-recognition status in their source-
guessing behavior. That is, they applied contingency knowledge only to those items that
they detected as old (i.e., probability matching) but relied on the schematic knowledge
about the professions as a default guessing strategy for detected-new items.
What remained unanswered is whether the pre-experimental knowledge was applied to
novel stimuli, because forced to make a source attribution for these items, as individuals
could not build an appropriate perception of the item-source contingency due to the large
number of unique pairings of faces and behaviors without specific and constant individu-
ating source information during encoding that could, in turn, be transferred and applied
to new items.
To rule out this explanation, we conducted a source-monitoring task using the well-
established doctor-lawyer paradigm (Bayen et al., 2000) in which participants learned
and later attributed expected-doctor and expected-lawyer information to either of three
constant sources (the doctor, the lawyer, and an unnamed third person). By presenting
information from constant and known sources, we aimed to test the generalization of
the probability-matching account to novel decision contexts with distinct sources—given
that we usually interact with recurring, specific (and oftentimes known) individuals in
real life. That is, is knowledge reliance in source guessing based on peri- experimental
contingency knowledge or pre-experimental stereotype knowledge in source attributions for
novel, context-independent, information? In a source-monitoring task, participants learned
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everyday statements as belonging to either of three sources: the doctor (= physician), the
lawyer, or a third unknown person who was not described in any further detail. The
doctor and lawyer were accompanied by black-and-white images showing two similarly-
looking adult men (see Bayen et al., 1996), a name, and profession label; the third unknown
source was presented without an image, a name, and profession label. The statements were
normed to be expected either for the profession of a doctor (“Your blood pressure is too
high.”) or a lawyer (“I have to be in court at 9am.”) in a survey study by Kuhlmann et al.
(2012). Both item types were paired with each of the three sources equally often (inducing
a null contingency). In a later memory test, participants attributed each item among new
distractor items to either of the three sources. One feature of the source-attribution test is
of particular importance as it differed from the paradigms used throughout the first three
manuscripts: Whenever an item was classified as new, the procedure forced participants
nonetheless to attribute the novel information (either expected-doctor or expected-lawyer
items) to either source. Even though participants could not draw on contextual source
memory for these instances (as the information has never been presented with any source
before), they should make their decision based on a simple guess for the source from which
they nonetheless thought that the statement would originate.
In order to infer the cognitive processes underlying participants’ categorical responses
for old and new items in the source-monitoring task, we also analyzed the data with the
extended three-sources model variant of the 2HTSM (Bayen et al., 1996; Keefe et al., 2002)
by Bell et al. (2020). This model extension explicitly assumes separate source-guessing
parameters for old and new items (detected or guessed as such), therefore, enabled us to
estimate source guessing for both item-recognition states in particular.
As can be seen in Figure 6, the status of the item recognition was incorporated into
source guessing: For those items that were detected as old (parameter a
E
), participants
based their guessing behavior on the item-source contingency reflected in the stimulus
material (i.e., probability matching). For those items that were detected as new (e
E
),
participants based their guessing behavior on pre-experimental knowledge about the pro-
fessions of a doctor and a lawyer. Thus, the learning history of the equal presentation of
both item types by specific source exemplars could not be used to generalize its applica-
tion to decision contexts for unstudied information. Instead, the profession schema mostly
biased source guessing for detected-new items. This finding was also observed for items
that were not remembered and their old-new recognition status therefore initially needed
to be guessed (parameters g
OE
and g
NE
).
The last manuscript offers new opportunities to rethink and question the external valid-
ity of knowledge reliance in source guessing which is the generalization of the probability-
matching account to new information when a source attribution is required. Replicat-
ing recent findings from Bell et al. (2020), this study demonstrated that generic, pre-
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Figure 6: Manuscript IV – Source-guessing parameters of the source monitoring MPT
model for detected-old and detected-new items (adapted from Bell et al., 2020). Estimates
represent source guessing for the expected (E) source depending on the recognition status
(old vs. new) of items that were either detected or guessed. a
E
= probability of guessing the
expected source given that the item was recognized in the first place; g
OE
= probability of
guessing the expected source given that the item was guessed to be old; e
E
= probability of
guessing the expected source given that the item was detected to be new; g
NE
= probability
of guessing the expected source given that the item was guessed to be new. Red dashed line
= chance-level, unbiased source guessing, parameters > .50 indicate schema-based source
guessing, parameters < .50 indicate counter-schema-based source guessing. Group-level
parameter means are displayed as bars, individual parameter estimates are displayed as
dots. The error bars represent the 95%-BCI.
experimental knowledge predominantly biased source guessing in situations where partic-
ipants were not able to use previously-encountered contextual cues for their source attri-
butions. The contingency knowledge was not even transferred to source decisions for novel
information from known source exemplars for which participants have built an association
between item types and the sources’ characteristic that, in principle, could have provided
the precondition to rely on contingency knowledge in source guessing also for new decision
contexts. This last manuscript thereby disclosed a restriction of the scope of application
for the probability-matching account to old items.
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5 General Discussion
[...] Knowledge structures [...] provide
invaluable backup to episodic memory.
(Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999)
In this dissertation thesis, I endeavor to address the nature of knowledge reliance in source
guessing in a systematic way within a joint overarching theoretical framework. By means of
multifaceted methodological approaches and recent statistical advances applied throughout
the manuscripts, this thesis contributes to creating a holistic picture of the specificities of
knowledge reliance in source guessing and broadens the understanding of its underlying
mechanisms. Whereas judgment processes in source monitoring have often been modeled
as, more or less, nuisance parameters with limited informational content to substantive
research questions about source-monitoring processes (cf. W. H. Batchelder & Batchelder,
2008), we demonstrate the high degree of adaptivity of knowledge reliance across a wide
range of application fields and influencing factors—thereby further qualifying guessing as
“important inferential processes in reconstructive memory decisions” (Meiser et al., 2007, p.
1037). Moreover, the use of state of the art analytical tools, unmask notable interindividual
and intraindividual differences in knowledge reliance in source guessing and their potential
predictors.
In Manuscript I (L. Wulff & Scharf, 2020), we explore the influence of pre-experimental
knowledge in forms of age stereotypes on source attributions with the increasingly popu-
lar process-tracing method of mouse tracking. We test whether cursor trajectories mirror
the decisional uncertainty between sources due to cognitive conflict arising from the op-
posing social categories of "prototypically young" and "prototypically old". The research
conducted in Manuscript I confirmed that the strength of decisional uncertainty is weak-
ened due to individuals’ memory performance but can be less described as a function of
individuals’ knowledge reliance in source-guessing behavior.
In Manuscript II (L. Wulff & Kuhlmann, 2020a), we examine whether source guessing
can count as a trait-like response bias and, by this, implies stability in the extent to which
individuals rely on knowledge structures in case source memory fails. We quantify the
stability of participants’ knowledge reliance in source guessing across two study-test cycles
of source-monitoring tasks varying the time lag or knowledge domain in between. Further,
derived from the literature on trait-like variables in judgment and decision making, we
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take into account that source guessing can be potentially explained by personality traits
and cognitive processing styles. The research conducted in Manuscript II confirmed that
source guessing encompasses somewhat stable features but can by far not be characterized
as trait-like to the same extent as other variables (e.g., old-new response bias) have been
in the past.
In Manuscript III (L. Wulff & Kuhlmann, 2020b), we broaden the scope of source cues
which individuals can presumably make use of from pre-experimental knowledge to peri-
experimental knowledge (item-source contingency perceived during encoding). We look
into the underlying automatic or controlled nature of both pre- and peri-experimental
knowledge reliance in source guessing with regard to its resource dependence. We do so by
implementing a dual task during source attributions at retrieval and, in addition, focus-
ing on aging as a natural "dual-task" condition. Further, we assess whether participants
benefit from specific source information provided already at encoding to counteract in-
fluences of knowledge acquired prior to the experiment on source guessing. The research
conducted in Manuscript III confirmed that the application of knowledge in the situation of
attributing information to its origin is mostly driven by automatic, resource-independent,
cognitive operations. This is true for both contingency-based and stereotype-based source
cues. Contingency knowledge can counteract stereotype knowledge in younger adults if
preconditions are met (specific source information given at encoding) to accurately per-
ceive the item-source contingency. This finding, however, is not entirely applicable to older
adults whose source guessing does not benefit from the contingency perception to the same
extent as source guessing for younger adults does.
In Manuscript IV (L. Wulff et al., 2020), we test source guessing for new information
for which no contextual cues are available emerging from the item-source contingency in
the learning history of the experiment’s encoding phase. By setting out the conditions
to build an accurate item-source contingency during encoding processing various infor-
mation from constant and specific source exemplars, we investigate the generalization of
the probability-matching account (Spaniol & Bayen, 2002) to novel stimuli. That is, we
study whether participants base their source guessing on contingency rather than stereo-
type knowledge when a source attribution is required also for new information of already
known sources. The research conducted in Manuscript IV confirmed that participants
consider the recognition status of the item in their source-guessing behavior: They guess
mostly based on contingency knowledge for detected-old items but draw on stereotype
knowledge for detected-new items revealing that they do not abstract and transfer the
contingency knowledge associated with known sources and acquired during the course of
the experiment to novel decision contexts.
In summary, this dissertation thesis contributes a crucial piece in the puzzle of how
knowledge reliance affects source guessing. Based on the empirical evidence reported in the
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four manuscripts, knowledge reliance in source guessing is rather (1) unrelated to decisional
uncertainty caused by stereotype knowledge tied to age categories, (2) to some extent
stable across time and knowledge domains, (3) used in an automatic manner detached from
cognitive capacities, and (4) not generalizable to source attributions for novel information
from specific, known source exemplars.
5.1 Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
Besides the substantive gain in learning about the nature of source guessing, this thesis
provides a decisive methodological foundation by means of cognitive modeling of source-
monitoring processes in addition; namely estimating hierarchical MPT models based on
Bayesian statistics. Source-monitoring processes, from which source guessing was of high-
est priority for the present thesis, were modeled (1) separately for each individual, (2)
accounting for parameter correlations, and (3) accounting for correlations with external
variables such as process-tracing indices (Manuscript I), personality traits and cognitive
processing styles (Manuscript II), or subjective contingency judgments (Manuscript II,
III, IV). One by-product of this thesis which should be acknowledged as a strength is
that knowledge reliance in source guessing within the domain of age stereotypes is pro-
nounced to a comparable extent across manuscripts (Manuscript I, II, and III). Whereas
the reproducibility of an age bias in source guessing is not the main focus of this thesis, it
nonetheless demonstrates its robustness of knowledge reliance in source guessing—despite
individual differences. The latter display an additional advantage of the methodological
approach followed in this thesis. We are able to study source guessing also on an individual
level, for which data of the respective manuscripts are made publicly available on the Open
Science Framework (OSF). These data may serve the interest of the scientific community
and the purpose of reproducible research—particularly important in times of a replication
crisis in psychological science (Open Science Collaboration, 2015).
In the same vein, another favorable characteristic of the statistical approach in combi-
nation with the user-friendly software tool TreeBUGS (Heck, Arnold, et al., 2018) became
apparent: parameter-recovery simulations. As power analyses in the Bayesian MPT frame-
work neither exist in the classical sense nor may they be appropriate for each individual
case (see Wagenmakers et al., 2015, for a discussion), simulation-based analyses are of great
significance. Of course, simulations are informative to determine the required sample size
prior to data collection given the true parameters of interest are known. These, however,
cannot be taken for granted—particularly not if researchers suffer from a lack of reference
concerning previous studies as an orientation for parameter values. In these cases and due
to potentially inconclusive results, as demonstrated in the first two manuscripts of this the-
sis, post hoc parameter-recovery simulations can be a valuable instrument to quantify the
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extent to which the obtained empirical evidence is considered robust and reliable—both
from a perspective of a basic researcher who seeks to answer a research question to the best
of their knowledge and from a perspective of trustworthy and openly-communicated results
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015). This thesis can be seen as an application example of
such analyses to explicitly account for potential limitations in the precise measurement
and estimation of cognitive processes and source guessing in particular.
Albeit this thesis lays a solid foundation for a more profound understanding of knowl-
edge reliance in source guessing, the research conducted within the scope of the four
manuscripts can only be considered as a starting point for many more, prospective studies
that can adapt the study’s experimental manipulations, procedure, or stimulus material,
to be compared with the results outlined here and presented in the respective manuscripts
in greater details. In the following, I address three notable challenges that have emerged
in this thesis and which solving should be incorporated in future research.
First, the present thesis is mostly restricted to the knowledge domain of age stereotypes.
This inherently poses the question of the generalization of the present findings to other do-
mains. However, based on the source-monitoring literature, there is not any indication why
the proposed underlying mechanisms in source guessing should necessarily differ between
knowledge domains. Thus, the findings should not be limited to the special case of age
stereotypes (which, nonetheless, needs to await to be backed up by appropriate empirical
evidence). Rather, I am convinced that the use of this item material is beneficial at least
for two reasons. Notably, the verbal stimuli (i.e., everyday statements) come closely to how
we process information in our social environment and is therefore more tailored to transfer
the results to actual behavioral consequences with regard to source attributions outside of
the laboratory setting. I am aware, however, that there are of course knowledge domains
(e.g., scene or profession schema) that, in general, trigger more pronounced biases (Bayen
et al., 2000; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Küppers & Bayen, 2014; Schaper et al., 2019) for
which it would be also of great interest to look at source guessing more closely. Moreover,
this thesis primarily focused on age stereotypes for the sake of their content and societal
relevance in everyday contexts. I elaborate on the implications of this knowledge domain
in Section 5.2.
Second, modeling source-monitoring data with more advanced tools (than the ones ap-
plied in this thesis) enables prospective research to draw conclusions about the nature
of the involved cognitive processes on a more fine-grained level. Recently, promising ap-
proaches have been proposed by Hartmann et al. (in press), Heck, Erdfelder, et al. (2018),
and Klauer and Kellen (2018). In particular, supplementing the approaches used in in
Manuscript I (L. Wulff & Scharf, 2020), in which we studied the cognitive dynamics of
source-monitoring processes with mouse tracking, with more sophisticated analyses to ex-
amine the influence of pre-experimental knowledge on source guessing even more detailed
5 General Discussion 31
certainly would increase the validity of the results. For instance, with generalized process-
ing tree models (Heck, Erdfelder, et al., 2018) discrete, categorical data can be modeled
jointly with continuous variables (such as process-tracing indices) given a suitable task set
up and, hence, data structure (which did not apply to Manuscript I). Another example of
how the outlined research could benefit from model-based extensions in upcoming studies
is to incorporate reaction times into MPT models as recommended by Klauer and Kellen
(2018) and Hartmann et al. (in press). This method is highly valuable because the order
in which processes occur can be modeled explicitly (Klauer & Kellen, 2018). In the par-
ticular case of resource dependence of knowledge reliance in source guessing (Manuscript
III; L. Wulff & Kuhlmann, 2020b), the temporal order of source-monitoring processes is
particularly interesting with regard to their rather automatic (e.g., fast) or controlled (e.g.,
slow; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) nature (as already highlighted by
Spaniol & Bayen, 2002).
Third, due to the novelty of the research questions proposed in the four projects, a
null-contingency manipulation (50%:50% distribution of item types to either source) is
introduced as baseline. This necessity to study unbalanced item-source contingencies (i.e.,
75% of each item type to either source) can be put up for discussion. More specifically,
the application of such a less pronounced stereotype-based item-source contingency dur-
ing encoding could trigger counter-stereotype guessing which, in turn, should be studied
with disruption at retrieval once again (as done in Manuscript III; L. Wulff & Kuhlmann,
2020b). The variation in the distribution of item types to sources would be—from my
point of view—of most interest to be studied in the following. The empirical evidence
suggesting an automatic nature of knowledge reliance could be supplemented by load
manipulations. In fact, an intriguing additional question would be to examine whether
individuals adapt their source-guessing behavior to the ratio of counter-stereotype exem-
plars presented by each source in a first step replicating previous research (e.g., Bayen &
Kuhlmann, 2011; Bayen et al., 2000; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005). But what would add on
the already-acquired evidence on the nature of source guessing, is to investigate the impact
of such counter-stereotype contingencies on source guessing under divided attention. Do
individuals in the specific situation of knowledge application during retrieval attempt to
implement the counter stereotype into their source-guessing behavior or, nonetheless, stick
to their pre-experimental stereotypes? Answering this question in future studies is sensible
from a perspective of a basic researchers but would be also highly informative by means
of potential real-life implications. If individuals fall back on pre-experimental knowledge
in source guessing under limited cognitive capacities (be it induced through experimental
or more natural settings such as aging)—irrespective of the encoded counter-stereotype
contingency—it would challenge the effectiveness of potential interventions counteracting
the reliance on pre-experimental knowledge (as, for instance, successfully demonstrated by
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an explicit stereotype negation instruction; Marsh et al., 2006).
5.2 Implications of Knowledge Reliance
As raised before, a potential danger is linked to biased source guessing in real life, especially
in situations of uncertainty in source attributions where the stereotype or schema is applied
as default guessing strategy. This may be rational and adaptive given that these knowledge
structures oftentimes lead to correct source attributions. But stereotypes (and schemas)
can be also referred to as simplification of our social life (cf. Bordalo et al., 2016) neglecting
individual differences and context dependence. By this, they can crucially be considered a
misleading cue for source attributions to a certain extent. Namely, to stick to the knowledge
domain of age stereotype as an example, whenever individuals do not behave as commonly
expected for their age-group membership, stereotypes and schemas become an invalid an
potentially harmful source-decision cue. Those individuals are mistakenly associated with
behaviors and attitudes that do not fully or in any way at all account for their true
personality features. Remarkably, even if individualized information from specific sources
is acquired in the past, future inferences for these sources are nonetheless most likely based
on generic, prototypical knowledge about the social categories that this person belongs to
(L. Wulff et al., 2020). This lack of transfer from knowledge based on previously-learned
information to applied to novel information is undoubtedly critical. Misattributions, even
innocently acquired and applied, can then have severe implications in various areas—
reaching beyond the setting or situation in which a source attribution is made. For instance,
biased source attributions can harm future impression formation about people because
“if perceivers cannot attribute behaviors to their proper source, then they cannot form
accurate impressions of other people. [...] Moreover, perceivers might not have the time
or resources to sift through the details of their memories to disentangle the contexts”
(Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999, p. 109). In the longer run, resistant misattributions may
then shape general (implicit and explicit) attitudes resulting in a maintenance or even
reinforcement of such stereotypes in society with “obvious negative implications for the
individuals who are stereotyped” (Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999, p. 110). For age stereotypes,
significant implications were reported for the stereotyped age groups in the literature (e.g.,
wrongful convictions; Lamont et al., 2015; Levy, 2009; Swift et al., 2017; Swift et al., 2012).
The severity of source misattributions due to uncertainty while attributing information
to its original context is even more critical when it comes to the legal decision-making
context. In case of eyewitness testimony in which marginal details in the progression of
events can be decisive at court, misattributions based on general knowledge can have
serious consequences to the affected person (groups; Lindsay, 1990, 1994, 2014; Lindsay &
Johnson, 1989; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; Sherman et al., 2003). Sherman and Bessenoff
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(1999) aptly described the use of stereotype cues during source attributions as a “double-
edged sword that trades off efficiency and accuracy” (p. 110). Nonetheless, the costs of
knowledge reliance in source guessing due to missing accuracy are mostly unstudied and
one can only speculate about the long-term implications of misattribution in society (e.g.,
Levy et al., 2015).
This thesis brings light into the darkness and provides a remedy for potential costs of
knowledge reliance for various reasons. Throughout all manuscripts, and thus knowledge
domains, the extent to which participants relied on pre-experimental knowledge varied
considerably between individuals. This means of course that some individuals strongly
guess based on stereotypes but others do not. They are not biased in either direction
or even show counter-stereotype guessing. Moreover, whereas we observed some trait-like
stability of source guessing across time and knowledge domains in Manuscript II (L. Wulff
& Kuhlmann, 2020a), knowledge reliance could not be undoubtedly characterized as highly
stable indicating variation also within individuals. Once again, biased source guessing is not
an inevitable backup for (source-)memory failure whose pronounced state-like, situational,
determinants need to be addressed in future assessments. Finally, we identified the accurate
encoding of item-source contingencies as a crucial factor for unbiased source guessing as
most evident from Manuscript III (L. Wulff & Kuhlmann, 2020b) and in line with previous
studies ( e.g., Arnold et al., 2013; Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann et al., 2016;
Kuhlmann et al., 2012; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). The relevance of item-source contingencies
acquired during the learning phase is emphasized arising from the automatic counteraction
of stereotype influences through contingencies. If preconditions are met for their accurate
perception, source guessing is mostly based on the item-source contingency (a tendency
that is observed even in older age) but if they are not met (or the contingency knowledge
is not transferred to novel stimuli without a contextual representation), pre-experimental
knowledge influences step in. This underpins the subtle role of unbiased encoding in source
guessing and lays, together with other predictor variables, the foundation for effectively
designing counter-knowledge based interventions targeted to these multifold influences
bearing in mind the pronounced individual differences.
5.3 Conclusion
In this thesis, I contribute to the current status quo of judgment processes in source
monitoring by uncovering the nature of knowledge reliance in source guessing within a
superordinate theoretical and statistical framework. This thesis herein is an important step
towards the understanding of biases in judgment processes during source attributions. It
can thereby serve as an inspiration for future research on reconstructive inference processes
in the memory and decision-making context, and in source monitoring in particular—both
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from a basic research perspective but also in terms of applied settings—and initiates
how to effectively rule out these biases in judgment processes if ultimately leading to
misattributions.
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A B S T R A C T
The goal of this study was to understand the cognitive dynamics of stereotype influences on source monitoring
employing mouse tracking. By continuously recording cursor movements, we examined how stereotypical
knowledge influences decision uncertainty when processing and later remembering stereotype-consistent and
-inconsistent exemplars of the age categories of “young” and “old”. In a source-monitoring task, participants
(N = 60) learned age-stereotype consistent or -inconsistent statements from two different-aged sources (young
vs. old person) that they attributed to their original sources via mouse clicks in a later memory test. Our results
showed that individuals experienced cognitive conflict during source attributions depending on both the cor-
rectness of the source response and whether the original source was (in)consistent with the stereotype of the
respective age group reflected in the statement. This pattern of results was supplemented by the analysis of
prototypical mouse-trajectory clusters. Modeling individual source-monitoring processes revealed that in-
dividuals' experienced conflict was less pronounced when they remembered the source and was unrelated to
guessing resulting from memory failure. These results highlight the benefits of combining cognitive modeling
and process-tracing techniques to unpack the mechanisms behind social influences on source monitoring. The
methodology of mouse tracking illuminated the role of stereotypes in the underlying cognitive processes during
source attributions that is not evident from discrete categorical responses. For designed counter-stereotypical
interventions, process-tracing methods may also be used to test their effectiveness on cognitive processes in-
volved in source monitoring.
1. Introduction
In our daily life, we face a constant stream of information. When
later remembering a piece of information, it is often important to know
the source of the information in order to judge the quality or trust-
worthiness of the just-remembered information. Yet it is often hard to
remember a source and it has been shown that people use prior
knowledge, such as stereotypes, relevant to the piece of information to
make an informed guess as to what the source of this information is
(e.g., Kuhlmann, Bayen, Meuser, & Kornadt, 2016). This use of prior
knowledge has been observed, for instance, in the domain of age ste-
reotypes in that people are more likely to guess that statements such as
“I am discontent with my health” were said by an older person than by
a younger person based on the consistency of the stereotype reflected in
the statement and the person's age (Kuhlmann et al., 2016). Although
remembering a stereotype-consistent source for a piece of information
seems innocent enough, a systematic misapplication of stereotypical
knowledge through biased source guessing may contribute to the per-
sistence and reinforcement of stereotypes over time (e.g., Levy, Slade,
Chung, & Gill, 2015) with potentially detrimental effects on the affected
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person (groups). For instance, older adults perform worse when they
are aware of their age-group related negative stereotypes (see Lamont,
Swift, & Abrams, 2015, for a meta-analytic review). Up to now, the
nature of stereotype influences on source-monitoring processes has not
been fully understood. How exactly do individuals process and attribute
previously acquired stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent information
to people of alternate social groups? Do they consider stereotype-con-
sistent and -inconsistent information during their source attribution? Do
they experience decision conflict in a state of memory failure or ste-
reotype-biased source guessing? And, if so, to what extent is decision
uncertainty related to individuals' proneness for stereotype influences
on their guessing behavior? Process-tracing methods may provide one
possibility to study the cognitive dynamics of source attributions and
may contribute to break down the underlying processes involved in it.
Assuming that mouse movements reflect ongoing decision processes
(Kieslich, Henninger, Wulff, Haslbeck, & Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2019;
Wulff, Haslbeck, Kieslich, Henninger, & Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2019),
real-time measurement of cognition via mouse tracking may foster the
understanding of how stereotypes influence source-monitoring pro-
cesses. Mouse tracking may reveal whether processing and re-
membering information from different-aged sources elicits conflict
when these sources are associated with stereotype-consistent informa-
tion for some instances and stereotype-inconsistent for others. Keeping
in mind that the biased inference of conforming attitudes and behaviors
may promote the persistence or reinforcement of stereotypes, the ex-
amination of cognitive dynamics may allow researchers to design ef-
fective intervention tools to counteract stereotypical influences on
source-monitoring processes in the future. In the following, we will first
introduce the theoretical background of stereotype influences on source
monitoring and then highlight how mouse tracking can help to get a
clearer picture of the processes involved in it. We then propose com-
bining both to study cognitive conflict associated with the reliance on
stereotypes during source attributions.
1.1. Source monitoring
The cognitive processes that are at play when attributing informa-
tion to sources (e.g., who told you something?, where did you read
something?) are summarized under the term source monitoring (M. K.
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). According to the source-mon-
itoring framework (M. K. Johnson et al., 1993), source attributions can
be based on memorized contextual details (e.g., of spatial or temporal
nature) or on prior knowledge such as stereotypes (beliefs about per-
sonal attributes of social groups; cf. Stroebe & Insko, 1989) and schemas
(mental structures that organize and link information based on previous
experience; cf. Alba & Hasher, 1983). Diverse studies have demon-
strated that source attributions are indeed based on stereotypes/
schemas (e.g., age stereotypes: Kuhlmann et al., 2016; gender stereo-
types: Marsh, Cook, & Hicks, 2006; social attitudes: Ehrenberg &
Klauer, 2005; political attitudes: Klauer & Ehrenberg, 2005; and pro-
fession schemas: Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang, 2000). Individuals
make use of these stereotypes/schemas to attribute information to
sources by eliminating and, thus, reducing the potential candidates for
the origin of the information (cf. Marsh et al., 2006). Thinking back to
the introductory example of remembering the person who told you “I
am discontent with my health”, may lead you to guess that it must have
been your grandparents rather than your colleague in his 20s. Stereo-
typical knowledge, such as older people generally talking more about
health-related issues (e.g., medication), makes it more likely to attri-
bute the information to the typical and stereotype-consistent source. A
common finding is that source attributions are better for stereotype/
schema-consistent information (e.g., an older person talking about
medicine) than for stereotype/schema-inconsistent information (e.g., an
older person talking about physical activity). The source-attribution
benefit for these typical statement-source combinations, however, may
be due to better memory or knowledge-based (e.g., stereotype-based)
guessing of the source (M. K. Johnson et al., 1993).
To answer the question of whether actual memory or biased gues-
sing is responsible for the benefit in attributing typical statement-source
combinations, multinomial processing tree (MPT) models can be used.
MPT models separately estimate these memory and guessing processes
based on categorical source-attribution data (Batchelder & Riefer, 1990;
Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996). These categorical data can be
collected in an experimental paradigm (such as the one used by
Kuhlmann et al., 2016) in which participants learn everyday statements
that are either typical for younger or older adults presented by two
person sources. After the study phase, the specific ages (e.g., 23 vs.
70 years old) of the sources are revealed before, in a later memory test,
participants attribute the statements to either source or classify them as
new (described in more detail in Kuhlmann et al., 2016). An MPT
model-based analysis showed that the beneficial performance for ty-
pical statement-source combinations was due to stereotype-biased
source guessing rather than better source memory (Kuhlmann et al.,
2016).1 That is, if participants did not remember the original source,
they were more likely to guess the stereotype-consistent one. For an
overview of experimental evidence on stereotype and schema-based
typicality effects in source monitoring refer to Kuhlmann and Bayen
(2016). Most of the few existing studies point in the direction of source
guessing being characterized by more systematic/controlled processing
(e.g., defined as rather slow, deliberate, resource-dependent; Bargh,
1994) than heuristic/automatic (e.g., defined as rather fast, uninten-
tional, resource-independent; Bargh, 1994) use of prior knowledge
(e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Spaniol &
Bayen, 2002; but see also Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; for a theoretical
overview, see M. K. Johnson et al., 1993; M. K. Johnson & Raye, 2000).
For instance, Spaniol and Bayen (2002) studied the nature of source-
monitoring processes focusing on the time course of item memory and
schema-based source guessing using a response-signal method. The
authors found that a schema bias in source guessing emerged after the
onset of item memory, suggesting that the influence of knowledge takes
more time to evolve and, thus, relies more strongly on systematic/
controlled processing.
1.2. Mouse tracking
One approach to study the nature of cognitive processes in real time
is mouse tracking, an increasingly popular process-tracing method.2
Mouse tracking continuously maps dynamic motor responses to task-
related cognitive processing (Spivey & Dale, 2006) which has been
referred to as “hand in motion reveals mind in motion” (Freeman, Dale,
& Farmer, 2011, p. 1; but see Wulff et al., 2019). Mouse tracking seeks
to quantify cognitive conflict arising from inconsistent information.
This conflict or, put differently, the co-activation of the unchosen re-
sponse option, is assumed to be reflected in the spatial deviation of
1 Schemas/stereotypes can also influence source memory. If an item is very
atypical for the source it was presented with, then attention is drawn to the
item-source combination due to violation of expectations. As a result, source
memory may be better for atypical combinations (inconsistency effect, e.g., Bell,
Buchner, Kroneisen, & Giang, 2012; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Kroneisen &
Bell, 2013), whereas the source-guessing bias nevertheless emerges.
2 Just to name a few examples of research areas mouse tracking has been
successfully applied to: language & numerical processing: Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey,
2007; Farmer, Cargill, Hindy, Dale, & Spivey, 2007; Faulkenberry, 2014; social
cognition: Cloutier, Freeman, & Ambady, 2014; Freeman & Ambady, 2009,
2011, 2014; Freeman, Ambady, Rule, & Johnson, 2008; Freeman, Pauker,
Apfelbaum, & Ambady, 2010; K. L. Johnson, Freeman, & Pauker, 2012; decision
making: Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, & Goschke, 2013; Szaszi, Palfi, Szollosi,
Kieslich, & Aczel, 2018; Tabatabaeian, Dale, & Duran, 2015; reasoning:
McKinstry, Dale, & Spivey, 2008; perception and attention: Huette & McMurray,
2010; memory: Abney, McBride, Conte, & Vinson, 2015; Koop & Criss, 2016;
Papesh & Goldinger, 2012).
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mouse trajectories from an idealized straight line (Stillman, Shen, &
Ferguson, 2018). For instance, in a study on gender categorization by
Freeman and Ambady (2009), participants attributed male and female
faces (e.g., typical-male faces vs. feminized, and therefore atypical,
male faces) to feminine and masculine-stereotype labels (e.g., caring vs.
aggressive). In sex-atypical trials (e.g., feminized male faces) mouse
trajectories were spatially more biased (curved) towards the opposite-
gender stereotype label (e.g., caring) compared to sex-typical trials
revealing a parallel activation of the stereotype knowledge related to
the sexes. This real-time dynamic of social categorization has been re-
ported for explicit stereotypical attitudes (e.g., Cloutier et al., 2014;
Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Freeman et al., 2010; Freeman, Pauker, &
Sanchez, 2016; Wojnowicz, Ferguson, Dale, & Spivey, 2009), also
varying as a function of personally-held prejudices (Cassidy, Sprout,
Freeman, & Krendl, 2017), and implicit attitudes (e.g., Yu, Wang,
Wang, & Bastin, 2012). Based on stereotype-induced cognitive conflict,
mouse movements also have been used to predict actual consequential
behavior (e.g., voting behavior: Hehman, Carpinella, Johnson, Leitner,
& Freeman, 2014; trust: Freeman et al., 2016).
2. Overview of the current experiment and research questions
As outlined above, the influence of prior knowledge on cognitive
processes in source monitoring is one approach to study stereotyping on
a memory-based level. Starting from the assumption that the influence
of age stereotypes on source monitoring may be disclosed through
cognitive conflict that is tracked by mouse movements, we conducted
an experiment including a source-monitoring task with age-stereo-
typical item material. The real-time recording of cursor movements
opens up the possibility to inspect the spatial attraction towards the
unchosen source. Additionally, we model the relationship of mouse
trajectories and the cognitive processes involved in source attributions.
Hypothesis 1. As described earlier, Freeman and Ambady (2009)
reported that individuals considered both gender-stereotypical and
atypical knowledge while categorizing faces to character traits as
indicated by more curved mouse trajectories towards the opposing
sex when processing inconsistent information. In line with Freeman and
Ambady (2009), we expect to find a comparable result transferred to
our experimental paradigm using a source-monitoring task based on
age stereotypes. First, we hypothesize that the cognitive conflict when
processing stereotype-inconsistent statement-source combinations also
maps onto mouse movements. That is, when indicating which source
presented a statement, the experienced cognitive conflict and, thus, the
curvature of mouse trajectories should be more pronounced if the age
depicted in the item material is inconsistent with the originally
presenting source's age. We assume that this increased cognitive
conflict stems from the simultaneous activation of stereotypical
knowledge tied to the age categories.
Hypothesis 2. Current evidence points towards source guessing using
prior knowledge under uncertainty in a systematic/controlled way
(e.g., Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). Therefore, we predict that a stronger
influence of stereotypes on source guessing reflects a more extensive
integration of underlying knowledge in source attributions and should
lead to more experienced conflict when faced with stereotype-
consistent and -inconsistent information. Due to this assumed
cognitive conflict, individuals with stronger stereotype-biased source
guessing should show an increased spatial attraction towards the
stereotype-consistent source. Applying a Bayesian-hierarchical MPT
model (Klauer, 2010), we, thus, cautiously predict that biased
guessing should be positively correlated with curved mouse
movements but are aware of the exploratory character of this
research question when interpreting the results.
3. Methods
3.1. Materials
For the source-monitoring task, we chose age-stereotypical state-
ments from a previous survey study by Kuhlmann, Kornadt, Bayen,
Meuser, and Wulff (2017), in which the authors examined the multi-
dimensionality of age stereotypes held by younger and older adults
based on typicality ratings for these statements. The latter were gen-
erated based on life domains that reflect different behaviors and atti-
tudes (e.g., “I am financially independent” reflecting the life domain
“finances” and the adjective dimension “autonomy”). Given that we
only tested young participants, we used statements that were rated as
typical for either young or old people by the 69 younger adults from the
survey study. We defined a statement as “typical” when the mean
statement rating (on a scale from 1 = very atypical to 5 = very typical)
was> 3.3 for one (target) age group (e.g., young person) and, at the
same time,< 2.8 for the other (target) age group (e.g., old person). For
more information on the procedure and the creation of these typicality
ratings, see Kuhlmann et al. (2017). Applying this cut-off criterion, the
remaining item set consisted of 118 statements, from which we ran-
domly selected 90 statements. Sixty served as to-be-learned in the study
phase and 30 as distractors in the test phase. Out of these 90 statements,
we created three lists - comparable in their mean ratings for both
(target) age groups (pairwise comparisons of the latter for each of the
three lists; all p-values > .11). Each list consisted of 30 statements, 15
statements reflecting typically-young behavior and 15 statements re-
flecting typically-old behavior. For each participant, two lists served as
to-be-learned in the study phase (one for each source), the remaining
list served as distractors in the test phase. Analogous to Kuhlmann et al.
(2016), “Christian” and “Michael,” two middle-aged German first
names (norms retrieved from Rudolph, Böhm, & Lummer, 2007), served
as source labels.
3.2. Design and procedure
The experimental design was a 2 (source age: young vs. old) × 2
(age stereotypicality: typicality reflected in statement consistent vs.
inconsistent with respective source age) within-subjects design. Source
label (Christian vs. Michael), source age (23 vs. 70 years old), color of
the source label (yellow vs. green), position of the yes-no response and
the sources in the test phase (left vs. right), and assignment of the three
statement lists as two study and one distractor list(s) were counter-
balanced between subjects. The experiment was programmed with
OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) and run on compu-
ters with a screen resolution of 1920 × 1080 pixels. We tracked par-
ticipant's mouse movements using the open-source mouse-tracking
package mousetrap added to OpenSesame as plug-in (for a detailed
overview of the mousetrap package, see Kieslich & Henninger, 2017).
The mouse set-up was adjusted to default settings on each computer
(acceleration turned on, medium speed). Position of the mouse cursor
was recorded every 10 ms. Participants were tested individually in
groups up to 10, and initially provided informed consent before com-
puterized instructions explicitly informed them about a subsequent
memory test.3 In the study phase, we presented the 60 statements, 30
typical for a young person (e.g., “I rarely get sick”), and 30 typical for
an old person (e.g., “I go to church every Sunday”). Half of the typi-
cally-young and typically-old statements were presented with Christian
as source and the other half with Michael, respectively (= zero con-
tingency between sources and statement typicality). After studying,
instructions for the source-memory test followed and participants
3We did not provide participants with an intentional source-memory in-
struction because this has been shown to reduce guessing bias (e.g., Kuhlmann,
Vaterrodt, & Bayen, 2012).
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learned the specific source age (young: 23 years/old: 70 years). We
used a two-stage response format and presented statements blocked for
each stage. In a recognition stage, participants first had to decide
whether a statement had been presented before or not. The response
options “YES” (indicating that a statement was old) and “NO” (in-
dicating that a statement was new) were constantly shown on the top
left and right corners of the screen. Thus, participants could reach them
without overshooting the option. Responses were indicated via mouse
click on one of the two options. In each trial, participants first had to
click on the question “Have you seen this statement before?” in the
bottom of the screen, then the statement appeared. The reset of the
mouse to a starting position after each trial ensured that the cursor had
the same distance from both response options in each trial.
In a second stage, we informed participants that they now had to
remember the source of each statement they had classified with “YES”
before. Participants initially clicked on the question “Whom of the
sources presented the statement before?” to see the statement and in-
dicated their source attribution immediately. The response options
“CHRISTIAN” and “MICHAEL,” and their respective age were again
constantly shown in the upper corners of the screen. A graphical il-
lustration of the procedure is displayed in Fig. 1. We presented state-
ments in randomized order. The number of statements recognized as
“old” thereby predefined the trial number of the source-attribution
stage. Participants were instructed to react fast and did not receive error
feedback. They completed the entire source-monitoring task approxi-
mately within 30 min, filled out a demographic questionnaire and were
debriefed. In exchange for their participation, participants received
either course credit or a monetary compensation.
3.3. Measures and analyses
3.3.1. Mouse tracking
Mouse-tracking data were preprocessed as recommended by
Kieslich and Henninger (2017) and Kieslich et al. (2019). We computed
the Maximum Absolute Deviation (MAD; e.g., Freeman & Ambady, 2010)
of all trajectories, which is the maximum distance between the ob-
served trajectories and the idealized straight line from the start button
to the response option. The MAD is used as an index of the spatial at-
traction towards the unchosen response option (Kieslich et al., 2019),
and is assumed to indicate the difference in activation of competing
response alternatives (e.g., Spivey, Dale, Knoblich, & Grosjean, 2010).
In this interpretation, large MAD (i.e., strong curvature) would indicate
that both response alternatives were substantially co-activated and,
therefore, cognitive conflict was present.
For all mouse-tracking analyses, we compared trials in which the
age of the originally presenting source was consistent or inconsistent
with the age reflected in the statement.4We further took the correctness
of the source attribution (correct vs. incorrect attribution of the state-
ment to either source) into account.5 In an exploratory manner, we
tested whether participants' mouse trajectories were generally more or
less biased in correct and incorrect source attributions and whether
both factors (consistency and correctness of response) would interact.
As there were multiple observations per participant and per statement
Study Phase:
Item Recognition (Old-new discrimination):
Source Attribution:
MICHAEL:
“I go to church every Sunday.”
CHRISTIAN:
“I rarely get sick.”
Have you seen this statement
before?
YES NO
Click here
“I go to church every Sunday.”
YES NO
Whom of the sources presented 
the statement before?
CHRISTIAN 
(70 years)
MICHAEL 
(23 years)
Click here
“I go to church every Sunday.”
CHRISTIAN 
(70 years)
MICHAEL 
(23 years)
Fig. 1. Example visualizations of the source-mon-
itoring task set-up. On the top, an example of the two
types of sources in the study phase is included. In the
second row, an example of the recognition stage is
presented. The bottom row shows exemplar screens
of the source-attribution stage. We included three
practice statements at the beginning and the end of
the study phase to control for primacy (Anderson &
Barrios, 1961) and recency effects (Greene, 1986).
Statements appeared on the screen for 4000 ms with
an inter-stimulus interval of 250 ms.
4We removed distractor statements that were incorrectly recognized as old
(corresponded to 9.60% of all trials) from these analyses because these state-
ments were not presented by any source and, thus, have systematically missing
values on the consistency factor.
5 Even though it is common practice in the literature to only analyze correct
trials as it simplifies the interpretation of curved mouse movements (i.e., at-
traction towards the “typical” category; e.g., Dale et al., 2007; Dignath, Pfister,
Eder, Kiesel, & Kunde, 2014; Freeman & Ambady, 2011), we decided to not
discard incorrect trials for the following reasons: Source monitoring is a com-
plex memory task, we, therefore, expect a considerable number of incorrect
source attributions compared to, for instance, semantic or facial categoriza-
tions.
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from the source phase for each of the dependent variables in both types
of observations (consistent vs. inconsistent statement-source combina-
tions and correct vs. incorrect responses), we used linear mixed models
for analyses with consistency, correctness of the response, and their
interaction as predictors.6
3.3.2. Multinomial modeling of source monitoring
We applied the Two-high-threshold multinomial model of source
monitoring (2HTSM) from Bayen et al. (1996) to disentangle memory
and guessing parameters. For a visualization of the model-tree structure
adapted to our study, see Fig. 2. The most parsimonious identifiable
2HTSM submodel (for an overview of all possible submodels, see Bayen
et al., 1996) explains the observed categorical responses with only four
latent parameters that reflect distinct cognitive processes. Parameter D
(= item memory) measures the probability of recognizing a statement
as old or as new, knowing that the presented statement is a distractor.
With the complementary probability (1 − D), the statement is not re-
cognized as old or new. In this case, the status of a statement is guessed
to be either old (parameter b) or new (1 − b) because the source can
also not be remembered without item memory (e.g., Malejka & Bröder,
2016). Parameter d (= source memory) measures the probability of
remembering the source of a statement that has been recognized as old.
If the source is not remembered (1 − d) or the statement has been
guessed to be old (b), the status of the source is guessed to be either
typical (g) or atypical (1 − g) for the respective statement-source
combination. Summarizing, item memory is assumed to be equal for
statements that are presented with the age-consistent source (i.e., ag-
gregate of typically-young statements presented by the “young” source
& typically-old statements presented by the “old” source), with the age-
Fig. 2. Two-high-threshold multinomial model of
source monitoring. DT= probability of recognizing a
statement that had been presented by the typical,
stereotype-consistent source; DA = probability of
recognizing a statement that had been presented by
the atypical, stereotype-inconsistent source;
DN = probability of knowing a statement is new;
dT = probability of correctly remembering the
source of a statement that had been presented by the
typical source; dA = probability of correctly re-
membering the source of a statement that had been
presented by the atypical source; b = probability of
guessing that an unrecognized statement is old; g/
a = probability of guessing that a (un)recognized
statement had been presented by the typical source.
Source: Adapted from Bayen et al. (1996).
6 Both, consistency and correctness, were effect-coded with +1/−1 (+1:
correct/consistent; −1: incorrect/inconsistent) in all linear mixed model ana-
lyses. To account for inter-trial dependencies, we included random intercepts
for participants as well as random intercepts for statements. To determine
whether the addition of random slopes improved model fit, we implemented the
maximum random-effects structure for each model first and then reduced the
complexity of the model by removing the random slopes with the least variance
until the model converged. We then tested whether including the random slopes
improved model fit with Likelihood Ratio Tests for nested models. For the
models reported here, including random slopes did not improve model fit. More
details on the used procedure can be found in the uploaded analyses scripts:
https://osf.io/85936/?view_only=214fa149e30748cbbd07852c43fab419.
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inconsistent source (i.e., aggregate of typically-old statements presented
by the “young” source & typically-young statements presented by the
“old” source) and those that are new (aggregate of typically-young and
-old statement distractors). Source memory for age-consistent and age-
inconsistent statements, as well as source guessing for remembered and
unremembered statements, is assumed to be equal, too (DT = DA = DN;
dT = dA; g = a). This submodel has been used elsewhere with similar
experimental paradigms (e.g., Kuhlmann et al., 2016; Spaniol & Bayen,
2002) and for analyses aggregated across item types (e.g., Ehrenberg &
Klauer, 2005; Kuhlmann et al., 2016; Schaper, Kuhlmann, & Bayen,
2019; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002).
To account for individual differences, we applied the latent-trait
MPT model from Klauer (2010) - a Bayesian-hierarchical approach of
multinomial modeling.7 This approach treats individual parameters as
random effects. The separate source-monitoring parameter estimates
per individual are constrained by population-level parameters assumed
to follow a multivariate normal distribution of probit-transformed
parameters as prior distribution with a mean and covariance matrix to
be estimated from the data (a conceptual illustration of the general
model structure is displayed in Appendix A but see Klauer, 2010, for a
theoretical foundation and statistical details).8 Based on this multi-
variate prior, the latent-trait approach considers individual parameters
and their correlations jointly in one model. Additionally, correlations
with continuous, external predictors, such as mouse-tracking indices,
can be easily modeled. Based on the Markov-chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithm, samples from the posterior distribution of para-
meters can be drawn. The latent-trait MPT model with the submodel
described above applied to our data showed a good model fit (as in-
dicated by non-significant Bayesian posterior predictive p-values >
.05; see Appendix B for model-fit details) and outperformed a more
differentiated model without aggregating across statement types (see
also Appendix B for a model comparison and model-based results for
the more differentiated model).
3.4. Participants
Determining effect sizes and appropriate power analyses for linear
mixed models is not trivial (Brysbaert & Stevens, 2018). Thus, we opted
to determine the required sample size for our first hypothesis by con-
sidering a roughly equivalent, non-trial based analysis, namely a paired
t-test for the effect of statement-source consistency on MAD. Compared
to Freeman and Ambady (2009), who found an effect of (stereo-)typi-
cality on mouse trajectories of dz = 0.71, we proposed a more con-
servative effect size of dz = 0.50, due to the complexity of the item
material. Thus, when setting equal Type I and Type II error rates of
α = β = .05, the required sample size is N = 45 (as determined with
G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). For our second
hypothesis, a rough equivalent (to the correlation in the hierarchical
Bayesian MPT model) is a frequentist (Pearson) correlation analysis. If
we assume a moderate true correlation of r = .3 (^ in the Bayesian
framework) for the average MAD and source guessing with α= .05 and
a power = .80, the required sample size is N = 64.9 We decided to
orient our aspired sample size to the required larger N. Due to time
constraints, we were only able to collect data from a total of 60 un-
dergraduate students (41 females, Mage = 21.62 years, age range:
18–28). The obtained sample size yielded high statistical power
(1 − β= .98) to detect a medium effect of dz = 0.50 in the paired t-test
and high statistical power (1 − β = .78) to detect a moderate corre-
lation of source-monitoring processes and covariate(s).
4. Results
All analyses were conducted using R (R Core Team, 2018). The
mouse tracking related analyses were done using the mousetrap package
(Kieslich et al., 2019; Wulff et al., 2019). Linear mixed model analyses
were conducted with the lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015)
and the lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017).
Posthoc tests for the mixed models were conducted using the emmeans
(Lenth, 2019). The hierarchical MPT model analyses were conducted
with the TreeBUGS package (Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2018). All plots
were based on ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016) as well as on the mousetrap
(Kieslich & Henninger, 2017) and afex package (Singmann, Bolker,
Westfall, & Aust, 2018).
4.1. Do age stereotypes elicit decision uncertainty in source attributions?
On average, participants' accuracy for the old-new discrimination
was high. They classified 81.11% (SD = 6.66) of the statements cor-
rectly as old or new and attributed 61.38% (SD = 16.79) of the
statements to the correct source.
We ran a linear mixed model to test our first hypothesis and ex-
pected to find a significant, negative regression coefficient for the
predictor consistency. For an overview of the linear mixed model re-
sults, see Table 1. Contrary to our prediction, consistency did not show
a significant effect on MAD. However, there was a significant interac-
tion of the factors correctness and consistency, b = -25.95, t(2634.83)
= −3.34, p< .001 (see Fig. 3). To further investigate this interaction
effect, we ran post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni-Holm
corrected p-values (tested two-sided). MAD for consistent statement-
source combinations were significantly smaller for correct than for in-
correct source attributions, indicating less experienced conflict, t
(2631) = −3.57, p = .002. Furthermore, consistent and inconsistent
statement-source combinations differed significantly when the source
attribution was correct, such that trajectories were more curved for
inconsistent than for consistent statement-source combinations, t
(2578) = −3.80, p = .001 (please refer to Fig. 4 for a schematic
breakdown of the interaction pattern).
4.2. Does stereotype consistency influence the shape of mouse trajectories?
When using MAD as a dependent variable for mouse tracking, the
information from the trajectory is condensed into one single index.
Parts of the information, such as the concrete shape of the trajectory,
are, thus, lost in this type of analysis. In the past, one way to deal with
this property of MAD was to look at their distribution - if the MAD
distribution revealed bimodality, it would be interpreted as evidence
7 Traditional MPT models are estimated on the group level, aggregating the
categorical response data across individuals and items, using Maximum like-
lihood (e.g., Hu & Batchelder, 1994). Aggregating data always bears the risk of
neglecting individual differences or dependencies between cognitive processes
(Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Lee, 2011; Matzke, Dolan, Batchelder, &
Wagenmakers, 2015). This inherent assumption of homogeneity can lead to
misspecified MPT models and biased parameter estimates (Klauer, 2010;
Matzke et al., 2015; Smith & Batchelder, 2010).
8We specified weakly informative prior distributions (following Klauer,
2010; Matzke et al., 2015; see Heck, Erdfelder, & Kieslich, 2018, for further
details) which are implemented as default settings in TreeBUGS for the group-
level means (prior: standard normal distributions) and covariance matrix (prior:
scaled inverse-Wishart uniform distribution) that were updated by the in-
corporated data. The algorithm cycled through three MCMC chains with 20,000
iterations each until all parameters reached the desired convergence-fit cri-
terion as indicated by <R^ 1.05 (Gelman & Rubin, 1992) plus additional 20,000
iterations (to verify convergence stability).
9We reduced the aspired level of power for the second analysis compared to
the first for the following reason: Due to monetary constraints, we did not have
enough funds to collect data from N = 111 participants, the required sample
size when setting the aspired power level to .95. As the correlational analysis
with the MPT parameters was exploratory in its nature, we decided to be less
conservative with regard to power and reduced the aspired power level to .80.
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that the trajectory shape was not homogeneous (Wulff et al., 2019).
Therefore, before running our planned analyses, we conducted ex-
ploratory bimodality analyses of the trajectories overall as well as for
the different levels of the factors correctness and consistency. Indeed,
the distribution of mouse trajectories revealed substantial bimodality
according to the bimodality coefficient (BC>0.75 overall and in each
group, SAS Institute, 1989) as well as the Hartigan's dip statistic
(ps< .002 overall and in each group, Hartigan & Hartigan, 1985). That
is, participants showed straight or slightly curved trajectories in some
trials and strongly curved or change-of-mind trajectories in others (see
Fig. 5 for the distribution of raw, time-normalized trajectories).
The non-homogeneous trajectory-shape distribution indicated that
different trajectory types might be present in our data set. Using MAD
as a dependent variable might conceal the variation of different tra-
jectory types due to our predictors source-response correctness and
statement-source consistency (e.g., different trajectory types can have
the same MAD value; c.f., Wulff et al., 2019). Further, when analyzing
MAD we cannot make any inferences with regard to how exactly the
source response unfolded over the course of trials as the whole trajec-
tory was reduced into one single index. By looking more closely at the
trajectory shapes, we also hope to get a clearer picture of the temporal
dynamics (Dale & Duran, 2011; Hehman, Stolier, & Freeman, 2015) of
the source-attribution process. Therefore, we conducted an exploratory
analysis of the distribution of the prototypical mouse trajectory shapes
Table 1
Linear mixed model with maximum absolute deviations as dependent variable.
Predictors b se t df p
Intercept 189.21 18.11 10.45 74.28 < .001
Correctness −15.47 7.95 −1.95 2649.82 .052
Consistency −6.16 7.53 −0.82 2552.01 .414
Correctness × Consistency −25.95 7.77 −3.34 2634.83 < .001
Note. Linear mixed model results for Maximum Absolute Deviations (MAD).
Correctness (of source attribution) and consistency (of statement-source com-
bination) were both effect-coded with +1 (correct/consistent)/−1 (incorrect/
inconsistent). b = beta-weight of effect, se = standard error, t = t-value,
df = degrees of freedom, p = p-value. To account for inter-trial dependencies,
random intercepts for participants as well as statements were included.
Fig. 3. Left panel: Maximum Absolute Deviation
(MAD) as a function of the two factors correctness (of
source attribution) and consistency (of statement-
source combination). Positive values of MAD in-
dicate spatial attraction towards the unchosen
source, 0 (dashed line) indicates the idealized
straight line towards the chosen source, negative
values indicate curved trajectories towards the
chosen source. Mean values per factor combination
and corresponding error bars representing standard
errors are displayed in black, individual values per
participant are displayed in grey (points = con-
sistent statement-source combinations, triangle = in-
consistent statement-source combinations). Right
panel: Temporal dynamic of mouse trajectories
based on the horizontal and vertical mouse position
(in pixels) for correct (orange) and incorrect (blue)
source attributions separate for consistent statement-
source combinations (dashed line) and inconsistent
statement-source combinations (solid line). (For in-
terpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article.)
Fig. 4. Breakdown of the interaction pattern of statement-source consistency and source-attribution correctness. Panel A represents the first significant, post-hoc
group comparison. In this case, trajectories were more curved when the correct source attribution was stereotype-inconsistent with the presenting source compared to
when it was stereotype-consistent with the presenting source. Panel B represents the second significant, post-hoc group comparison. Here, trajectories were more
curved when participants answered the incorrect, stereotype-inconsistent source compared to when they answered the correct, stereotype-consistent source.
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Fig. 5. Time-normalized trajectories for correct (left panel)/incorrect (right panel) source attributions and consistent (orange)/inconsistent (blue) statement-source
combinations. x coordinate (px) = position of the cursor in pixels on x-coordinate; y coordinate (px) = position of the cursor in pixels on y-coordinate.
Fig. 6. Exemplar ordinal prototype cluster which
trajectories can be classified into (Panel A).
Trajectories are sorted according to their curvature
from straight trajectories to double change-of-mind
trajectories and separately shown for correct (Panel
B) and incorrect (Panel C) source attributions of
consistent and inconsistent statement-source combi-
nations. The relative frequency of each prototype
(within the respective design cells) is depicted in the
bottom left corner of each cell in Panel B and C. x
coordinate (px) = position of the cursor in pixels on
x-coordinate; y coordinate (px) = position of the
cursor in pixels on y-coordinate; straight = most
direct trajectory from the start button to the response
option, curved = medium curved trajectory,
cCoM = continuous change of mind,
dCoM = discrete change of mind, dCoM2 = double
discrete change of mind.
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to test whether our MAD results were an artifact of condensing the
trajectories and to get a better picture of the underlying cognitive dy-
namics.
We followed the procedure described by Wulff et al. (2019) and
classified trajectories into five prototypes: straight, curved, continuous
change of mind, discrete change of mind, and double discrete change of
mind (for a visualization of the prototypes and the clustered trajectories
see Fig. 6). When looking at the distribution of trajectory types for
correct and incorrect source attributions, one can see that there are
more discrete change-of-mind trajectories for inconsistent than con-
sistent correct source attributions. For incorrect source attributions, one
can see that there are more straight trajectories when the original
statement-source combination was inconsistent than when it was con-
sistent (i.e., trajectories were more often classified as straight when
participants responded incorrectly but stereotype-consistent than when
they responded incorrectly and stereotype-inconsistent). In order to
analyze whether the probability of showing a more curved trajectory
prototype changes with correctness of the source attribution and the
consistency of the statement-source combination, we ran an ordinal
mixed regression with the trial-based prototype categories as dependent
variable. Based on the results from the mixed model with MAD as de-
pendent variable, we expected to find the same interaction pattern of
consistency and response correctness. The results showed a significant
interaction of both predictors, b = −0.15, z = −2.90, p = .004 (see
also Table 2 and Fig. 6). Again, we ran Bonferroni-Holm adjusted
pairwise comparisons (tested two-sided) for each level of the predictors.
The results mirrored the results of the post-hoc analyses for MAD as
dependent variable: for consistent statement-source combinations, the
odds of conforming with a more curved prototype category were higher
for incorrect compared to correct source attributions, z = −2.61,
p = .045. Similarly, within correct source attributions, the odds were
higher for inconsistent statement-source combinations to conform with
a more curved prototype category than for consistent statement-source
combinations, z = −3.36, p = .005.
4.3. Do individuals guess based on (age) stereotypes when their source
memory fails?
To study source monitoring on a process level in addition to the
recording of cursor movements, the model-based analyses are reported
next. In the following, we provide the means and corresponding 95%-
Bayesian Credibility Intervals (BCIs) of the posterior distribution for
parameters and their correlations. On the group level, participants' item
memory (D) was .65 [.61, .68]. If they recognized a statement as old,
they were able to remember the source of a statement (d) with a
probability of .37 [.24, .51]. If they did not recognize the status (old or
new) of a statement, participants guessed the statement to be old (b)
with a probability of .40 [.35, .45]. Given that they had either guessed
or remembered a statement to be old (without remembering the
source), participants guessed (g) the stereotype-consistent source (age
reflected in the statement corresponded to the source's age) more often
with a probability of .59 [.54, .63] (chance level: 50%). To test in an
exploratory manner whether it is indeed legitimate to argue in favor of
an age-stereotypical source-guessing bias here, we sampled the pos-
terior distribution for the difference in source guessing and chance-level
guessing. On the group-level, source guessing was stereotype-biased,
Δ(g− .50) = .09 [.04, .13] to a substantial extent (as the BCI excluded
0). Exploratory parameter correlations further revealed that source
memory and source guessing were linked (see Table 3 for correlations).
Participants compensated for poor source memory (d) by guessing more
stereotype-biased, =^ .52 [−.78, −.19]. As the credibility intervals
for the parameter correlations were rather large, we conducted a
parameter-recovery simulation.10 Results and further information on
how we conducted the simulation are reported in Table C1 in
Appendix C. The simulation demonstrated that parameter means and
correlations were mostly recovered, which was also true for the nega-
tive correlation of source memory and guessing obtained in our sample.
We, thus, replicated prior findings on source memory as a determinant
of the strength of the source-guessing bias (e.g., Arnold, Bayen,
Kuhlmann, & Vaterrodt, 2013; Kuhlmann et al., 2016) which is also in
line with theoretical assumption that successful source monitoring es-
sentially relies on the quality of available (encoded) information in
memory and the decision process (guessing) when making source at-
tributions (M. K. Johnson et al., 1993).
4.4. Do source-monitoring processes map onto mouse trajectories?
To test whether individuals who show a strong source-guessing bias
generally experience greater cognitive conflict during source attribu-
tions when processing stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent state-
ments-source combinations, we included MAD (mean-aggregated across
trials per participant) as a continuous, external covariate in the hier-
archical MPT model. In a first step, the correlations of MAD with the
posterior values of all individual MPT parameters were computed as
default in TreeBUGS (Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2018). The correlation
computation was repeated for all posterior samples, thereby accounting
for uncertainty in estimating the sample correlation due to parameter
estimation (see Heck et al., 2018, for details in TreeBUGS). Our second
hypothesis pertained to the relationship of the source-guessing para-
meter g and MAD: Source guessing was positively correlated with MAD,
=
^ .21 [.05, .35]. Individuals who were more likely to attribute
statements to the stereotype-consistent source (and, thus, also showed
more incorrect source attributions) experienced greater conflict during
their source attribution (see Fig. 7). In addition, the exploratory in-
spection of other source monitoring and MAD correlations revealed that
source memory was linked to mouse-trajectory deviations towards the
Table 2
Mixed ordinal regression for mouse trajectory prototypes.
Predictors b se z p
Correctness −0.05 0.05 −0.95 .342
Consistency −0.05 0.05 −0.95 .344
Correctness × Consistency −0.15 0.05 −2.90 .004
Note. Mixed ordinal regression results for mouse trajectory prototypes.
Correctness (of source attribution) and consistency (of statement-source com-
bination) were both effect-coded with +1 (correct/consistent)/−1 (incorrect/
inconsistent). b=beta-weight of effect, se= standard error, z= z-value, p= p-
value. To account for inter-trial dependencies, random intercepts for partici-
pants as well as statements were included.
Table 3
Model-based estimates of source monitoring parameter correlations.
Parameter D d b g
D — – – –
d . 5 9 [ . 2 6 , . 8 4 ] – – –
b −.33 [−.63, .03] −.29 [−.62, .07] – –
g −.25 [−.58, .12] − . 5 2 [ − . 7 8 , − . 1 9 ] .11 [−.26, .47] –
Note. Estimates of the Bayesian-hierarchical MPT model for correlations be-
tween parameters. D = probability of recognizing a statement as previously
presented and probability of knowing that a distractor statement is new;
d = probability of correctly remembering the (either stereotype-consistent or
inconsistent) source of a statement; b = probability of guessing that an un-
recognized statement is old; g = probability of guessing that a statement had
been presented by the stereotype-consistent source when the source is not re-
membered. Brackets indicate 95%-Bayesian Credibility Intervals (BCI) and
substantial correlations (BCI excludes 0) are marked in bold.
10We thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her suggestion to conduct a
parameter-recovery simulation.
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unchosen source, =^ .36 [−.47, −.25] (see also Fig. 7). This means
that individuals who were more often in a state of source uncertainty
due to poor source memory also experienced greater cognitive conflict.
In a second step, we analyzed whether the correlation specific to our
sample can be generalized to the population level. That is, will the
reported correlation be valid for a newly drawn sample from the same
population (Ly et al., 2017)? The sample correlations were reused to
derive the posterior of the correlation adjusted for sampling error,
which are the averaged across all posterior samples estimate the po-
pulation correlation (Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2018; Ly et al., 2017).
The BCI of the posterior distribution for the population correlation of
source guessing and MAD included 0 [−.10, .46], indicating that the
reported correlation was restricted to the sample. The BCI for the cor-
relation of source memory and MAD, however, indicated that the re-
sults were also valid for a new sample [−.58, −.09].
5. Discussion
The primary aim of this study was to examine the cognitive dy-
namics of stereotypical influences on the ability of attributing in-
formation to its origin. For this purpose, we made use of the increas-
ingly popular process-tracing method of mouse tracking. We tracked
individuals' mouse movements when deciding whether a stereotype-
consistent or -inconsistent source presented a respective statement.
Mouse tracking has thus far only been applied to study recognition
memory (e.g., Koop & Criss, 2016; Papesh & Goldinger, 2012), another
crucial part of source monitoring, but not yet to source monitoring on
its own. We endeavored to disentangle and investigate the nature
specifically behind stereotypical influences on source-monitoring pro-
cesses by means of response dynamics as potentially reflecting the ra-
ther complex cognition involved in these processes. The results did not
support our a priori hypotheses that the stereotype consistency of the
statement and the source alone induced cognitive conflict or that source
guessing and cognitive conflict were substantially correlated. We could
show, however, that processes of social categorization due to age ste-
reotypes in combination with the correctness of the source response
induced cognitive conflict in the source-attribution process that, in
addition, varied as a function of individuals' source memory.
5.1. Age stereotypes elicit decision uncertainty in source attributions
We found a substantial interaction of response correctness and
consistency of the statement-source combination: while processing
consistent statement-source combinations (age reflected in statement
corresponds to source age), greater trajectory curvature was observed
when the source attribution was incorrect compared to correct. When
looking at correct source attributions only, we replicated previous
findings that the cognitive conflict (as indicated by larger MAD) was
more pronounced for inconsistent than for consistent statement-source
combinations. That is, individuals were (spatially) more attracted to the
stereotype-consistent source when correctly choosing the stereotype-
inconsistent source. Thus, an internal inconsistency in the perception of
typical/atypical statements of different-aged people was uncovered by
MAD. The mouse-tracking results indicate that age stereotypes were
activated during source attribution prompting individuals to consider
both sources. Mouse tracking, therefore, informed us that participants
were actually attracted towards and considering the unchosen source
based on its stereotypical features (e.g., replicating Cassidy et al., 2017;
Freeman & Ambady, 2009; Freeman et al., 2010). The results also show
the added value of analyzing mouse trajectories during source attri-
butions: Mouse movements are better able to capture this simultaneous
consideration of both sources compared to, for instance, reaction
times.11
5.2. Stereotype consistency influences prototypical mouse-trajectory shapes
The MAD results received further support when looking at the tra-
jectory shape at the prototype level: trajectories conformed with a
higher probability to a more curved prototype category when in-
dividuals responded incorrectly to an originally consistent statement-
source combination (i.e., responding stereotype-inconsistent) compared
to correctly (i.e., responding stereotype-consistent). In addition, when
individuals responded correctly, trajectories were more likely to belong
to a more curved prototype if the source's age was inconsistent (com-
pared to consistent) with the respective statement typicality. This
Fig. 7. Sampled population correlation coefficients ^ between the source-memory parameter (d, on the left; can vary between 0 and 1) and mean-aggregated
Maximum Absolute Deviation (MAD) as well as the source-guessing parameter (g, on the right; can vary between 0 to 1) and MAD based on the Bayesian-hierarchical
latent-trait MPT model (Klauer, 2010). Individual correlations are displayed in grey points as well as the linear trend line. The correlation coefficient and corre-
sponding 95%-Bayesian Credibility Interval (BCI) are displayed in the upper right corner of each plot.
11 As reaction times are an established dependent variable for investigating
cognitive processes (e.g., Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, &
McKoon, 2016), we also analyzed the effect of statement-source consistency on
reaction times in an exploratory manner. By leveraging this analysis, we hope to
get a more complete picture of the cognitive processes involved in source at-
tributions. In addition, we also analyzed different indices of trajectory curva-
ture to test the stability of our MAD findings. The results of both additional
analyses can be found in the Supplemental Materials.
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interaction pattern for correct source attributions was revealed in both
MAD and prototypes but could not be found for either dependent
variable for incorrect source attributions. But looking at the distribution
of prototypes for incorrect source attributions, it appears that at least
the descriptive pattern of prototypes shows an effect of consistency
similar to the one found for correct source attributions. When partici-
pants responded incorrectly in trials in which the age of the presenting
source was consistent with the stereotypicality of the statement (i.e.,
chose the source for which the statement was inconsistent with the
respective age), they showed less straight and more discrete change-of-
mind trials than when they incorrectly chose the stereotype-consistent
source. This pattern might not have been significant because partici-
pants responded to more trials correctly than incorrectly due to rela-
tively high source-memory performance. Additionally, the correctness
of the response was also confounded with the consistency: consistent
statement-source combinations were remembered more often than in-
consistent ones.
Our results also highlight why it is beneficial to look at the proto-
typical curvature of mouse trajectories, since it enabled us to cautiously
infer the underlying process behind the trajectories. For instance, it
seems as if the observed (aggregated) curvature mainly stems from ei-
ther curved trajectories or discrete change-of-mind trajectories. This
gives reason to speculate whether there are possibly two different
processes underlying the spatial attraction towards the unchosen source
(Freeman et al., 2008). Dual-process accounts in social cognition
(Devine, 1989), for instance, have proposed that the impression for-
mation about others is based on a fast, non-conscious, and automatic
evaluation before a second, slow, conscious, and more fine-grained
modification emerges if the initial impression needs to be corrected.
The same logic applies to bimodality of mouse trajectories (for a the-
oretical review, see Freeman et al., 2008; Freeman & Dale, 2013).
Straight trajectories indicate that the initial categorization and later
correction point in the same direction. Curved, and change-of-mind
trajectories in particular, indicate that the initial categorization is in-
correct and needs to be adjusted (Freeman et al., 2008). The bimodal
distribution of mouse trajectories in our study might indicate that there
is a dual process in source attributions as well. However, it cannot be
ascertained with reasonable confidence that the bimodal nature of
mouse trajectories during source attribution is traced back to source
guessing or source memory (note that we were not able to incorporate
trial-level trajectory indices as source-monitoring covariates in our
model; see Limitations section).
5.3. Individuals guess based on age stereotypes when their source memory
fails
We further demonstrated that processing social information is in-
fluenced by social expectancies about other (social) groups (cf.
Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005). We observed considerable individual dif-
ferences in the age-stereotype reliance in source guessing but, on group
level, replicated previous findings of stereotype-biased source guessing
(Kuhlmann et al., 2016) and poor source memory as its determinant
(Arnold, Bayen, Kuhlmann, & Vaterrodt, 2013; Kuhlmann et al., 2016)
with the latent-trait model (Klauer, 2010). Stereotypical knowledge was
used as a backup for episodic-memory failures (cf. Sherman &
Bessenoff, 1999), indicating that, when source memory was absent or at
least not optimal for making an adequate source attribution, individuals
substituted their missing contextual information with prior knowledge
(cf. Hicks & Cockman, 2003). In this case, prior knowledge was based
on stereotypical expectations and what is commonly associated with
being young or old (at least to some extent). In the present experiment,
the magnitude of source-guessing bias was comparable to Kuhlmann
et al. (2016) using similar item material and an experimental procedure
even if the overall guessing bias - still of credible size - may not be as
pronounced as for other schema or stereotype domains. This might,
however, be explained by the inherent nature of age stereotypes re-
vealing that individuals do not have as strong of attitudes towards what
is typically young and what is typically old (normed explicit typicality
ratings, Kuhlmann et al., 2017) as, for instance, what is schematically
expected to be said by a doctor versus a lawyer (see Bayen et al., 2000).
5.4. Source-monitoring processes partially map onto mouse trajectories
Furthermore, we examined whether the strength of source guessing
was related to the curved mouse movements. The reliance on stereo-
typical knowledge when a participant did not remember the source was
displayed in the curvature of mouse trajectories at first sight but be-
came invalid when controlling for sampling error in the Bayesian-
hierarchical MPT model. Strong claims about the underlying nature of
source guessing (e.g., individuals who guessed more in line with ste-
reotypes experienced greater conflict revealing a rather systematic/
controlled process, in line with, e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Spaniol
& Bayen, 2002, as both age categories are at least partially considered
before a final decision for one source is made) could not be derived with
certainty. The integration of mouse tracking into modeled source-
monitoring processes revealed that mouse movements mirror decision
uncertainty due to poor source memory – not source guessing.
5.5. Limitations
While the study provides a promising insight into the complex
processing in source monitoring, results should be viewed in the context
of some limitations. The comparatively high complexity of statements
could influence the observed effects due to relatively long cognitive
processing (reading) that might contradict the prerequisite of mouse
tracking, namely to react quickly and intuitively. To satisfy this need,
future studies could take advantage of the less complex item material
(e.g., words) commonly used in schematic source-monitoring research
(e.g., Bayen et al., 2000; Kuhlmann et al., 2012; Schaper et al., 2019) to
rule out this methodological concern, assuming that the cognitive ba-
sics of processing stereotypical and schematic information are not
fundamentally different. Due to the mouse-tracking set-up we ensured,
however, that the relevant information needed to infer the source (i.e.,
presentation of to-be-classified statement in the test phase) was avail-
able only shortly before the decision was made and, thus, reduced the
amount of information that needs to be processed. Even when the
complexity of the item material appears to be a limitation at first sight,
we may also consider it an advantage from an applied point of view. In
our everyday life, we commonly process highly complex (social) in-
formation, which is also true for source monitoring. Therefore, the use
of rather complex, verbal item material mimics this process and gen-
eralizes to a more realistic setting on how we process social informa-
tion.
The assignment of specific ages to the sources only at test can be
discussed critically, too. Of course, when bearing social interactions in
real life in mind, we often encode information with salient source
characteristics (e.g., know the age or profession of a familiar person in
advance). First, we wanted to create a test situation in which we could
study stereotype influences on source-monitoring best. This has been
shown to be true when no internal representation of item-source
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contingency can be built (e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann
et al., 2012). Second, it may be reasonable to assume that in some si-
tuations, no specific source characteristics may be present (e.g., when
interacting with a stranger via phone or communicating on the in-
ternet).
Furthermore, using a study design such as ours, the reliance on age
stereotypes is an adequate, rational response strategy in the memory
test under some circumstances, namely when the stereotype-consistent
source leads to a correct source attribution (which is only true in half of
the trials). The age stereotype is, however, misleading and results in
incorrect source attributions in the other half of the trials. We are aware
that the use of this null contingency between statement typicality and
source age may seem artificial and does not necessarily reflect the
“true” world (which is also based on the subjective perception of this
reality; e.g., Augoustinos & Walker, 1998) in which people of different
ages may be more likely to be associated with their respective age-
stereotypical attitudes and corresponding behavior at least to some
extent (Chan et al., 2012). But stereotypes also mirror a simplification
of our social life (cf. Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2016) for
which individual differences for members of a social group and context-
dependencies (e.g., Casper, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2011; Gluth,
Ebner, & Schmiedek, 2010; Kornadt & Rothermund, 2011) as well as
counter-stereotypical exemplars may be (partly) neglected. We aimed
to best study source monitoring, and guessing in particular, under cir-
cumstances with the largest possible inconsistency in the perception of
different-aged people. However, to what extent the cognitive bias ob-
served in source guessing is generalizable to the impression formation
about other persons outside of the lab still awaits further research and is
beyond the scope of our paper.
Apart from potential limitations inherent in the experimental
paradigm, an open issue concerns how source-monitoring processes and
mouse movements are linked on each trial. We estimated individuals'
guessing bias but aggregated trajectories across trials for the correlation
analysis. Thus, to further foster the understanding of the nature of
source guessing, future studies may use more advanced statistical
analyses such as the ones reported by Matzke et al. (2015), Heck &
Erdfelder, 2016, and Heck, Erdfelder, and Kieslich (2018) to estimate
source-monitoring processes on a trial-by-trial basis (considering also
item heterogeneity) covarying with the respective mouse trajectory in
that distinct, single trial - given a sufficient amount of data per parti-
cipant which in our case were considerably low when participants
classified a statement as new and no source attribution was made. This
shortage of data was due to our experimental design: To follow re-
commendations of two spatially-separated response options with regard
to the mouse-tracking set-up (see Hehman et al., 2015), we needed to
split up and implement a two-stage test phase. Due to this set-up, we
faced missing values by design whenever individuals respond new in
the first stage and subsequently no mouse movements for this specific
statement were recorded in the source-attribution stage. Therefore, an
important caveat that we would like to highlight is that, unfortunately,
we were not able to jointly model categorical data and continuous
variables as suggested by Heck et al., 2018.
Methodological weaknesses could be overcome when adapting the
experimental paradigm to the needs of more sophisticated approaches
of data analysis, for example by using a one stage source-monitoring
design which offers three response alternatives (i.e., the two sources
and “new” for distractor items). This design would allow more so-
phisticated analyses and researchers interested in source monitoring
may use such a set-up in combination with mouse tracking. As we were
mainly interested in the clean measurement of mouse trajectories, we
opted for the two-stage process which only presents two response al-
ternatives in every stage (i.e., “old” vs. “new” in the recognition stage
and “young source” vs. “old source” in the source-attribution stage).
With this procedure, mouse trajectories and MAD are easily inter-
pretable.
5.6. Future directions for response dynamics in source monitoring
Taken together, our study was a first attempt to examine the cog-
nitive processes behind source monitoring within the domain of age
stereotypes by tracking individuals' mouse movements while attributing
information to its origin. The results show us how important it is to
apply new methodologies to already well-established paradigms to in-
form us further about the underlying mechanisms of cognitive pro-
cesses. Furthermore, we have uncovered additional insights that the
involvement of stereotypes in source attributions is accompanied by
cognitive conflict, shedding light on the processes in the application of
stereotypical knowledge. In prior studies, mouse movements have been
tracked to investigate the consequential behavior of stereotypical ca-
tegorizations (see Stillman et al., 2018). Researchers should continue to
pursue this line of research as stereotypes influence not only how we
process information but also how we remember and retrospectively
associate people with attributes or behavior that did not originate from
them. We demonstrated that source memory may be a crucial and
adequate prerequisite (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne,
1999) for individuation as it prevents the necessity to make use of prior
knowledge in source guessing. Accurate encoding, maintenance, and
retrieval seem to be key to reduce stereotypical influences in social
categorization. If source memory fails, source guessing can come into
play (for an overview, see Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016) which, in turn,
may lead to biased information processing and inaccurate impression
management about others in the future (cf. Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005;
Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999), with potential behavioral consequences
(e.g., false accusations in court: Lindsay, 2014).
Thus, if the underlying nature of source guessing (e.g., rather sys-
tematic/controlled or heuristic/automatic) is studied sufficiently, in-
terventions to overcome the reliance on stereotypes in source mon-
itoring could be targeted to its nature. In a first step, the reliance on
stereotypes in source guessing should be manipulated, prompting in-
dividuals to either guess stereotype-biased or even counter-stereotype-
biased (e.g., manipulate the item-source contingency, Bayen &
Kuhlmann, 2011; or negate stereotypes before testing, Marsh et al.,
2006). Assuming that a repeatedly processing counter-stereotypical
exemplars will modify and shape basic knowledge structures in cogni-
tion, interventions for stereotype change may be a promising avenue to
follow up on (Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005). In a second step, the effec-
tiveness of counter-stereotypical interventions on source-monitoring
processes could then be measured with mouse tracking again - a valu-
able tool to provide a sophisticated understanding of the underlying
processes in the future.
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Appendix A. Illustration of Bayesian-hierarchical MPT model
ni
Θi
∑μ
ki
Fig. A1. Conceptual illustration of a Bayesian-hierarchical MPT model (e.g., Klauer, 2010). Observed outcomes are represented as shaded, unobserved outcomes are
blank. Discrete variables are reflected in square nodes; continuous variables are reflected in circular nodes. i denotes the i-th individual; k denotes the individual
categorical frequencies resulting from task responses; n denotes the number of trials per individual. Because the categorical responses depend on the number of trials
and the source-monitoring parameters θ, arrows are directed towards the node k. μ and Σ represent the probit-transformed group-level parameters with mean and
covariance matrix to be estimated from the data. Probit-transformed parameters assume to follow a multivariate normal distribution. Standard normal distributions
for μ and a scaled inverse-Wishart distribution for Σ are used as priors.
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Appendix B. Analysis of a differentiated MPT model split up by item type
Calculating the Pearson's χ2 based model-fit statistics for hierarchical MPT models from Klauer (2010), the chosen restrictions of the MPT model
adequately fitted our data as indicated by non-significant Bayesian posterior predictive p-values > .05 (Meng, 1994) for the mean (T1 = .44) and
covariance (T2 = .427) structure of the data. We additionally used a more differentiated model without aggregating our data into typical and
atypical statement-source combinations. Results for this analysis follow for which parameter estimates (Table B1) and their correlations (Table B2)
are presented. The more differentiated model fitted the data as well (mean, T1 = .208, and covariance structure, T2 = .13) but comparing both
models trading off model fit and complexity reflected in the Deviance Information Criterion (DCI; Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van Der Linde, 2002)
showed worse model fit for the differentiated model (DICaggregated = 1453 vs. DICdifferentiated = 2324). We, thus, reported analyses based on the less
differentiated model.
Table B1
Model-based estimates of source-monitoring parameter means and correlations with maximum absolute deviations
for the differentiated model.
Parameter Mean esti-
mate
MAD
D_yy .63 [.57, .69] −.25 [−.45, .13]
D_yo .62 [.54, .69] −.23 [−.44, .04]
D_oy .63 [.56, .69] −.16 [−.43, .30]
D_oo=D_ny=D_no .65 [.61, .70] − . 3 1 [ − . 4 5 , − . 1 4 ]
d_yy .38 [.05, .73] − . 3 1 [ − . 4 6 , − . 1 0 ]
d_yo .47 [.17, .80] − . 3 4 [ − . 4 6 , − . 1 9 ]
d_oo .34 [.07, .58] − . 3 2 [ − . 4 7 , − . 1 4 ]
d_oy .34 [.06, .71] − . 3 1 [ − . 4 4 , − . 1 5 ]
b .43 [.37, .50] .02 [−.18, .22]
a_y=g_y .62 [.52, .70] .20 [−.09, .41]
a_o=g_o .56 [.46, .64] .18 [−.13, .40]
Note. Mean parameter estimates of the Bayesian-hierarchical MPT model and their correlation with covariate
Maximum Absolute Deviations (MAD) of the more differentiated model. The first letter of each parameter denotes the
respective source-monitoring parameter: D = item memory, d = source memory, b = old-new item guessing,
g = source guessing. The letter after the underscore character denotes the age of the source (either y = young or
o= old) which originally presented the statement or the distractor status of a statement (n= new). The second letter
after the underscore character denotes the statement's typicality (either y = typical young or o = typical old). Note
that for source guessing (g) the single denotation refers to the statement's typicality. For the means of source guessing,
values > .50 indicate a stereotype bias (i.e., guessing the source which age is consistent with the statement's ty-
picality). As indicated by the equality sign, item-memory parameters and source-guessing parameters were equated
between statement types to reach model identifiability. Model-fit indices (see Appendix B) suggest that it was le-
gitimate to do so. 95%-Bayesian Credibility Intervals (BCI) are displayed in brackets. Credible correlations are
marked in bold.
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Appendix C. Parameter-recovery simulation
Table C1
Summarized results of the parameter-recovery simulation of the latent-trait 2HTSM.
Parameter “True” Recovered estimates
Posterior mean 2.5% 97.5% True in 95%-BCI
Mean D .65 .64 .61 .68 1
d .37 .38 .23 .52 1
b .40 .40 .35 .46 1
g .59 .59 .54 .63 1
Correlation [d;D] .59 .50 .17 .77 .86
[d;b] −.29 −.23 −.57 .13 .22
[d;g] −.52 −.44 −.73 −.08 .70
[D;b] −.33 −.27 −.60 .11 .27
[D;g] −.25 −.24 −.58 .14 .23
[b;g] .11 .10 −.28 .46 .08
Note. Simulation was based on 500 replications with 7 chains of 30,000 iterations (15,000 as burn-in period) each. D= item memory, d= source memory, b= old-
new item guessing, g= source guessing. “True” refers to the data-generating values taken from the results of our study (best guess of true values). The simulated data
were based on the number of items (90 in total) and participants (60 individuals) as in our study. Only samples that showed convergence ( <R^ 1.05; Gelman & Rubin,
1992) were retained for analyses. Group-level means μ were on the probability scale, correlations were on the latent probit scale. Posterior means and credibility
intervals (2.5 and 97.5% quantiles) were estimated per replication and averaged across replication. True in 95%-BCI refers to the percentage of replications in which
the 95%-Bayesian Credibility Interval (BCI) excluded 0 indicating credible estimates/correlations. Model-specific details and a commented script of the analyses can
be retrieved from https://osf.io/85936/?view_only=214fa149e30748cbbd07852c43fab419.
Appendix D. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103917.
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stability across time and domain
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Abstract
When people need to infer the source of information in the absence of memory, they may rely on general knowledge (e.g.,
stereotypes) to guess the source. Prior research documented task-related determinants and individual differences of stereotype
reliance in source guessing, but little is known about the underling nature of this process. In two experiments, we tested whether a
cognitive trait could account for the knowledge reliance in source guessing. Participants performed two distinct study–test cycles
of a classical source-monitoring paradigm in which two person sources present stereotypical information that in a later test phase
had to be attributed to its origin. In Experiment 1, both tasks used item material from the same knowledge domain (age
stereotypes) and were either separated by 10 minutes or 7 days. In Experiment 2, we used item material from two different
knowledge domains (Task 1: age stereotypes; Task 2: gender stereotypes). Although cross-task correlations of source-guessing
parameters from Bayesian-hierarchical multinomial processing tree model analyses showed only weak positive correlations,
absolute source guessing remained fairly stable within individuals across time (Experiment 1) and knowledge domains
(Experiment 2). Considering statistical challenges of the assessment of relative stability via correlations, we suggest based on
the stricter absolute stability criterion that source guessing rather encompasses trait-like features. We discuss implications
regarding the generalizability and nature of source guessing in comparison to other cognitive processes involved in source
attribution, which were highly stable in both experiments.
Keywords Source guessing . Cognitive trait . Bayesian-hierarchical multinomial modeling
The ability to remember the source of information (e.g., who
presented it) is crucial for many types of cognitive tasks in our
everyday life (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). For
instance, we have to remember who told us something or
where we read the latest news. The process of attributing in-
formation to sources is highly susceptible to prior knowledge,
such as stereotypes and schemas (e.g., Bayen, Nakamura,
Dupuis, & Yang, 2000). For example, if we do not remember
who told us about a new aerobic course in the gym, we may
infer that the person source was a young adult rather than an
old adult based on guessing in line with our stereotypes about
aging and what we typically associate with being young and
old (Kuhlmann, Bayen, Meuser, & Kornadt, 2016;
Kuhlmann, Kornadt, Bayen, Meuser, & Wulff, 2017). This
inherent reliance on prior knowledge, of course, does not al-
ways lead to the correct source attribution and a biased misat-
tribution could consequently support the maintenance (and
reinforcement) of stereotypes over time.
Crucially, some studies have documented individual differ-
ences in the extent to which people rely on their prior knowl-
edge in source attributions (Arnold, Bayen, Kuhlmann, &
Vaterrodt, 2013; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). Although influ-
ences on knowledge reliance in source guessing are well stud-
ied on the group level (contingency perception: e.g., Arnold
et al., 2013; Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann, Vaterrodt,
& Bayen, 2012; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002; sourcememory: e.g.,
Kuhlmann et al., 2016), little is known about the underlying
mechanisms of source guessing that may explain the origin of
individual differences. That is, why do some people strongly
rely on their prior knowledge and others not at all? Is knowl-
edge reliance in source attributions an intraindividual predis-
position? Thus, the purpose of the current set of experiments
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was to examine individual knowledge-based source guessing
and whether source guessing manifests a “cognitive trait”
(Kantner & Lindsay, 2012)—reflected in stability across time
and (content) domain of the item material—or fluctuates
across tasks, which in turn would imply that situational deter-
minants of source guessing are primarily at play. Keeping in
mind the detrimental effects of incorrect attributions of memo-
ries based on source guessing in the social environment (e.g.,
biased impression formation about others; Bell, Giang,Mund,&
Buchner, 2013; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Sherman &
Bessenoff, 1999) or in the legal context (e.g., false accusations
in court; Lindsay, 1994, 2014), it is essential to understand the
potential persistence of such a source-guessing bias.
Knowledge reliance in source guessing
Attributing information to sources—defined as source
monitoring—can be based on two cognitive processes:
People can either rely on memory for contextual details
(e.g., spatial, temporal, episodic, perceptual or affective de-
tails) or general knowledge (Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell
& Johnson, 2000). General knowledge includes schemas that
organize, link, and structure information based on previous
experience (Alba & Hasher, 1983), and stereotypes, “a set of
beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people”
(Stroebe & Insko, 1989, p. 5). The reliance on prior knowl-
edge in source-monitoring tasks has been demonstrated in a
multitude of studies (e.g., profession schemas: Bayen et al.,
2000; room schemas: Küppers & Bayen, 2014; gender stereo-
types: Marsh, Cook, & Hicks, 2006; social stereotypes:
Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999;
age stereotypes: Kuhlmann et al., 2016).
Using Bayen et al.’s (2000) doctor–lawyer paradigm as an
example, we will illustrate the standard experimental design
for investigating influences of stereotypes and schemas on
source monitoring. In the study phase, participants learn in-
formation presented by two sources (e.g., two persons: “Tom”
& “Jim”) that present an equal number of statements that are
either typical for their source (i.e., consistent with the schema
or stereotype associated with this source category; e.g., law-
yer: “I have to be in court at nine”) or statements that are
typical for the other source (e.g., doctor: “It will take a couple
of hours to get the results of this blood test”). At test, partic-
ipants are informed about the specific category each source
belongs to (e.g., profession of a doctor & a lawyer), and they
have to remember the source of each statement among new
distractor statements.
In previous source-monitoring studies, participants com-
monly made more correct source attributions when a state-
ment was typical for its source (e.g., Bayen et al., 2000).
The cognitive processes that lead to this performance benefit
for typical statements are not evident from the categorical
responses given in the task at first sight. Both improved mem-
ory for or biased guessing in favor of typical statement–source
combinations could explain the performance benefit.
Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models such as the Two-
high-threshold multinomial model of source monitoring
(2HTSM; Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996) disentangle
different cognitive processes contributing to observable be-
havior (e.g., Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Bayen et al., 1996).
The 2HTSM decomposes the following processes from
source-attribution behavior: item memory (i.e., the probability
of recognizing a presented statement), source memory (i.e.,
the probability of remembering the source that presented a
statement), item guessing (i.e., the probability of guessing that
an unrecognized statement was old), and source guessing (i.e.,
the probability of guessing that a statement was presented by a
specific [e.g., the typical] source).
Bayen et al. (2000) showed that schema-reliant source
guessing, and not differential source memory, caused the per-
formance benefit for typical statement–source pairs.1 When
participants did not remember which source presented a state-
ment, they guessed the schema-consistent source. Thus, a lack
of memory is often found to be compensated with preexisting
knowledge at least when analyzing the data on the group-level
(i.e., aggregated across participants; Arnold et al., 2013;
Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Bayen et al., 2000; Ehrenberg &
Klauer, 2005; Kuhlmann et al., 2016; Kuhlmann et al., 2012;
Küppers & Bayen, 2014; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). As MPT
models are merely measurement models that quantify certain
cognitive processes, the question what determines these
processes—and especially biased source guessing—remains
open. Several determinants of biased source guessing have
been identified already: misperception of item–source contin-
gency (Arnold et al., 2013; Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011;
Kuhlmann et al., 2012; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002), poor source
memory (Arnold et al., 2013; Kuhlmann et al., 2016), reduced
cognitive capacities at encoding (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011;
Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Kuhlmann et al., 2012), and pro-
vision of category information about sources after encoding
(Hicks & Cockman, 2003; Kuhlmann et al., 2012). Even
though these determinants can explain differences in source
guessing between experimental conditions, they do not con-
sider remaining interindividual variance (but see Arnold et al.,
2013; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002) and whether biased guessing
happens occasionally or consistently.
1
Schemas/stereotypes can also influence source memory. If an item is very
atypical for the source with which it was presented, then attention is drawn to
this expectation-violating item-source combination, which may result in better
source memory for the atypical, schema-incongruent or stereotype-
incongruent information (i.e., inconsistency effect; e.g., Bell, Buchner,
Kroneisen, & Giang, 2012; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Kroneisen & Bell,
2013; Küppers & Bayen, 2014). However, this is not consistently observed
whereas schema-based/stereotype-based source guessing is consistently ob-
served, even when this inconsistency effect occurs. In any case, this guessing
bias leads to a performance advantage for typical item-source combinations.
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Recent methodological advances in the estimation of MPT
model parameters offer more sophisticated statistical analyses
and allow for inferences about cognitive processes on an in-
dividual level. One such advance is the latent-trait model, a
Bayesian-hierarchical extension of multinomial models pro-
posed by Klauer (2010). The latent-trait model accounts for
variability between individuals and estimates parameters that
reflect latent cognitive processes for each individual separate-
ly. With this extension, individual parameter estimates can be
compared and correlated across different applications of a task
(e.g., across time and stimulus material).
Cognitive trait
One possible extension to the aforementioned group-level de-
terminants could be that individual differences in knowledge
reliance in source guessing reflect trait-like stability.
Independent of the experimental condition, some people
might be more inclined to rely on knowledge to fill memory
gaps whereas others might be less inclined to do so. If one
follows the definition of Roberts (2009), trait-like stability is
“meaningfully consistent” (p. 139) behavior. That is, although
behavior should be consistent across certain situations it must
not be identical in order to be considered stable. Trait-like
stability would, for instance, be reflected in correlational evi-
dence of two variables but not necessarily in the same numeric
point estimates across situations. For response tendencies such
as old–new guessing bias in recognition tasks (Kantner &
Lindsay, 2012, 2014), knowledge reliance in recognition heu-
ristic (Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016), and risky decision-
making (Glöckner & Pachur, 2012), trait-like stability in these
cognitive processes underlying responses was reported.
In a study by Kantner and Lindsay (2012), individuals
learned English nouns for a later memory test in two separate
study–test cycles. After studying these items, individuals in-
dicated whether they had learned the items before or not. The
tendency to respond that a previously studied item was pre-
sented (“old”), measured as signal-detection theory (SDT)
response-bias measure c (Macmillan, 1993), correlated highly
across tests, separated by either 10 minutes or seven days, and
also across stimulus material (words & digital images of paint-
ings). The authors concluded that the old–new response bias
in memory is a cognitive trait that should not vary deliberately
within individuals and has predictive value given comparable
experimental settings across tests. They explicitly distin-
guished it from a personality trait but acknowledged that cog-
nitive and personality traits could be associated.
Cross-task stability of the reliance on prior knowledge has
also been documented for the recognition-heuristic use in judg-
ment tasks (i.e., choosing the recognized object and ignore
knowledge about it; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Applying
a latent-trait MPT model, Michalkiewicz and Erdfelder (2016)
found strong correlations of individuals’ recognition-heuristic
use between two tests, separated by either one or seven days or
immediately succeeding each other but with varying judgment–
content domains. Thus, the general tendency to rely on the rec-
ognition heuristic (i.e., on one’s prior knowledge) in judgments
seems to be a cognitive disposition that is stable across time and
independent of the knowledge domain.
Even though the source-guessing bias is somewhat differ-
ent from the old–new response bias (Kantner & Lindsay,
2012) and the recognition-heuristic use (Michalkiewicz &
Erdfelder, 2016), these measures share not only task-related
features such as the mechanism of recognition, but, especially,
the recognition-heuristic use shares a common content feature
with source guessing: people’s reliance on prior knowledge.
Thus, the trait-like stability may also hold for knowledge-
based source guessing but has not been tested yet.
Cognitive trait = personality trait?
Kantner and Lindsay (2014) examined “personality trait-like
qualities” (p. 1273), defined as an association between a re-
sponse bias and a personality trait (a detailed description of
key personality traits and cognitive-processing styles
discussed in this section can be retrieved from Table 1).
Their results brought only weak evidence for a correlation
with need for cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and
internal punishment–reward preference (behavioral inhibition
system/behavioral activation system; Carver & White, 1994)
scores. Whereas a cognitive trait may be independent from a
personality trait, Kantner and Lindsay (2014) acknowledged
that this association may nonetheless exist. Michalkiewicz,
Minich, and Erdfelder (2019) assessed the relation between
the recognition-heuristic use and NFC as well as faith in intu-
ition (FII; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). They
found a negative correlation of recognition-heuristic use and
NFC but no substantial correlation with FII. Participants who
scored low on NFC tended to use the recognition heuristic
more frequently. This relationship was unique to NFC and
held even after controlling for the Big Five personality traits.
So, the recognition-heuristic use possesses personality trait-
like qualities at least to some extent.
If knowledge reliance in source guessing turns out to be a
cognitive trait, personality traits may be related to it as well.
Additionally, knowledge reliance in source guessing may be also
related to stereotypical thinking in general. We often use stereo-
types as a cognitive tool (Gilbert &Hixon, 1991;Macrae,Milne,
& Bodenhausen, 1994) to evaluate members of social groups
because individuating is mentally effortful (Fiske, 1989). This
lack ofmotivation to process individual information deeply could
also hold for knowledge-based source guessing. For instance,
and in line with the aforementioned research on the recognition
heuristic, stereotyping is related to NFC in some studies. That is,
people who score low onNFC tend to use stereotyping as mental
shortcuts more often (e.g., Carter, Hall, Carney, & Rosip, 2006;
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Perlini &Hansen, 2001) or even less often in terms of stereotype-
consistent recall (Crawford & Skowronski, 1998). Transferred to
source guessing, this mixed evidence in terms of the direction of
relation suggests that source guessing and NFC could be related,
although the direction of correlation cannot be derived. With
regard to the Big Five personality traits, Flynn (2005) showed
that the trait Openness to Experience was negatively correlated
with explicit interracial attitudes and positively with impressions
of other-race persons. Carter et al., (2006) showed that the will-
ingness to accept stereotyping is negatively correlated with
Agreeableness and positively with Extraversion and
Neuroticism. Assuming that the knowledge reliance in source
guessing is also used to form an impression about other persons,
one could speculate that it may be negatively correlated with
Openness to Experience and Agreeableness and positively cor-
relatedwith Extraversion andNeuroticism (based onCarter et al.,
2006; Flynn, 2005). It is, however, generally debatable whether
the correlation of stereotyping with personality traits or
cognitive-processing styles can be transferred to stereotyping in
memory tasks, and more specifically, to the cognitive process of
source guessing, and this thereof remains an exploratory research
question.
Overview of the current experiments
We knew from prior research that people differ in the extent to
which they make use of stereotypes/schemas in source guess-
ing (e.g., Arnold et al., 2013; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). In two
experiments, we examined the stability of knowledge reliance
in source guessing to test whether Kantner and Lindsay’s
(2012, 2014) findings characterizing response bias as a cog-
nitive trait generalize above and beyond old–new item guess-
ing and the methodological approach of signal-detection the-
ory to multinomial processing tree modeling. Following
Michalkiewicz and Erdfelder (2016), we tested two different
facets of stability as a trait-like predisposition—stability
across time and knowledge domain. Therefore, we applied
two distinct source-monitoring tasks to each participant, using
item material of the same stereotype domain but separated by
a time interval of 10 minutes or seven days (Experiment 1) or
different stereotype material between tasks (Experiment 2).
Other than Kantner and Lindsay (2012, 2014), we specified
a Bayesian-hierarchical model version of the 2HTSM (Bayen
et al., 1996) to assess parameter correlations, but our data did
nonetheless also allow for a replication of their findings with
both MPT and SDT measures of response bias. In addition to
this relative stability, we examined the absolute stability mea-
sured as the absolute difference of source guessing between
tasks. Based on Roberts’s (2009) stability definition, we did
not necessarily expect to observe the exact same point esti-
mates of source guessing across tasks (i.e., absolute stability)
but rather a correlation across time or knowledge domain ir-
respective of the overall group-level estimate (i.e., relative
stability). Participants who guess stereotype based more
strongly than others in one test should be more prone to do
so in another test even if the mean group-level source guessing
Table 1 Definition of exemplar (personality trait) constructs related to knowledge reliance and response bias
Construct Definition Reference
Recognition heuristic (RH) Simple decision strategy applied in dichotomous judgment tasks. For
instance, when participants need to answer the question “Which city is
more populous: Tokyo or Busan?,” they should choose the recognized
object (here: Tokyo) according to the RH because they immediately
recognize this city (and not the other; here: Busan). They could integrate
more detailed knowledge about the city (e.g., that cities with international
airports such as Tokyo are often populous) and come to the same choice.
e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer (2002);
cf. Michalkiewicz &
Erdfelder (2016)
Need for cognition (NFC) Individual’s tendency to engage in effortful, deep thinking and to enjoy
structuring situations in a meaningful way.
cf. Cacioppo & Petty (1982)
Faith in intuition (FII) Individual’s tendency to rely on intuitive, experiential processing of
information.
cf. Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj,
& Heier (1996)
Big Five Taxonomy for five basal personality traits. Openness for Experience
contrasts curious and exploratory trait facets with rigid and traditional
ones. Conscientiousness contrasts disciplined trait facets with
unambitious ones. Extraversion contrasts warm and outgoing trait facets
with reserved ones. Agreeableness contrasts generous and honest trait
facets with selfish and aggressive ones. Neuroticism contrasts calm and
stable trait facets with sad and scared ones.
e.g., Goldberg (1993); John &
Srivastava (1999); cf. McCrae &
Costa (2008)
Behavioral inhibition
system/behavioral activation
system (BIS/BAS)
Taxonomy for twomotivational systems that underlie negative and positive
affect. The BIS reflects an orientation towards aversive outcomes; the
BAS reflects an orientation towards pleasant outcomes. The BAS scale
can be subdivided into reward responsiveness, drive, and fun seeking.
cf. Carver & White (1994)
Note. Description of central concepts mentioned in the introductory paragraph including examples where these concepts have been referred to in the
literature
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changes (e.g., due to regression to the mean or reactive effects
from the first task).
Experiment 1: Stability across time
If stereotype-based source guessing is a cognitive trait, it
should be stable within individuals across time (Kantner &
Lindsay, 2012; Roberts, 2009). Therefore, we tested whether
participants show comparable (absolute and/or relative to the
group level) knowledge reliance in source guessing in two
separate source-monitoring tasks, performed either 10minutes
or seven days apart. We estimated individual source-
monitoring parameters and cross-task correlations/
differences using Bayesian-hierarchical modeling (latent
trait; Klauer, 2010).
Method
Participants and design
The design was a 2 (time interval between tasks; between
subjects) × 2 (source age: old vs. young; within subjects) ×
2 (age stereotypicality: statement typicality for respective
source age; within subjects) mixed factorial. As there is cur-
rently no appropriate power analysis for Bayesian-hierarchical
MPT models available, we computed the equivalent
frequentist analysis for orientation. An a priori power analysis
in G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) re-
vealed that assuming a moderate positive correlation of source
guessing across time, Pearson’s r = .30, n = 82 participants per
condition are needed to yield a power (1 − β) of .80 at α = .05
(two-tailed). We increased the number of participants per con-
dition beyond a minimum of 100 for two reasons: first, to
increase estimation precision and, second, to fulfill our
counterbalancing constraints. Additionally, we conducted re-
covery simulations to test the precision of parameter estima-
tion for the recruited sample size and used item number in the
experiment (see Table S1 in the Supplemental Material).2
In total, 224 students of the Universities of Mannheim and
Heidelberg participated for psychology course credit or mon-
etary compensation.3 We randomly assigned participants to
two conditions (between subjects) in which they had to com-
plete two age-stereotype source-monitoring tasks either
separated by 10 minutes (n = 114; M = 21.37 years, SD =
2.11 years, age range: 18–26 years, 76% women, 40% psy-
chology majors) or seven days (n = 110;M = 20.76 years, SD
= 2.12 years, age range: 18–26 years, 82% women, 50% psy-
chology majors). Exclusion criteria during participant recruit-
ment were color-blindness, age >26 years (i.e., older than the
younger participants in the survey study for norming the item
material; see Material section), neurological disorders, previ-
ous participation in a similar experiment, and insufficient
German proficiency (i.e., learned after the age of 6).
Material
Age-stereotypical statements for the source-monitoring tasks
consisted of everyday statements selected from a previous
survey study (Kuhlmann et al., 2017). In this survey, 74 older
(M = 70.17 years, 60-84 years) and 69 younger (M = 22.03
years, 18-26 years) participants rated the age typicality of 368
statements reflecting the positive or negative pole of three
adjective dimensions (autonomy, instrumentality, and integri-
ty) in five life domains (family & partnership; finances;
friends & acquaintances; health, fitness, & appearance; reli-
gion & spirituality). An example statement is: “I volunteer at
church.” (adjective dimension: instrumentality [positive]; do-
main: religion & spirituality). The typicality of a statement for
either a “young adult” or an “old adult” (between subjects)
was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very atypical, 2 =
atypical, 3 = neither typical nor atypical, 4 = typical, 5 = very
typical). Following Kuhlmann et al. (2016), we defined a
statement as typically–old if the mean typicality rating for an
“old adult” was ≥3 and, at the same time, <3 for a “young
adult” and vice versa for typically–young statements. One
hundred and thirteen typically–old and 103 typically–young
statements fit our criterion. Out of these, we randomly selected
60 typically–old and typically–young statements each and di-
vided them into two item sets of 60 statements (30 of each
typicality) for the two tasks. Item sets were comparable in
their mean typicality ratings (all ps ≥ .649), polarity, adjective
dimension and life domain. Furthermore, each of the 60-item
sets was divided into three matched subsets of 20 statements,
of which two subsets served as study lists and one as
distractors at test. The assignment of item lists to study and
distractor lists was counterbalanced across participants.4
Further, the source ages and names were counterbalanced
across tasks. At test, one source’s age was indicated to be 70
years and the other’s to be 23 years because these were the
ages participants thought of while rating the statement typical-
ity for an “old adult” or a “young adult,” respectively, in the
2
We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these parameter-recovery
simulations.
3
For unknown reasons, source-guessing variance was strongly restricted for
the first 54 participants in the 7-day condition, preventing a meaningful cor-
relation analysis (see Fig. S1 in the Supplemental Material). Therefore, we
started data collection for this condition anew. Analyses based on the initial
data set of 54 participants can be retrieved from the Supplemental Material as
well as analyses based on the initial 54 (see Fig. S1) and additional 110
participants combined (see Fig. S2). Inclusion of these data did not change
the conclusions (see Tables S2 and S3).
4
The assignment of study and distractor lists was not fully counterbalanced, as
for organizational reasons more participants took part than necessary to fulfill
counterbalance constraints. Because the differences in the number of partici-
pants between counterbalance conditions were small and not at all systematic,
we preferred to analyze all collected data.
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survey (Kuhlmann et al., 2017). In both tasks, commonGerman
last names (without indicating age or gender) served as sources:
either “Müller” and “Schneider” or “Fischer” and “Schmidt.”
Both experiments included the BFI-2 short form (Soto &
John, 2017) derived from the German self-report long form
(Danner et al., 2016; Rammstedt, Danner, Soto, & John,
2018). This short form consists of 30 items assessing the Big
Five personality traits under 15 specific facet traits (each two
items).5 Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strong-
ly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Need for cognition (NFC) and
faith in intuition (FII) were assessed with the German transla-
tion of the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al.,
1996; Keller, Bohner, & Erb, 2000). The REI consists of 29
items, 14 assessing the construct of NFC, 15 assessing FII,
rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = completely false, 7 =
completely true).
Procedure
Experiments were programmed with OpenSesame (Mathôt,
Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) and run on computers with a
screen resolution of 1,280 × 1,024 pixels. Participants were
tested in groups up to four in individual computer booths.
After providing written informed consent, each participant
performed two distinct study–test cycles of a source-
monitoring task. In each task, participants learned information
presented by two sources that they had to remember in a
following test phase. To render both tasks comparable, partic-
ipants were explicitly instructed before learning that both item
and source memory would later be tested. Although incidental
source learning results in greater source-guessing bias
(Kuhlmann et al., 2012), we used intentional source-learning
instructions for both tests as participants would have known
that we test their source memory during the second task based
on the first tasks’ memory test. We further informed partici-
pants that one source person was old and the other young but
did not reveal the specific ages until test. We presented the
statements trial by trial in the study phase, each combined with
one of two source names. Each source presented half typical
information and half atypical information. For instance, the
“old adult” was associated with typically–old behavior, such
as going to church or visiting the doctor but, at the same time,
with typically–young behavior, such as going to the gym and
meeting friends for a shopping tour, equally often. The source
names were printed in green or yellow (counterbalanced be-
tween subjects) on black background (font: sans; font size:
35pt); the statements were written in white below (font: sans;
font size: 32pt). Each statement–source combination remained
on the screen for 4 s followed by an interstimulus interval of
250 ms. We randomized the order of statement–source com-
binations restricted to three subsequent statements presented
by the same source.
At test, we informed participants that it might be helpful to
know social category information about the sources (i.e.,
which source was 70 vs. 23 years old) for the upcoming mem-
ory test. During the self-paced test phase, participants again
saw all statements from the study phase randomly intermixed
with one-third new distractor statements. Participants then de-
cided for each statement whether it had been presented with
one of the two sources or was new. We presented the question
“Who said” written in white font in the top left corner of the
screen, and the test statement, centered on the screen. In the
center, one source name was presented to the left, the other
source name was presented to the right, both in the corre-
sponding color (green or yellow) as in the study phase with
the age information below (i.e., “70 years” vs. “23 years”). We
additionally presented the response option “NEW” in the bot-
tom center in red font. Participants responded via pressing the
key “D” for the left response option, “K” for the right response
option, and the space bar for the new response option. Key
positions on the used QWERTZ keyboard corresponded to
source position on the screen and were additionally marked
with colored (green, yellow, red) stickers. Finally, participants
estimated their perceived ratio of age-typical statement–
source combinations (contingency judgment). That is, they
estimated how many of the statements from the study phase
of each typicality category (i.e., young, old; order
counterbalanced between tasks and within subjects) had been
presented by each source. The procedure for the second
source-monitoring task was equivalent to the first but used
different source labels (e.g., first task: “Fischer” &
“Schneider”; second task: “Müller” & “Schmidt”) and age-
stereotypical statements.
We randomly assigned participants to either complete the
two tasks in the first session, separated by 10 minutes, or one
per session, separated by seven days. In the first session, par-
ticipants in the 10-minute condition worked on the first
source-monitoring task, filled out the demographic question-
naire and the BFI-2 within the fixed interval of 10 minutes
(measured with a stopwatch) followed by the second source-
monitoring task. If participants finished the questionnaires in
less than 10 minutes, they were instructed to wait quietly until
time had passed (nobody needed more than 10 minutes).
Participants in the 7-day condition completed the first
source-monitoring task and then rated the typicality of state-
ments for either a man or a woman (used in Experiment 2) and
completed the REI. Both participant groups returned to the lab
one week later on the same day and, if possible, at the same
time as for the first appointment (± 8 hours) to ensure compa-
rability in the procedures. Participants in the 10-minute con-
dition now rated the statement’s gender typicality and filled
5
Due to experimenter error, the first 26 questionnaires lacked one item for the
domain of conscientiousness (from the trait facet responsibility), which we
thus dropped from analyses for all participants in Experiment 1. We used the
corrected questionnaire in Experiment 2.
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out the REI; participants in the 7-day condition worked on the
second source-monitoring task, then filled out the demograph-
ic questionnaire and the BFI-2. Finally, all participants were
debriefed and compensated.
Results and discussion
Model-based analyses
We applied the 2HTSM (Bayen et al., 1996) to estimate the
following underlying cognitive processes based on the ob-
served response frequencies collected in each source-
monitoring task: The probability of item recognition is mea-
sured by parameter D, separately for statements that were
originally presented by the typical source (DT), the atypical
source (DA), or are new (DN).When a statement is recognized,
the source may also be remembered with probability d. More
specifically in the present paradigm, with probability dT the
typical source is remembered, whereas with dA the atypical
source is remembered. When source memory fails (with prob-
ability 1 − dT or 1 − dA, respectively), guessing processes are
engaged. Specifically, parameter ameasures the probability to
guess that a recognized statement is presented by the typical
source and with the complementary probability 1 − a that the
statement is presented by the atypical source. If item memory
fails, the source can also not be remembered (Bell, Mieth, &
Buchner, 2017; Malejka & Bröder, 2016; see also Klauer &
Kellen, 2010). With probability b, participants then guess that
a statement was previously presented in the study phase (i.e.,
is “old”), either followed by guessing the typical (probability
g) or atypical source (probability 1 − g). With probability 1 −
b, participants guess that the statement is new.
We used Submodel 4 of the 2HTSM (cf. Bayen et al., 2000)
which has been used to analyze data from similar paradigms in
prior studies (Kuhlmann et al., 2016; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002),
illustrated in Fig. 1. This is the most parsimonious model to
start with as it explains source-monitoring data with four pa-
rameters only: D measures the probability of recognizing a
statement as old, regardless of the originally presenting
source, or new (i.e., DT = DA = DN = D). Parameter d mea-
sures the probability of remembering the source of a recog-
nized old statement (i.e., dT = dA = d). Parameter b measures
the probability of guessing “old.” And, crucially, g measures
the probability of guessing the typical source, regardless of
whether the statement was recognized or merely guessed to
be old (i.e., a = g). Thus, the data basis for our analysis
consisted of “typical” trials (aggregating attributions across
typically–old statements presented by the “old” source &
typically–young statements presented by the “young” source),
“atypical” trials (aggregating attributions across typically–old
statements presented by the “young” source & typically–
young statements presented by the “old” source) and new
trials (aggregating attributions across typically–young and -
old distractors).6
To obtain individual parameter estimates and correlations, we
applied a latent-trait Bayesian-hierarchical extension of multino-
mial modeling (Klauer, 2010). This approach accounts for var-
iability between participants by treating parameters as random
variables.7 Individual model parameters and their correlations
are estimated jointly in one model. Separate parameter estimates
for each person are constrained by the population-level model
that assumes a multivariate normal distribution of the probit-
transformed model parameters with a mean and covariance ma-
trix to be estimated from the data. This Bayesian-hierarchical
approach is particularly advantageous here because, in addition,
it allows inclusion of external covariates of model parameters
(e.g., personality traits). Samples from the posterior distribution
of parameters are drawn with the Monte Carlo–Marcov chain
(MCMC) algorithm. We used the R package TreeBUGS for this
purpose (Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2018). To fit a latent-trait
MPT model, prior distributions for the group-level mean and
covariance are needed that are updated by the incorporated
data resulting in a posterior distribution of model parameters.
Following Klauer (2010) and Matzke, Dolan, Batchelder, and
Wagenmakers (2015), TreeBUGS uses weakly informative
priors (see the Supplemental Material or Heck et al., 2018, for
further details). The number of iterations for each model was fit
to convergence. That is, we cycled through threeMCMC chains
with 20,000 iterations each until all parameters reached the de-
sired convergence criterion as indicated by R^ < 1.05 (Gelman &
Rubin, 1992). In order to check for convergence stability, we ran
6
Following a suggestion by an anonymous reviewer, we additionally fitted an
alternative no-bias model attributing any typicality-based differences in source
attributions to differences in source memory (i.e., dT versus dA estimated
independently) but not source-guessing bias (i.e., a = g = .50; retaining the
item-memory restriction DT = DA = DN). This model neither fit the data from
the 10-minute condition of Experiment 1, T1 < .001, T2 < .001, nor the data
from Experiment 2, T1 = .001, T2 < .001. In the 7-day condition, this no-bias
model merely fit in the mean structure, T1 = .09, but not in the covariance
structure T2 < .001. The trade-off between model fit and complexity using the
Bayesian measure DIC (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van der Linde, 2002)
revealed that Submodel 4 (reported in the main analysis of the manuscript;
equating source memory for typical and atypical statement-source combina-
tions) is preferred across all experiments/conditions (10-minute condition of
Experiment 1, DICSubmodel 4: 4718 vs. DICNo-bias Model: 4939; 7-day condition
of Experiment 1, DICSubmodel 4: 4541 vs. DICNo-bias Model: 4656; Experiment 2,
DICSubmodel 4: 5125 vs. DICNo-bias Model: 5528). This confirms that the typi-
cality effects we observed in source attributions are best described by source-
guessing biases, not source-memory differences.We thus retained Submodel 4
of the 2HTSM for the main analyses as this was the most parsimonious model,
which fit the data from all our experimental conditions well and provides a
valid measure of source-guessing bias.
7
Traditionally, MPT model parameters are estimated from the group-level
aggregated response frequencies using maximum likelihood estimation (e.g.,
Hu & Batchelder, 1994), and thus inherently assuming homogeneity of both
participants and items (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999). As a result, MPT models
can be misspecified and their parameter estimates biased if participants and/or
items are heterogeneous (Klauer, 2010; Matzke, Dolan, Batchelder, &
Wagenmakers, 2015; Smith & Batchelder, 2010). Most crucially, individual
differences are ignored in this analysis approach.
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one additional cycle of 20,000 iterations. The convergence
criterion was maintained for this additional cycle in all
our analyses; otherwise, the estimation would have started
anew.
We tested whether the model adequately describes our data
using the test statistics T1 and T2 proposed by Klauer (2010).
T1 tests the mean fit and T2 the covariance fit by computing the
distance between expected and observed mean frequencies or
covariances, respectively, based on Pearson’s χ2 statistic. A
satisfactory group-level model fit is indicated by a posterior
predictive p value >.05. We obtained good model fit for the
means T1 in both conditions, p = .111 (10 minutes) and p = .29
(7 days) but observed a satisfactory model fit for the
covariance structure only in the 7-day condition, p = .062,
and not in the 10-minute condition, p = 0.8
We report the group-level mean estimates of the posterior
distribution for the four source-monitoring parameters and cor-
responding 95%Bayesian credibility intervals (BCI) as present-
ed in Table 2. In the following, we will focus on the source-
guessing parameter g. We first examined whether there was a
stereotype bias in source guessing on the group level.
Therefore, we sampled the posterior distribution for the differ-
ence in the mean source-guessing parameter g from the chance
level of .50 (i.e., Δg − .50). A statistical meaningfully differ-
ence of posterior parameter distributions would be reflected in a
BCI of the difference that excluded zero. In the 10-minute con-
dition, source guessing differed substantially from chance-level
guessing in Task 1,Δ(g− .50) = .07 [.03, .11], and Task 2,Δ(g
− .50) = .06 [.02, .09], thus replicating prior findings of source-
guessing biases in the domain of age stereotypes (in traditional
aggregate-MPT analyses; Kuhlmann et al., 2016). In the 7-day
condition, source guessing exceeded .50 only in the first task,
Δ(g − .50) = .05 [.01, .08] but not in second task one week
later, Δ(g − .50) = .01 [−.03, .04].
Stability
Relative stability We define relative stability as the cross-task
correlations of source-monitoring parameters. These were au-
tomatically estimated in the latent-trait approach as imple-
mented in TreeBUGS (Heck et al., 2018). Table 3 presents
estimates of the between-task correlations of each source-
monitoring parameter based on the posterior samples. For
source guessing, the individual-level correlation across tasks
is also depicted in Fig. 2. Numerically, these source-guessing
correlations were in the positive direction, suggesting that par-
ticipants whose source guessing was biased in the first test
also tended to be biased in the second test. However, both
correlations were rather small and their BCIs included zero,
such that a negative correlation or null population correlation
cannot be ruled out. Thus, there was no conclusive evidence
for individual-level relative stability of the stereotype bias in
source guessing. To exclude poor reliability of source guess-
ing as an explanation for the observed weak cross-task corre-
lations, we confirmed via split-half analyses that source guess-
ing was estimated with satisfactory reliability within each task
(ρ^ = .47–.70; see Appendix A for further details). In addition,
we conducted simulation analyses to confirm that trait-level
8
The misfit of the covariance structure in the 10-minute condition persisted (p
< .01) for all other submodels. The covariance misfit in the 10-minute condi-
tion was caused by seven participants for whom Submodel 4 did not fit in the
mean structure either. The exclusion of these seven participants led to a sig-
nificant improvement of both model fit indicators (T1 = .349, T2 = .614),
without substantially changing the overall parameter group means and corre-
lations. We thus decided to retain Submodel 4 for all further analyses, which
has been successfully applied to analyze source-monitoring data in prior stud-
ies with similar paradigms (Bayen et al., 2000; Kuhlmann et al., 2016).
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Fig. 1 Two-high-threshold multinomial model of source monitoring
adapted to the current paradigm. DT = probability of recognizing a
statement that had been presented by a typical source; DA = probability
of recognizing a statement that had been presented by an atypical source;
DN = probability of knowing a statement is new; dT = probability of
correctly remembering the source of a statement that had been
presented with a typical source; dA = probability of correctly
remembering the source of a statement that had been presented with an
atypical source; b = probability of guessing that an unrecognized
statement is old; a = probability of guessing that a recognized statement
had been presented by the typical source; g = probability of guessing that
an unrecognized statement had been presented by a typical source.
Adapted from “Source Discrimination, Item Detection, and Multinomial
Models of Source Monitoring” (Bayen et al., 1996)
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correlations of .70 between source guessing across tasks could
have been recovered with satisfactory precision in the latent-trait
model with the given number of items and participants. Crucially
note, however, that our recovery simulations, about which more
details can be retrieved from the Supplemental Material, showed
that weaker correlations (i.e., ρ = .30) could not be precisely
recovered; thus, there may be a true weak correlation of
source-guessing bias across tasks, but it is smaller than the trait-
like across-task correlation reported for old–new guessing.
Indeed, in contrast to source guessing, other memory and
guessing processes showed strong relative stability across
time (see Table 3). This also pertained to the item-guessing
parameter b, which measures the tendency to guess old when
an item is not recognized and can be interpreted as the MPT
analogue to the old–new response bias in the signal-detection
framework underlying Kantner and Lindsay (2012). As is ev-
ident in Table 3, we conceptually replicated their findings of
cross-time relative stability in item guessing. Additionally, we
generally replicated the results from Kantner and Lindsay
when fitting the SDT bias measure c for item memory to the
data as used by the authors (whereas adapting the bias mea-
sure c for source memory did not result in substantial correla-
tions across tasks). A description of the SDT analyses and
their results are summarized in Appendix B.
Absolute stability As the correlative evidence with regard to
relative stability largely hinges on the observed interindividual
variance in source guessing, a restriction of variance as present
(at least to some extent) in this first experiment, may mask
existing comparable source-guessing parameters on an individ-
ual level. For this reason, we further tested whether participants’
source-guessing bias remained stable across tasks in absolute
terms by sampling the posterior distribution of the absolute
mean differences between both tasks.9 In the 10-minute condi-
tion, the absolute mean difference in the source-guessing param-
eter across tasks indicated a change to a credible extent, but it
was of negligible size, |Δ(Task 1 – Task 2)| = .02 [.001, .06]. In
the 7-day condition, the mean difference in the source-guessing
parameter across tasks also changed credibly, albeit the change
was again fairly small, |Δ(Task 1 – Task 2)| = .04 [.003, .09].
That is, as graphically illustrated in Fig. 2, most participants’
absolute reliance on stereotypes in source guessing as measured
by source-guessing bias was to a fairly comparable extent in
both tasks. A closer inspection of the reliance on stereotypes
in source guessing revealed that for only 10.53% (12 out of
114) of participants in the 10-minute condition and 22.73%
(25 out of 110) in the 7-day condition, the mean absolute differ-
ence was larger than .15 between tasks. That is, albeit some
participants changed their guessing behavior to a substantial
degree, the vast majority of participants did not—irrespective
of the time interval between tasks. Further, the guessing bias
was descriptively more pronounced in the first task for most
individuals (n10 minutes = 63, 55.26% of individuals; n7 days: 74,
67.27% of individuals), indicating regression to the mean ten-
dencies (also evident from Fig. 2). Thus, in contrast to the
correlational relative stability analysis, the analysis of the more
conservative absolute stability in individual source guessing
across time suggested that stereotype reliance in source guess-
ing is stable across time in the majority of participants.
Covariates of source guessing
Table 4 presents estimates of the correlations between source
guessing and z-transformed covariates, and Table 5 presents
9
We thank Adam Osth for suggesting this analysis.
Table 2 Multinomial processing tree model group-level parameter estimates of both experiments
Experiment Task Parameters
D d b g
Experiment 1
10 minutes 1 .73 (.40) [.70, .76] .36 (1.46) [.24, .48] .42 (.52) [.36, .47] .57 (.37) [.53, .61]
2 .67 (.40) [.63, .70] .38 (1.83) [.23, .54] .37 (.59) [.31, .42] .56 (.30) [.52, .59]
7 days 1 .71 (.35) [.69, .74] .39 (1.12) [.28, .49] .42 (.58) [.36, .48] .55 (.36) [.51, .58]
2 .69 (.40) [.65, .72] .38 (1.35) [.27, .50] .32 (.50) [.27, .36] .50 (.29) [.47, .54]
Experiment 2
1 .55 (.29) [.52, .58] .34 (1.01) [.25, .43] .48 (.36) [.44, .51] .59 (.47) [.55, .62]
2 .68 (.44) [.65, .72] .53 (.71) [.47, .60] .33 (.58) [.28, .38] .51 (.45) [.47, .55]
Note. We used Submodel 4 of the Two-high-threshold multinomial processing tree model from Bayen et al., (1996) adapted to our paradigm. Parameter
values were estimated using the latent-trait Bayesian-hierarchical approach (Klauer, 2010) with the R package TreeBUGS (Heck et al., 2018). See text for
further details. Parentheses represent standard deviations (on the probit scale). Brackets indicate 95% Bayesian credibility intervals (BCI). D =
probability of recognizing a statement as previously presented and probability of knowing that a distractor statement is new; d = probability of correctly
remembering the (either typical or atypical) source of a statement; b = probability of guessing that an unrecognized statement is old; g = probability of
guessing that a statement had been presented by the source with the typical age/gender for this statement when the source is not remembered
Mem Cogn
Fig. 2 Top row: Sampled population correlation coefficients ρ^ of source-
guessing parameters (g) across tasks. Individual correlations are displayed
in gray points as well as the linear trend line. Error bars represent standard
errors (gray). Bottom row: Individual source-guessing parameter
estimates connected across tasks. The respective task-specific knowledge
domain is displayed in brackets. For both rows, first graph = Experiment
1, 10-minute condition; second graph = Experiment 1, 7-day condition;
third graph = Experiment 2
Table 3 Across-task correlations between source-monitoring parameters of both experiments
Experiment Task 1 Task 2
D d b g
Experiment 1
10 minutes D .64 [.43, .82] .37 [.12, .60] −.21 [−.46, .06] −.11 [−.42, .21]
d .32 [.06, .54] .31 [.07, .52] −.16 [−.41, .10] −.34 [−.61, −.03]
b −.15 [−.42, .14] −.04 [−.33, .25] .82 [.64, .94] .23 [−.10, .55]
g −.03 [−.31, .26] −.07 [−.35, .21] .14 [−.16, .41] .27 [−.06, .56]
7 days D .45 [.19, .69] −.02 [−.30, .26] −.06 [−.36, .25] −.05 [−.37, .27]
d .31 [.04, .54] .14 [−.12, .38] −.24 [−.52, .04] −.10 [−.41, .22]
b −.08 [−.35, .21] −.10 [−.37, .17] .38 [.06, .65] .03 [−.32, .36]
g −.11 [−.38, .17] −.03 [−.32, .26] .17 [−.15, .47] .20 [−.14, .52]
Experiment 2
D .70 [.50, .85] .35 [.07, .60] −.13 [−.41, .15] −.23 [−.49, .05]
d .31 [.06, .55] .29 [.03, .53] .06 [−.22, .34] −.06 [−.33, .21]
b −.11 [−.36, .15] .09 [−.19, .35] .78 [.61, .91] −.09 [−.34, .18]
g −.22 [−.43, .01] −.26 [−.48, −.02] .14 [−.11, .39] .31 [.07, .53]
Note. Sampled population correlation coefficients ρ^ are displayed. We used Submodel 4 of the two-high-threshold multinomial processing tree model
from Bayen et al. (1996) adapted to our paradigm. Parameter values were estimated using the latent-trait Bayesian-hierarchical approach (Klauer, 2010)
with the R package TreeBUGS (Heck et al., 2018). See text for further details. Brackets indicate 95%Bayesian credibility intervals (BCI).D = probability
of recognizing a statement as previously presented and probability of knowing that a distractor statement is new; d = probability of correctly remem-
bering the (either typical or atypical) source of a statement; b = probability of guessing that an unrecognized statement is old; g = probability of guessing
that a statement had been presented by the source with the typical age/gender for this statement when the source is not remembered. Substantial
correlations (BCI excludes 0) are marked in boldface
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descriptive statistics of these covariates. We found weak but sub-
stantial negative correlations between source guessing and NFC
for both tasks in the 7-day condition. For all other correlations in
both conditions, the 95% BCIs included zero, revealing that the
influence of any Big Five domain and FII on source guessing
was unreliable. Thus, we could not identify any systematic
personality-trait predictors of stereotype-based source guessing.
Regarding the within-task relationship between source
memory and source guessing, we found a negative trend (10
minutes; Task 1: ρ^ = −.15 [−.44, .14]; Task 2: ρ^ = −.19 [−.51,
.14] and 7 days; Task 1: ρ^ = −.29 [−.57, .01]; Task 2: ρ^ = −.28
[−.59, .07]) suggesting that source guessing becomes more
stereotype based with poorer source memory (in line with
experimental manipulations; Kuhlmann et al., 2016).
However, the BCIs of these correlations again included zero.
Additionally, the contingency judgment (proportion of typical
statement–source combinations in the study phase, averaged
for typically–old and typically–young statement–source com-
binations) for each source-monitoring task was incorporated
as a covariate in the model. On the mean level (see Table 5),
the contingency judgment was not biased in either condition
(i.e., all ps ≥ .635 testing against .50), except for the first task
in the 7-day condition, which showed a small overestimation
of typical statement–source combinations, t(109) = 2.29, p <
.05, BF10 = 1.27. Correlations between this contingency judg-
ment and source guessing were numerically in the expected
positive direction in all conditions. However, these
correlations were only substantial (i.e., BCI excludes zero)
in the first task of the 10-minute condition and the second task
of the 7-day condition. Thus, we partially replicated prior
findings of the probability-matching account of source-
guessing bias (Arnold et al., 2013; Bayen & Kuhlmann,
2011; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002), which posits that when people
do not remember the source, they match their source-guessing
behavior to the perceived contingencies between items and
sources.
Experiment 2
One potential limitation of our first experiment is that partic-
ipants were faced with the similar (albeit different statements
and names) task twice, which could elicit reactance in the
second (repeated) task as participants respond to the same type
of statements. They may have actively reflected on the first
task during the time interval between tasks (albeit being rela-
tively short in the 10-minute condition) and, consequently,
changed their response behavior for the second task based
on a strategy, or generated an internal hypothesis about the
experiment. To test whether the weak relative stability in the
first experiment was caused by using the same stereotype
domain twice, we conducted a second experiment that specif-
ically tested the effect of item material that reflected distinct
knowledge domains: age (analogous to Experiment 1) and
Table 5 Descriptive statistics for the covariates of both experiments
Experiment Contingency Cognitive-processing styles Personality traits: Big Five
NFC FII O C E A N
Experiment 1
10 Minutes
Task 1 Task 2
M .51 .52 4.95 4.42 3.69 3.64 3.31 3.86 2.85
SD .16 .16 .82 .84 .66 .68 .58 .58 .75
Min .10 .13 3.07 1.80 1.83 1.80 2 2.50 1
Max .95 .90 7 6.13 5 5 4.33 4.83 4.83
7 days
M .53 .51 5.14 4.22 3.76 3.66 3.23 3.88 2.81
SD .14 .15 .72 .90 .66 .65 .65 .60 .67
Min .15 .20 3.50 1.80 1.17 2.20 1.33 2 1.17
Max .88 .85 6.71 6.27 5 5 4.50 5 5
Experiment 2
M .52 .50 5.08 4.28 3.67 3.44 3.48 3.85 2.78
SD .16 .13 .77 .73 .62 .54 .64 .59 .75
Min .17 .20 1.93 2 2.33 2.33 1.83 1.83 1.33
Max .92 .83 6.79 6.20 5 4.50 4.83 5 4.67
Note. NFC = need for cognition; FII = faith in intuition; O = openness; C = conscientiousness; E = extraversion; A = agreeableness; N = neuroticism.
NFC and FII were rated on a 7-point Likert scale; Big Five were rated on a 5-point Likert scale. Contingency = perceived ratio of typical statement–
source combination per source-monitoring task (averaged for statement–source combinations of both typicalities).M = means, SD = standard deviation,
Min = minimum, Max = maximum. All values are aggregated across items
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gender stereotypes. This also allowed us to test whether the
absolute stability in source-guessing bias found in Experiment
1 generalizes across different knowledge domains.
Method
Participants and design
Participants were 108 students of the University of Mannheim
(44% psychology majors; 71% women), with a mean age of
21.47 years (SD = 2.25 years, age range: 18–26 years). Our
sample size considerations and exclusion criteria were identi-
cal to those of Experiment 1; we additionally excluded partic-
ipants of Experiment 1. Again, participants received course
credit or monetary compensation.
Material
Ninety age-stereotypical statements were selected from the
same survey study (Kuhlmann et al., 2017) as in Experiment
1, using a cutoff criterion of >3.2 for one age group and ≤2.9
for the other age group. By needing age-stereotypical state-
ments for one task only, we were able to change the item
number from 60 to 90 per task compared with Experiment 1
to increase estimation precision.
Gender-stereotypical items for the second source-
monitoring task consisted of everyday statements that were
normed by a subset of 86 participants (M = 21.55 years, SD
= 1.85 years, age range: 18–26 years) from Experiment 1.10
Statements reflected the domains “career” and “family” for
both genders (i.e., men/career, women/career, men/family,
women/family). An example statement is: “I see myself as
the head of our family” (men/family). Participants either rated
the statements’ typicality for a man or a woman (randomly
assigned; between subjects) on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very
atypical, 5 = very typical).11 We defined a statement as
typically male if the mean typicality rating for a male person
was >3.2 and, at the same time, ≤3 for a female person, and
vice versa for typically-female statements. We randomly se-
lected 90 statements to be equally distributed to the four gen-
der × domain categories. Statements per category did not dif-
fer in terms of their typicality ratings from male and female
participants, all ps ≥ .50. Each of the 90-item sets was divided
into three matched subsets of 30 statements, of which two
subsets served as study lists and one subset as distractors at
test. We used the same source labels (names) as in Experiment
1 for both tasks.
Procedure
Participants completed both source-monitoring tasks in one
session, structured like the first session of Experiment 1’s
10-minute condition, with the exception that participants filled
out the demographic questionnaire, the BFI and the REI dur-
ing the 10-minute break. We held task order constant across
participants: All participants first completed the task with age-
stereotypical item material, followed by the task with gender-
stereotypical item material.
Results and discussion
Model-based analyses
As in Experiment 1, we analyzed the data with the 2HTSM
Submodel 4 (Bayen et al., 1996) using the Bayesian-
hierarchical latent-trait approach in TreeBUGS (Heck et al.,
2018). We obtained good model fit for both the mean (T1, p
= .45) and covariance (T2, p = .22) structure. Group-level
estimates of the four parameters are presented in Table 2. On
the group level, source guessing exceeded chance level (.50)
for the first task, Δ(g − .50) = .09 [.05, .12], but not for the
second task using gender stereotypes,Δ(g − .50) = .01 [−.03,
.05]. Participants changed from being biasedwhen performing
an age stereotype source-monitoring task to being unbiased in
the second source-monitoring task with gender-stereotypical
item material 10 minutes later.
Stability
Relative stability Table 3 presents estimates of the correlations
between the four source-monitoring processes across the two
tasks. Although the cross-task correlation of source guessing
was again rather small, it was substantial (i.e., BCI excludes
zero). Thus, participants who guessed based on age stereo-
types in the first task, were also more likely to guess based
on gender stereotypes in the second task (see also Fig. 2).
Albeit the correlation analysis suggested credible relative sta-
bility across knowledge domains, the magnitude is again rath-
er small and descriptively comparable to Experiment 1, in
10
All participants of Experiment 1 completed the gender-typicality rating in
Experiment 1 but we prepared and started data collection for Experiment 2
before Experiment 1 was finished.
11
The original item set consisting of 420 statements was provided by Dr.
Marie Luisa Schaper (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf). Statements for
men and women were generated based on the domains “career” and “family”
for both genders (i.e., men/career, women/career, men/family, women/family)
and were originally rated on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly male, 5 = strongly
female). Ninety-six statements (typically-female statements: M = 3.07, SD =
.33; typically-male statements: M = 3.17, SD = .28, 48 statements from each
domain) with equal typicality ratings frommale and female participants and 65
additional statements (typically-female statements: M = 3.23, SD = .42;
typically-male statements: M = 3.01, SD = .84; 27 statements from the career
domain & 38 statements from the family domain) from the original item pool
were chosen for our norming study to have a sufficient large number of
typically-male and typically-female statements in our source-monitoring task.
To have comparable typicality ratings and cut-off criteria between source-
monitoring tasks with different material, we adjusted the response scale to a
5-point Likert scale, as used in Experiment 1, ranging from 1 = very atypical to
5 = very typical for the norming in Experiment 1.
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which this correlation, however, did not reach statistical cred-
ibility. This seemingly inconsistent result across our experi-
ments is to be expected, given our recovery simulations show-
ing that with the given sample and item sizes, only large trait-
like cross-task correlations of source guessing could be recov-
ered satisfactorily, whereas there are issues with recovering
smaller correlations. Thus, there is some evidence for cross-
task relative stability of knowledge reliance in source guess-
ing, but it is less stable than it would be expected for a cogni-
tive trait. Again, within-task split-half correlations indicated
good reliability of source guessing across the first task using
age stereotypes, ρ^ = .75 [.56, .89], and the second task using
gender stereotypes, ρ^ = .70 [.45, .88] (see Appendix A for
further details), such that poor reliability cannot explain the
observed weak cross-task correlation.
Other memory and guessing parameters also showed rela-
tive stability (see Table 3). Old–new item guessing was highly
correlated across tasks, again conceptually replicating Kantner
and Lindsay (2012). In addition, we again replicated the re-
sults from Kantner and Lindsay with the SDT bias measure c
for item memory (whereas adapting the bias measure c for
source memory did not result in credible correlations across
tasks; see Appendix B).
Absolute stability To account for the observed group-level
differences in source guessing between tasks, we calculated
the difference between each individual guessing estimate and
the respective task group-level mean to relativize each indi-
vidual’s strength of knowledge reliance within each task. We
then sampled the absolute mean difference for this mean-
centered guessing score between the two tasks. The difference
|Δ(Task 1 – Task 2)| was .12 [.002, .36]—again indicating
some changes in source guessing between tasks (see Fig. 2).
However, the absolute mean difference was only larger than
.15 for 36.11% of participants (39 out of 108). Thus, albeit
some participants changed their guessing behavior between
tasks, the majority of participants did not and instead showed
fairly stable guessing tendencies. As already indicated by di-
verging group-level guessing biases between tasks, on an in-
dividual level, the guessing bias was descriptively more pro-
nounced in the first task for most individuals (n = 73, 67.59%
of individuals), possibly indicating regression to the mean
tendencies in the second task. Further, the somewhat larger
mean change in source guessing across tasks (and for a some-
what larger proportion of participants) in comparison to
Experiment 1 may be due to differential strength of age versus
gender stereotypes within participants (albeit matched average
stereotype strength of the item material).
Covariates of source guessing
Estimated correlations between source guessing and z-trans-
formed covariates are presented in Table 4. We found a
substantial negative correlation of source guessing with
NFC and a substantial positive correlation with FII in the first
task. However, this pattern did not emerge for the second task.
For all other correlations, the 95% BCI included zero showing
that the influence of any Big Five domain on source guessing
was estimated unreliably. This indicates that a (already rather
weak) cognitive trait is not necessarily linked to a personality
trait, as suggested by Kantner and Lindsay (2012).
Further, there was a negative correlation between source
memory and source guessing for the first task (Task 1: ρ^ =
−.48 [−.69, −.25]; Task 2: ρ^ = −.08 [−.34, .19]), showing that
poorer source memory is, the more source guessing becomes
stereotype based (confirming the trend of Experiment 1 and
replicating, e.g., Arnold et al., 2013; Kuhlmann et al., 2016).
Participants’ contingency judgments at the end of each task
showed no bias at all (see Table 5). Participants seemed to
perceive the true 50:50 contingency of statement–source com-
binations almost perfectly, both ps ≥ .116, tested against .50.
As presented in Table 4, the estimated correlation of source
guessing with the respective contingency judgment of each
task indicated a strong relationship. Beyond the positive
trends observed in Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2
replicated the probability-matching account of source-
guessing bias (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Spaniol & Bayen,
2002; hierarchicalMPT: Arnold et al., 2013). People appear to
match their source-guessing behavior to the perceived contin-
gencies between items and sources, regardless of the distinct
knowledge domain.
General discussion
In two experiments, we tested the state versus trait-like nature of
stereotype-based source guessing. The rationale behind these
experiments was derived from previous research documenting
intraindividual stability of response bias in item memory and of
decision-making processes. Individuals performed two inde-
pendent study–test cycles of a source-monitoring task. They
learned information from two person sources of different ages
or gender that needed to be remembered in a later (source)
memory test. Information was either typical or atypical for the
source’s social category (age group or gender). If individuals
did not remember, they could have relied on their prior knowl-
edge (i.e., social stereotypes) to infer the source. We examined
whether, and if so, to what extent, the reliance on stereotypes is
an inherent cognitive trait mirrored in stable guessing behavior
across time (Experiment 1) and knowledge domains
(Experiment 2). We estimated memory performance and guess-
ing tendencies of each individual with Bayesian-hierarchical
MPT models. Cross-task correlations of source guessing re-
vealed (at best) weak positive associations across 10 minutes,
seven days, and knowledge domains. In contrast, item guessing
(conceptually replicating Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014, with
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the MPT analogue of their SDT-based item response bias mea-
sure) and other source-monitoring processes showed medium
to large relative stability across these manipulations.
Nonetheless, individual guessing tendencies were mainly stable
between tasks when measured in absolute differences. Across
experiments, we observed some evidence that the perceived
statement–source contingency explained individuals’ guessing
tendencies, but none of the personality traits and cognitive-
processing styles consistently did.
Methodological challenges of cross-task relative
stability in source guessing
Although we obtained positive cross-task correlations of
source guessing, implying its relative stability, in all experi-
ments and conditions, we acknowledge that these correlations
were rather weak and not estimated precisely (i.e., large cred-
ibility intervals), resulting in only one substantial cross-task
correlation in Experiment 2 (and in Experiment 1’s extended
sample with n = 164; see Supplemental Material). However,
we caution not to dismiss the relative stability based on these
correlational analyses due to several statistical challenges in-
volved in this correlative measure. Although our split-half
reliability analyses dismiss poor reliability of source guessing
as a methodological explanation, our post hoc parameter-
recovery simulations (see Supplemental Material) revealed
that only large correlations (i.e., ρ = .7) could be precisely
recovered in the latent-trait 2HTSM Submodel 4 with the
given number of observations. Weaker correlations, in partic-
ular those of the size observed in both experiments (i.e. ρ =
.30), could not be recovered with adequate power, particularly
because the recovery simulations were based on the smallest
number of items and participants in our experiments. The
credible cross-task source-guessing correlation for the extend-
ed sample indicated that even small correlations should be
recovered more precisely with an increasing number of obser-
vations. We are thus careful to not overinterpret the overlap of
two of three source-guessing cross-task correlation’s credibil-
ity interval with zero, as evidence against relative stability of
source guessing. Nonetheless, if source guessing was a highly
stable cognitive trait to a comparable extent as the response
bias in recognition memory (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012, 2014)
or the knowledge reliance in the recognition-heuristic use
(Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2016), then we should have de-
tected such large cross-task correlation based on the sample
size and item numbers in both experiments. As such, we can
conclude that source guessing does not show the high relative
stability that one would expect for a cognitive trait.
It is notable that we detected medium to large cross-task
correlations between the item response bias parameter b,
confirming its trait-like status (Kantner & Lindsay, 2012,
2014) and between other source-monitoring parameters.
Compared with these parameters, variance in source guessing
tended to be smaller, with the largest variance observed in the
source-memory parameter d. However, variance in source
guessing was overall only slightly smaller than in the item
response bias parameter b, which consistently showed large
cross-task correlations.
Thus, a restriction of inter-individual variance in source
guessing is rather implausible as an explanation of why we
observed only small source-guessing correlations. In contrast,
the sparse amount of information (number of observations)
underlying each parameter estimate in the 2HTSM model
(Bayen et al., 1996) may explain the difficulty to precisely
recover estimates of cross-task correlations in source guessing,
specifically, whereas the cross-task correlations of other model
parameters (including the item response bias parameter b that
was of additional interest to us) could be recovered precisely.
Specifically, the dependence of source guessing on various pre-
ceding parameters may render the detection of small correla-
tions in this parameter more difficult in the data at hand. In
addition, in Experiment 1, in which both source-guessing cor-
relations were not substantial, the covariance structure of the
data was overall not explained well by the model.
One potential substantive explanation why relative item-
guessing stability did not generalize to source guessing may
be that the conceptualization of both cognitive processes differs.
Item guessing refers to a conservative versus liberal response
bias—individuals inherently diverge from each other with re-
gard to their response criterion. Source guessing refers to
responding stereotypically versus atypically when (source)
memory is absent. Contrary to item guessing, no task-/materi-
al-unrelated criterion such as conservative versus liberal exists
for source guessing without prior knowledge activation. Source
guessing cannot be investigated and interpreted in a sensible
manner without the activation of schema/stereotypes as a con-
servative or liberal response criterion (which would just mean
to respond to one source more often than the other). Although
the interpretation of source guessing depends on what the
sources stand for, similar findings such as probability matching
have been documented across paradigms with diverse schema
and stereotype domains (e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011;
Kuhlmann et al., 2016; Kuhlmann et al., 2012; Spaniol &
Bayen, 2002; for an overview, see Kuhlmann & Bayen,
2016). This is why one can expect our results to be generaliz-
able also to other knowledge-based source-guessing biases
(which, however, awaits to be tested in future studies).
We are confident that there is not a general problem with
estimating relative correlation stability of parameters from the
2HTSM MPT model. Indeed, our supplemental correlational
analyses of the SDT response-bias measure c, in item and
source memory, replicated the latent-trait MPT-model-based
results for item guessing (parameter b) and source guessing
(parameter g), respectively. Thus, our results are independent
of the employed memory measurement model (MPT vs.
SDT). Regarding item response bias, this means that
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Kantner and Lindsay’s (2012, 2014) findings can be robustly
replicated within the MPT framework, further evidencing the
(relative) stability of responding either liberal or conservative
with regard to old–new recognition.
The nature of stereotype-based source guessing
Given the described inherent methodological drawbacks of
estimating relative stability in source guessing, we additional-
ly considered absolute stability in our analyses. Crucially, this
absolute difference captures minimal changes in guessing ten-
dencies and can thus be defined as an even stricter measure of
stability. This measure revealed rather small changes in the
knowledge reliance of source guessing within individuals. In
particular, these changes were of negligible size (≤.04) in
Experiment 1, in which the reliance on the same stereotypes
(age) was assessed in both tasks. The somewhat larger absolute
change in source guessing in Experiment 2 was to be expected,
as the transition of knowledge domains (age to gender) between
tasks may likely still elicit a substantial change in individuals’
guessing behavior. Although we matched average stereotype
strength between tasks based on the surveys, the age and gender
stereotypes may be of different strength within a given individ-
ual. Nonetheless, only about a third of participants showed a
substantial change of .15 or larger in source guessing between
tasks in Experiment 2. Thus, in absolute terms, source guessing
was fairly stable across tasks in both experiments.
Both stability measures broadly result in convergent evidence
that source guessing encompasses at least to some extent trait-
like features. Although correlations were weaker than one would
expect for a trait, the majority of participants remained highly
stable in absolute terms in their source guessing, thus fulfilling
the more conservative stability criterion. In any case, these sta-
bility analyses provided a more nuanced picture of the knowl-
edge reliance in guessing tendencies. In particular, the obtained
findings for (absolute) stability of source guessing may speak to
the underlying process nature—namely, whether it is a rather
automatic cognitive process or under conscious control (cf.
Bargh, 1994). One could speculate that source guessing may
rather be an automatic cognitive process not under conscious
control if it is fairly stable across tasks and,more generally, across
situations. Contrary to this, prior research suggested that source
guessing relies on systematic rather than on heuristic processing
(e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005;
Spaniol & Bayen, 2002; for a theoretical overview, see
Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Raye, 2000), and in the present
experiments there was also some evidence that the perceived
item–source contingency influenced source guessing, which
seems to rather reflect systematic processing (cf. Kuhlmann
et al., 2012). However, as the two presented experiments only
provide indirect evidence, future studies should consider to di-
rectly manipulate and test the (automatic versus controlled) na-
ture of source guessing.
However, our results clearly demonstrated that the trait-like
nature of source guessing is not as pronounced as for other
cognitive biases and thereby diverges from other cognitive
processes involved in source attributions. As the process of
source guessing may be of more complex nature it may not
only depend on other cognitive processes such as source
memory but also on the perception of contingencies already
at encoding of information (e.g., Arnold et al., 2013) and the
need to integrate further knowledge (e.g., about social
groups). Therefore, the nature of stereotype-based source
guessing may not be entirely comparable to, but qualitatively
different from, other response biases (e.g., knowledge reliance
in the recognition-heuristic use; Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder,
2016) or decision-making processes (e.g., such as risk
seeking; Glöckner & Pachur, 2012). The potentially more
complex nature of source guessing as a cognitive trait may
also explain the absence of its link with personality traits,
which is present for the previously named cognitive processes.
In addition to noting that the reliance on prior knowledge
may often lead to correct source attributions outside the labora-
tory, one could further speculate that instead ofmere knowledge
reliance, stereotype-based source guessing reflects a rational
metacognitive bias compensating for (perceived) memory dif-
ferences between sources (cf. Batchelder & Batchelder, 2008).
In particular, knowledge-based source guessing might be a
metacognitive compensation strategy for the sometimes found
memory deficit for expected sources (i.e., inconsistency effect;
e.g., Bell, Buchner, Kroneisen, & Giang, 2012; Ehrenberg &
Klauer, 2005; Kroneisen & Bell, 2013; Küppers & Bayen,
2014). Even though source guessing has been found to reflect
rational metacognitive strategies due to item–memory differ-
ences (e.g., Kuhlmann & Touron, 2011; Meiser, Sattler, &
Von Hecker, 2007), Schaper, Kuhlmann, and Bayen (2019)
recently demonstrated that knowledge-based source guessing
cannot be described as a rational metacognitive bias. In fact,
expectancies about the memorability of expected and unexpect-
ed item–source combinations did not predict the knowledge
reliance (here: schema) in source guessing.
State determinants of source guessing
The current findings are of particular importance, as age stereo-
types become internalized at a young age and then become self-
stereotypes at an older age (Levy, 2009; Levy, Slade, Chung, &
Gill, 2015), which under threat can lead to older adults’
underperformance in cognitive and physical tasks (see
Lamont, Swift, & Abrams, 2015, for a meta-analytic review).
The somewhat stable reliance on stereotypes and schemas in
source guessing potentially maintains or even reinforces stereo-
types in general, profoundly influencing how we form impres-
sions about others (e.g., Bell et al., 2013) and how we behave
(e.g., in a legal decision-making context; Lindsay, 1994, 2014).
Therefore, future studies should be inspired by research
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questions on how to nevertheless explore state-like features to
identify specific situational determinants that prompt people to
rely more or less on prior knowledge, and age stereotypes in
particular, in source guessing. Former research has shown that
the stereotype reliance in source guessing can be debiased
through effective encoding (Arnold et al., 2013; Bayen &
Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann et al., 2012; Spaniol & Bayen,
2002) and by informing people about the negative impact of
stereotypes in society (Marsh et al., 2006). However, whether
these interventions also help to reduce age-stereotype-based
source guessing has not yet been determined. In addition, the
long-term effects of such interventions on the maintenance of
knowledge reliance need to be examined. Future studies could
identify additional state moderators of stereotype-based source
guessing related, for instance, to the uniqueness and memorabil-
ity of the statements and the personal relevance of the person’s
sources and depicted stereotype. Other external factors that
could contribute to the knowledge reliance may be the general
motivation to participate or strategy use.
In sum, our experiments are a first step towards unpacking
the underlying nature of the cognitive process of source guess-
ing. Along with future studies, a better understanding of trait
and state characteristics may help to determine who is most
prone to stereotype-biased memory and how this bias may be
effectively prevented.
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Appendix A
In order to examine the stability of stereotype reliance source
guessing across tasks (time), we first must ensure that we have
a reliable and stable measure of source guessing within each
source-monitoring task. To test this, we used the split-half
method and created two different lists per test phase from each
task consisting of 60 test statements each for Experiment 1.
We assigned test statements to the lists based on their
statement-source typicality and temporal order in which they
appeared in the test phase. Specifically, the chronologically
first test statement of each statement-source combination
(e.g., typically–young statement originally presented by the
source “Schmidt”) was assigned to the first list, the second
statement of each combination was assigned to the second list
and so on for all statement-source combinations (3 sources
[“old” source vs. “young” source vs. new] × 2 statement typ-
icalities [old vs. young]). Thus, each list contained an equal
number of statements from each statement-source combina-
tion. We chose this procedure to have comparable lists (i.e.,
test halves) regarding their content and testing time. We esti-
mated parameters for the two tests lists of each task with the
latent-trait approach, including estimation of the correlations
of source-guessing probabilities between lists. We obtained a
good model fit for the mean but, again, a less satisfactory
model fit for the covariance structure (see Table 6).
For Experiment 2, data preprocessing for this split-half
analysis was analogous to Experiment 1 except that we ex-
cluded the first statement of each statement-source combina-
tion due to the odd number of statements per combination in
the item set in general (90 items in total; six statement-source
combinations each containing 15 statements split into seven
statements per half).
Appendix B
Signal detection theory based analyses of relative
stability
We calculated the signal detection theory (SDT) response-bias
measure c for old-new item recognition as follows
(Macmillan, 1993):
c ¼ −0:5 zHit Rate þ zFalse−Alarm Rateð Þ
Positive values indicate a bias to respond “new” and negative
values indicate a bias to respond “old.”Before we calculated hits
and false-alarm rates, we added .5 to hits and false alarms and 1
to signal and noise trials to correct for perfect hit rates of 1 and
absent false-alarm rates of 0 in the data (cf. Hautus, 1995).
We calculated the response-bias measure c for sourcemem-
ory analogously with our conceptualization of hits and false
Mem Cogn
alarms in the source attributions following Dodson, Bawa, and
Slotnick (2007). That is, we selected only those items that had
been recognized as “old” and for which a source attribution
was thus made. We conceptualized source memory as follow-
ing two distributions: one for (recognized) items that were
presented with the age-typical source and one for
(recognized) items that were presented with the age-atypical
source; analogous to the old-item and new-item distributions
for item recognition. Positive values indicate a bias to respond
the “atypical source,” negative values indicate a bias to re-
spond the “typical source.” Results for the SDT analysis can
be retrieved from Table 7.
Table 7 Signal-detection theory-based analyses of response bias for item and source memory
Experiment Cognitive process Task Bias c Cross-task correlation
Experiment 1
10 minutes Item memory 1 .08 (.31) r(114) = .61, p < .001, BF10 = 3e
10
2 .16 (.35)
Source memory 1 −.13 (.35) r(114) = .14, p = .08, BF10 = .32
2 −.11 (.33)
7 days Item memory 1 .07 (.34) r(110) = .26, p = .003, BF10 = 8.97
2 .20 (.31)
Source memory 1 −.12 (.34) r(110) = .02, p = .44, BF10 = .12
2 −.004 (.33)
Experiment 2
Item memory 1 .03 (.27) r(108) = .62, p < .001, BF10 = 1.28e
10
2 .20 (.33)
Source memory 1 −.21 (.42) r(108) = .22, p = .01, BF10 = 1.69
2 −.16 (.36)
Note. Mean item-memory and source-memory bias values per task. Positive values of item-memory c refer to guessing that an item was “new,” negative
values of c refer to guessing that an item was “old.” Positive values of source-memory c refer to guessing the “atypical” source, negative values of c refer
to guessing the “typical” source. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Test statistic = Pearson product-moment correlation between bias
measures of both tasks per experiment/condition; p values refer to one-tailed testing; Bayes Factors BF10were computed with JASP (JASP Team, 2018)
and are interpreted as substantial to strong evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesisH1 for item-memory bias and as substantial evidence in favor of
the absence of an effect for source-memory bias following Jeffreys (1961)
Table 6 Model-fit statistics for
split-half reliability analyses of
both experiments
Experiment List Model-fit indices
T1 (Mean) T2 (Covariance)
Experiment 1
10 minutes 1 .305 0
2 .345 .003
7 days 1 .521 .103
2 .292 .005
Experiment 2
1 .695 .417
2 .653 .033
Note. Values represented the respective posterior predictive p-value for the mean (T1) and covariance structure
(T2) of the data (proposed by Klauer, 2010). Good model fit is indicated by p > .05
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Abstract
People often lack source memory for the original context of information (e.g., who
presented it) and thus have to guess the source. According to the probability-matching
account, this guessing process is either determined by general knowledge (e.g.,
stereotypes) or by the item-source contingency (if perceived during encoding). In this
preregistered source-monitoring experiment, we examined whether each type of source
guessing is rather automatic (i.e., resource independent) or controlled (i.e., resource
dependent). Individuals learned and later needed to remember age-typical or -atypical
statements for two different-aged sources. To examine the resource dependence,
attention at test was divided for half of the younger participants (18−26 years). In
addition, older adults (61−80 years) with a natural decline in cognitive resources were
tested. To examine the probability-matching account, both age groups either received
specific source information (age) already at encoding or only at test (worsening
item-source contingency perception at encoding). Memory and guessing processes were
estimated on the group and individual level using multinomial modeling. Neither
stereotype- nor contingency-based source guessing depended on cognitive
resources—whether they were depleted due to the experimental manipulation or natural
aging. In line with the probability-matching account, younger adults based their
guessing on stereotype knowledge only when the perception of the item-source
contingency was hindered. Older adults strongly guessed stereotype-based and were not
able to counteract via accurate contingency representations. The results underpin the
role of encoding for a successful counteraction of stereotype-based guessing and are
discussed with regard to their applicability for future source-attribution attempts.
Keywords: source monitoring, source guessing, age stereotypes, cognitive aging,
Bayesian-hierarchical multinomial modeling
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Is Knowledge Reliance in Source Guessing Automatic or Controlled?
Evidence from Divided Attention and Aging
In our everyday life, we almost constantly process (social) information.
Oftentimes, this information needs to be accessed at a later point and can then be used
to draw conclusions about its trustworthiness. For instance, after interacting with a
conversational partner, one must remember the person (i.e., "source") who told you
something. Due to the vast amount of processed information, we often cannot
remember the source. In this case, general knowledge structures (stereotypes, schemas)
can be used to infer the source (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). For instance,
one may simply rely on attitudes towards a source’s age group. The separate analysis of
memory and guessing processes in source monitoring via multinomial processing tree
(MPT) models (Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996) revealed that when the source
could not be remembered, people guessed that information (e.g., “I am discontent with
my health”) that was prototypical for different age groups (here: older adults) was
presented by the source whose age was consistent (here: 70-year-old source) with the
information (Kuhlmann, Bayen, Meuser, & Kornadt, 2016).
Thus, expectations about members of (social) groups that exist prior to the
conversation (or the experimental task) are used to infer the source when source
memory fails (cf. Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016). This knowledge can, of course, sometimes
be a valid source cue and may be even diagnostic for future social categorizations
(Klauer & Ehrenberg, 2005), but it is misleading whenever a person does not behave
prototypically for its social group. These "costs" of knowledge application as a lack of
individuation may in this case lead to biased impression formation as these persons are
attributed to be compliant and share specific attitudes with a social group that do not
reflect their actual attitudes and behaviors. With regard to age stereotypes, a common
and repeated misattribution of characteristics due to biased guessing may have severe
consequences for affected individuals when being confronted with negative connotations
about the own age group (e.g., Lamont, Swift, & Abrams, 2015). And one can only
speculate whether this misattribution may foster the long-term maintenance of (age)
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stereotypes in society (e.g., Levy, Slade, Chung, & Gill, 2015).
General Knowledge-Based Versus Individuating Contingency-Based Source
Guessing
It is, therefore, particularly important to examine the circumstances under which
mostly unbiased source guessing can be achieved. Spaniol and Bayen (2002) proposed a
theoretical framework to account for the application of different knowledge structures in
source guessing—the probability-matching account. Accordingly, individuals adjust their
guessing behavior to the actual contingency between attributes reflected in the item
material and the (social-) group membership of the source (item-source contingency)
that they perceive during encoding whenever this is possible. Thus, noticing the ratio
with which each source has presented certain information either typical or atypical for
its (social) group, prompts individuals to use this situation-specific knowledge in source
guessing (e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann, Vaterrodt, & Bayen, 2012). Only
when the item-source contingency remains undetected, individuals rely on broader
knowledge structures such as stereotypes (e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Ehrenberg &
Klauer, 2005; Klauer & Ehrenberg, 2005; Kuhlmann et al., 2012; Spaniol & Bayen,
2002).
Guessing based on individuating information (item-source contingencies), is thus
likely when individuals are explicitly instructed to focus on the sources (in addition to
the items; Kuhlmann et al., 2012), when they receive specific information about the
sources (e.g., their age) already at encoding (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011), and when their
attention is fully directed towards the item-source contingency (Bayen & Kuhlmann,
2011). Thus, prior studies have identified the encoding process as a crucial prerequisite
for adequate source guessing reflecting the experimental item-source contingency.
The Nature of Knowledge Reliance in Source Guessing
But what is the nature of these knowledge-based source-guessing processes? Is it
rather automatic or controlled? Following Bargh (1994), the automaticity versus
controllability of a cognitive process can be disentangled in terms of its awareness,
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intentionality, conscious inhibition, and resource dependence. Results from two studies
examining the resource dependence of knowledge-based source guessing suggest that it
may be rather an automatic process, unaffected by cognitive load at test (Klauer &
Ehrenberg, 2005; Marsh, Cook, & Hicks, 2006). However, Marsh et al. (2006) found
that stereotype-based guessing can be consciously controlled by reflecting on the
harmful impact of stereotypes. In line with this, results from another study examining
the time course of source guessing point towards a controlled nature of pre-experimental
knowledge applications (Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). More specifically, schema-based source
guessing only emerged when a longer response time was allowed at test. The
aforementioned contingency-based overwriting of stereotype-/schema-biased guessing
additionally suggests its controlled nature (e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Ehrenberg &
Klauer, 2005; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002).
Overall, evidence thus far points towards a controlled nature of knowledge-based
source guessing. However, a contrasting conclusion emerges when the scope of
stereotyping is broadened. The nature of social categorization based on stereotyping
can be described as rather automatic (i.e., operating outside of awareness; e.g., Devine,
1989; see Monteith, Woodcock, & Lybarger, 2013, for an overview). Automatic features
in age stereotyping have also been documented (Gonsalkorale, Sherman, & Klauer,
2014; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990, but see Chasteen, Schwarz, &
Park, 2002). Furthermore, as Gilbert and Hixon (1991) already suggested, stereotype
activation and application may differ in terms of their resource needs. The activation
and counteraction may be resource dependent whereas the application may then be
resource independent (e.g., Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Sherman, 1999; Hamilton &
Sherman, 1994, but see Rivers, Sherman, Rees, Reichardt, & Klauer, 2019). Thus, if
one defines knowledge-based source guessing as reflecting stereotype application, the
social-cognition literature contradicts what has been predominantly reported in the
source-monitoring literature regarding its nature.
Whereas the few existing studies about the nature of source guessing focused on
stereotypes/schemas, even less is known about the nature of contingency-based source
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guessing. Notably, Bayen and Kuhlmann (2011) and Ehrenberg and Klauer (2005)
manipulated attention at encoding and demonstrated that the acquisition of
contingency knowledge at encoding is resource dependent. That is, biased source
guessing was observed when attention was divided but not when attention was
unimpeded at encoding. Whether the overwriting of stereotype influences in the
moment of source guessing (at test) through contingency knowledge is also resource
dependent remains unexplored, however.
Overview of Experiment and Research Questions
Whereas research on source monitoring points towards a rather controlled,
resource-dependent application of pre-experimental knowledge in source guessing and
has not examined the nature of peri-experimental knowledge-based guessing, evidence
from the social-cognition literature suggests a more automatic, resource-independent
application but resource-dependent counteraction of this knowledge reliance (e.g.,
Klauer & Ehrenberg, 2005, but see Rivers et al., 2019). We thus aimed to more directly
examine the resource dependence of both forms of knowledge reliance in source
guessing. This is often done by implementing a second task that needs to be performed
while, at the same time, focusing on a primary task (as done, for instance, by Klauer &
Ehrenberg, 2005). But cognitive load may also naturally emerge with increasing age due
to a general decline in available cognitive resources (e.g., Park, 2000). If one then
defines aging as natural divided attention, the resource-(in)dependent nature of the
knowledge reliance in source guessing can be studied across age groups. Importantly,
none of the aforementioned studies examined the nature of knowledge reliance based on
age stereotypes in both younger and older adults.
The current study was designed to shed light on these still unanswered questions
about the nature of knowledge application in source guessing by varying specific source
information at encoding and by using dual tasks at retrieval (which has rarely been
done so far; Klauer & Ehrenberg, 2005; Marsh et al., 2006) and aging as natural divided
attention. That is, individuals of both ages performed a source-monitoring task with
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age-stereotypical item material and received specific information about the sources
(ages) either already at encoding or only at retrieval. Additionally crossed with this
manipulation, half of the younger adults performed a secondary task at the
source-monitoring test. To be explicit, the primary interest was to study the nature of
source guessing and not age differences. We thus adapted encoding times for older
adults to compensate for age differences in source-monitoring processes and optimize
accurate contingency perception; see Procedure section). Note that the now following
hypotheses constantly refer to source guessing as measured by the two-high-threshold
multinomial model of source monitoring (2HTSM; Bayen et al., 1996).1
First, we hypothesize to replicate the probability-matching account (Spaniol &
Bayen, 2002) in younger adults. That is, we expect source guessing to be based on the
learned item-source contingency whenever participants can easily perceive it (source age
provided at encoding). Otherwise, when the source age is provided at test and
contingency detection should thus be difficult, source guessing should be based on
stereotype knowledge.
Second, we test the nature of stereotype-based source guessing by comparing
younger adults with full and divided attention in the retrieval conditions—those
conditions in which we predict stereotype-based guessing. Unaffected (or even
increased) knowledge-based source guessing under divided attention would imply an
automatic process. Decreased knowledge-based source guessing under divided attention,
however, would imply a controlled process.
Third, we test the nature of contingency-based source guessing by comparing
younger adults with full and divided attention in the encoding conditions—those
conditions in which we predict contingency-based guessing. Unaffected
contingency-based source guessing would imply an automatic counteraction of
(stereotype-based) source guessing. If the latter corresponds to .50 for individuals with
full attention and exceeds .50 for individuals with divided attention, this would imply a
controlled counteraction.
We further test the nature of contingency-based guessing by examining whether
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older adults are still able to counteract stereotype-based source guessing with
contingency knowledge. If older adults adjust source guessing to this knowledge, it
would imply an automatic counteraction. If they do not adjust guessing to this
knowledge, it would imply a controlled counteraction.
Methods
We preregistered the experiment’s research plan on the Open Science Framework
(https://osf.io/2ezrn/?view_only=ce2d6ad3949c4ed39e0ca664423ebe21). The
experiment was programmed with the open-source software program OpenSesame
(Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012).
Design and Participants
For younger adults, the design was a 2 (dual-task condition: full vs. divided
attention at test; between-subjects) × 2 (encoding condition: age information at
encoding vs. at test; between-subjects) factorial. For older adults, we only manipulated
the encoding condition (encoding condition: age information at encoding vs. at test;
between-subjects). For reasons of convenience, we introduce a notation to abbreviate
the six experimental conditions: YA (younger adults) and OA (older adults) refer to the
participants’ age group, enc (encoding) and ret (retrieval) represent the
encoding-condition manipulation (i.e., whether the specific source information was
revealed before the study or test phase), and full (full attention) and div (divided
attention) correspond to the dual-task manipulation at test (i.e., whether participants
performed a parallel task or not).
For our analyses based on Bayesian-hierarchical MPT modeling, an a priori power
analysis is neither straight-forward nor appropriate for a Bayesian approach. As we
were mainly interested in group-level comparisons between experimental conditions, we
planned the sample size on the appropriate frequentists equivalent on an aggregate
group level using multiTree (Moshagen, 2010). As our experiment was motivated by the
nature of source guessing, we defined the comparison of younger adults with full and
divided attention at test as crucial for the determination of the final sample size. Based
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on Kuhlmann et al. (2016) who used comparable item material and presentation times
during encoding for their younger-adults sample, we set the population-level parameters
for item memory (D) to .70, for source memory (d) to .60, for old-new item guessing (b)
to .45, and for source guessing (g) to .60. We additionally assumed a decrease in
item-memory and source-memory performance of .10 in the dual-task condition.2 To
detect a between-subjects difference of .10 in source guessing with a power of .80 and
(α = .05), a minimum of 3037 observations per condition (i.e., 34 participants × 90
items) is required. To fulfill our counterbalance constraints, we increased the sample
size to 36 participants per condition (3240 observations).
Younger adults were recruited via an electronic system or ads from the University
of Mannheim and Heidelberg. Older adults were recruited from our participant
database, originally recruited via local newspaper ads and snowballing. Participants of
both age groups were only invited for this experiment if they had not participated in
previous age-stereotype based source-monitoring experiments. Further, individuals were
excluded if they did not meet the age criteria (based on a survey study for the used
item material, Kuhlmann et al., 2016) of 18−26 years (younger adults) or 60−84 years
(older adults), if their native language (i.e., learned before the age of six) was not
German, and if they were colorblind (due to different colored response options in the
memory test). To avoid confounds with pathological cognitive changes, participants
with a history of stroke, heart attack, severe brain injury/trauma,
alcohol/drug/substance abuse, any neurological disorder (e.g., epilepsy, Alzheimer’s, or
Parkinson disease), current (i.e., past 6 months) diagnosis of major depression, and
regular use of benzodiazepines or antidepressants were excluded. Our preregistered
performance-related exclusions in the dual-task conditions based on the mean accuracy
in the secondary task (< 2 SD below respective condition’s mean) were not necessary.
In total, we tested 218 eligible participants, 144 younger adults (range = 18−26
years, M = 20.90, SD = 2.25) and 74 older adults (range = 61−80 years, M = 70.88,
SD = 5.52).3 Due to lower rates of university education in former times in Germany, it
comes as no surprise that older adults had, on average, completed slightly fewer years of
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formal education (M = 13.47, SD = 2.16) than younger adults (M = 14.06,
SD = 1.67), t(215) = 2.22, p = .027, BF10 = 1.54, tested two-sided.
4 The additionally
assessed verbal abilities with the SASKA vocabulary test (Riegel, 1967) showed that
older adults (M = .87, SD = .12) outperformed younger adults (M = .65, SD = .15),
t(216) = 11.15, p < .001, BF10 = 7.06e
19, tested two-sided. More details about the
sample composition can be retrieved from Table 1.
Materials
The item set consisted of 90 German statements reflecting everyday behaviors or
general attitudes typical for younger versus older adults. These statements were created
taking the multidimensionality of age stereotypes into account (Gluth, Ebner, &
Schmiedek, 2010; Kornadt & Rothermund, 2011) in a survey study by Kuhlmann,
Kornadt, Bayen, Meuser, and Wulff (2017). In this study, younger and older
participants initially rated 368 statements with regard to their typicality for either a
young or an old target person on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “very atypical”, 2 =
“atypical”, 3 = “neither typical nor atypical”, 4 = “typical”, 5 = “very typical”). We
selected those statements that were rated as "typical" (M ≥ 3) for one age group and
"atypical" (M < 3) for the other by both participant age groups. From this item pool,
we created three lists of 30 statements each (including 15 typically-young and 15
typically-old statements) from which two lists served as to-be-learned and one as
distractor list for the (source-) memory test. Assignment of lists as study or distractor
list was counterbalanced between participants. (A)Typicality of the statements did not
differ between lists, all ps ≥ .36. The two common German last names "Müller" and
"Schneider" (age- and gender-neutral) served as sources. Sources were described to be
either 23 or 70 years old (as these were the ages participants reported thinking of when
rating the typicality of statements in the survey study; Kuhlmann et al., 2017).
Procedure
Participants were tested in homogeneous age groups (up to eight persons for
younger adults; up to three persons for older adults to assist with computer handling if
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necessary) in separate computer cubicles. After participants provided written informed
consent, they were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions in the order they
came to the lab. A schematic illustration of the procedure can be retrieved from
Figure A1 of Appendix A.
All participants first performed the digit-symbol substitution task (DSST;
Wechsler, 1981), a paper-pencil processing-speed test, timed by the experimenter after
90 seconds. Following this, the computerized experiment started and all participants
performed a source-monitoring task with age-stereotypical item material which
procedure only differed based on condition-based adjustments. Participants were
initially informed that they will process everyday statements from either a young or an
old person source labeled with common German last names ("Müller" vs. "Schneider").
We instructed them to memorize the statements for a later test but refrained from an
explicit source-memory instruction. Participants learned 60 statements (preceded by
two additional statements as a primacy and followed by two additional statements as
recency buffer) of which 30 statements were typical for a person of younger age and 30
statements were typical for a person of older age (typicality ratings based on the survey
study from Kuhlmann et al., 2017). Each of the two sources presented one of the
aforementioned lists with half typically-young and half typically-old statements, and the
third list served as a distractor (counterbalanced assignment of subsets to study and
distractor lists and sources). A 250 ms blank screen followed each statement. During
the retention interval, younger participants practiced the tone-monitoring task
(irrespective of whether they actually had to perform it at test). A test phase followed
in which all 60 statements from the initial study phase and 30 new distractor
statements appeared. For each statement, participants decided whether the statement
was old or new and, if it was judged to be old, which source presented it. The specific
ages of the sources were written below each source label. These source attributions were
made self-paced by responding via the keyboard (keys "D" and "K" for the sources
[assignment counterbalanced across participants in each condition], space key for new
statements). Target and distractor statements appeared in random order. In the end,
KNOWLEDGE RELIANCE IN SOURCE GUESSING 12
participant’s perception of the item-source contingency during the study phase was
collected. They judged how many statements of each typicality were presented by each
source (e.g., “How many typically-young statements have been presented by the young
vs. old source?”). Then, all participants completed the computerized version of the
SASKA (Riegel, 1967) in which they selected one out of five response options that
represented the meaning of a target word most via key press (keys "A" to "E").
Demographic and health-related personal information were provided at the end of the
experiment followed by a debriefing. Participants were compensated and dismissed.
The specific assignment of the ages to the person sources (which source was
labeled to be 23 vs. 70 years old) was revealed either at encoding or at test. That is,
half of all participants from both participant age groups learned the specific
assignments of ages to the two sources before encoding (YA_enc_full, YA_enc_div,
OA_enc_full; specific ages were written below each source on screen); the other half
learned this assignment only before the test phase (YA_ret_full, YA_ret_div,
OA_ret_full). Each statement was presented for four seconds for younger participants.
As age-related declines in cognitive functioning may impair older adults’ contingency
perception at encoding (cf. load at encoding for younger adults; Bayen & Kuhlmann,
2011), we increased the presentation time to eight seconds per item-source combination
to facilitate encoding and contingency perception for older participants.
Only in the younger-adults sample, participants in the divided-attention
conditions (YA_enc_div, YA_ret_div) performed a secondary tone-monitoring task
adapted from Boywitt, Rummel, and Meiser (2015). During source attributions at test,
participants additionally listened to tones of two different frequencies and were
instructed to respond via key press (key "P") whenever three consecutive tones of the
same frequency were presented. The tone sequence consisted of a pseudo-randomly
order of two tones of either high (440 Hz) or low frequency (330 Hz) with a length of
180 trials. We adjusted the this sequence with the following restrictions: Not more than
three tones of the same frequency should be presented consecutively, the same number
of target (i.e., three consecutive tones with the same frequency) and distractor trials
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(i.e., < three consecutive tones with the same frequency) should be presented in each
frequency, and at least one target trial should be presented within the first 10 tone
trials. Tones were presented for one second followed by an ISI of two seconds. In total,
60 of the 180 tones were target trials with three consecutive tones of the same frequency
and 120 were single tones and therefore defined as distractors. Between study and test
phase, younger participants practiced the dual task for two minutes irrespective of
whether they actually had to perform it during source attributions or not. The practice
dual task consisted of the tone-sequence task (as described in the main text) while
working on a math task simulating proper dual-task conditions. We presented simple
mathematical equations (e.g., 9 + 14 = 23?) that participants classified as either
correct (key "S") or incorrect (key "L"). Participants received performance-related
feedback at the end of the practice phase. Older adults performed the math task
without the dual task. We instructed participants in the dual-task conditions that both
tasks were equally important and that they should respond to the tone-monitoring task
on target trials immediately but otherwise respond to the source-monitoring task. We
provided error feedback for two seconds whenever participants missed a target. The
respective source attribution remained on the screen until a response for this task was
registered. If participants needed longer than 180 tones to attribute all statements to
the sources, the tone sequence was repeated until they had attributed all test
statements to the sources. We calculated the overall performance for the
tone-monitoring task as hit rate minus false-alarm rate (discrimination measure Pr).
Hit rate corresponds to the proportion of correct responses on target-present trials (i.e.,
three consecutive tones of the same frequency), false-alarm rate corresponds to the
proportion of incorrect responses on target-absent trials (i.e., single tones). Individuals
performed fairly well in the tone-monitoring task. Their respective performance
measure indicated that individuals in both dual-task conditions executed this secondary
task while their primary focus was to attribute the to-be-remembered statements to
their sources comparably well (YA_enc_div = .74, SD = .13, YA_ret_div = .75,
SD = .15), t(70) = .29, p = .775, BF10 = .25.
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Statistical Model
In this experiment, data were coded into three item types like in previous research
(e.g., Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005; Kuhlmann et al., 2016; Schaper, Kuhlmann, & Bayen,
2019; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002): statements originating from the age-consistent source
(i.e., aggregate of typically-young statements presented by the young source &
typically-old statements presented by the old source), statements originating from the
age-inconsistent source (i.e., aggregate of typically-old statements presented by the
young source & typically-young statements presented by the old source), and new
statements that had not been presented by either source (aggregate of typically-young
and -old distractor statements). The 2HTSM (Bayen et al., 1996) was then used to
disentangle memory and guessing processes underlying the source attributions. In order
to obtain model identifiability, parameter constraints needed to be implemented. From
the submodels of the 2HTSM (see Bayen et al., 1996), Submodel 5d was the most
parsimonious submodel that fitted the data best.5 This submodel contains the following
parameters: Parameter D (= item memory) measures the probability of either
recognizing a statement as old or as new (assumption: item memory is equal across
item types, D
T
= D
A
= D
N
). With the complementary probability (1−D), the
statement is not recognized in the first place. In this case, with probability b the item is
guessed to be either old or new (1− b) because the source can also not be remembered
if the statement has not been remembered before (e.g., Malejka & Bröder, 2016).
Parameter d
T
(= source memory) reflects the probability of remembering the
age-typical source and parameter d
A
reflects the probability of remembering the
age-atypical source if the statement will be recognized before. If source memory fails (1
− d
T
or 1 − d
A
) or the statement is guessed to be old, the source will be guessed
(assumption: source guessing does not depend on whether a statement was remembered
before, a = g). A graphical illustration of the submodel can be found in Figure 1.
Multinomial modeling traditionally relies on maximum-likelihood estimation
aggregating across participants and thus neglecting (potential) differences between
individuals (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Lee, 2011; Matzke, Dolan, Batchelder, &
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Wagenmakers, 2015). We thus applied a Bayesian-hierarchical extension of MPT
models (latent trait; Klauer, 2010) to estimate group- and individual-level parameters
jointly. This latent-trait approach assumes that individual parameters are constrained
by an overarching population-level distribution (multivariate normal distribution)
thereby accounting for individual differences and parameter correlations. Parameter
values can be derived through sampling from the resulting posterior distribution based
on the Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm.
Whether the 2HTSM five-parameter submodel fit our data in each condition, was
tested with Bayesian posterior predictive p-values > .05 for both the parameter means
and covariance. We followed Klauer (2010) and relied on the T1 statistic to assess model
fit for the mean (difference between observed and expected mean frequencies) and the
T2 statistic for the covariance structure of the data (summed difference between
observed and expected covariance; standardized by expected SD), separately for each
experimental condition.6 To ensure parameter comparability between conditions, we
fitted this submodel to all conditions of both participant age groups. Non-significant
p-values for the mean and covariance structure of each data set indicated that this
model well accounted for all conditions of both participant age groups (see Table 2).
Analyses were conducted using R (R Core Team, 2020) and JASP (JASP Team,
2019). The hierarchical MPT model analyses were conducted with the TreeBUGS
package (Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2018), figures were created with the ggplot2 package
(Wickham, 2016). In the subsequent Results section, we report the model-based mean
parameter values and sampled parameter differences for between-condition comparisons
with corresponding 95%-Bayesian Credibility Intervals (BCI) of the posterior
distribution. Differences and parameter correlations are considered meaningful if the
BCI excludes 0. Condition-based group-level parameter estimates can be retrieved from
Table 2. Source-guessing parameter estimates are illustrated in Figure 2.
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Results
First, we aimed to replicate the probability-matching account in younger adults. Based
on Kuhlmann et al. (2012), we predicted stereotype-based source guessing for the
younger participants under full attention with source information provided at test but
contingency-based guessing under full attention with source information provided
already at encoding. Indeed, when testing each conditions’ source-guessing parameter
against chance level of .50, the obtained difference was not credible in the encoding
condition, △g − .50 = .04 [−.05, .13], indicating unbiased source guessing but there was
a credible bias in the retrieval condition, △g − .50 = .11 [.02, .19]. However, the direct
comparison of both conditions did not reveal a credible difference, −.07 [−.19, .06]. This
is likely due to age stereotypes being rather weak, as opposed to the stronger profession
schemas used in Kuhlmann et al. (2012).
Second, we tested the resource dependence of stereotype-based source guessing at
retrieval by comparing younger participants in the retrieval condition with full or
divided attention. Whereas source guessing exceeded chance level for YA_ret_full, as
reported above, it did not for YA_ret_div, △g − .50 = .06 [−.02, .14].7 However, source
guessing tended to be biased in YA_ret_div and did not differ from the biased guessing
in the YA_ret_full condition, −.08 [−.17, .01].
Third, we tested whether the counteraction of stereotype-based source guessing
via contingency knowledge depended on cognitive resources by comparing younger
participants in the encoding condition who had either full or divided attention. As
reported earlier, source guessing for YA_enc_full did not exceed chance level; neither
did YA_enc_div, △g − .50 = −.002 [−.08, .08]. The comparison of both conditions also
revealed no credible difference, .04 [−.08, .16].
In older adults, source guessing exceeded chance level in both conditions,
△g − .50 = .10 [.01, .18] (encoding) and △g − .50 = .18 [.11, .24] (retrieval). Although
this bias descriptively reduced in the encoding condition, the between-condition
comparison revealed no credible difference, .08 [−.19, .03]. Thus, older adults, with
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declines in cognitive resources, were not able to sufficiently counteract stereotype-based
source guessing based on the actual contingency in the encoding condition.
In an exploratory analysis, we implemented the subjective contingency judgment
(i.e., estimated number of typically-young and typically-old statements that were
presented by either source during the study phase) collected at the end of the
experiment as an external covariate for the source-guessing parameters. All conditions
of both participant age groups correctly perceived the item-source contingency of .50,
all BF10 ≤ .97, but their contingency judgments were not substantially correlated with
source guessing (see Table 3).
Discussion
This study examined what underlying mechanism may describe knowledge
reliance in source guessing by testing effects of a dual task at retrieval and cognitive
aging. Our main finding is that in younger adults neither stereotype-based nor
contingency-based guessing was strongly affected by cognitive load at retrieval
suggesting their resource independence, and thus automatic nature, of both
stereotype-based and contingency-based source guessing. However, the ability to
counteract stereotypes based on contingency knowledge in source guessing appears to
be impaired in older adults suggesting that it is not fully automatic but, as discussed
later, this may rather be due to contingency detection requiring resources.
Our conclusion that stereotype-based source guessing is automatic rests on the
comparison between load conditions in younger adults’ retrieval conditions as well as on
the observation of stereotype-based guessing in older adults. It must be noted, however,
that the direct comparison against chance level revealed a significant bias only in two of
these three conditions but only a descriptive bias tendency for younger adults with
divided attention. In younger adults, the accurate contingency perception under
optimal encoding conditions can counteract the stereotype reliance in source guessing
(replicating, e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann et al., 2012). To our knowledge
this is the first time that this is demonstrated for source guessing based on age
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stereotypes and thus shows that enhancing attention to younger and older adults’
actual behaviors can help overcome age stereotypes. Notably, younger adults’ ability to
counteract stereotypes based on contingency knowledge in source guessing was
independent from cognitive resources available at test—reflecting a rather automatic
application of contingency knowledge during source attributions.
However, older adults were not able to guess unbiased after learning the specific
source information at encoding. Although at first glance this seems contradictory to the
null effect of cognitive load on contingency-based guessing in older adults, it is crucial
to keep in mind that the age-related declines in cognitive resources affect older adults’
performance throughout the entire task, not just during retrieval. Thus, older adults
might have had difficulties perceiving the contingencies during encoding, despite the
longer encoding times, as do younger adults under cognitive load at encoding (Bayen &
Kuhlmann, 2011). Unfortunately, the subjective contingency judgments do not seem
informative to this matter as they did not show any condition differences or relation to
source guessing. As already discussed in our preregistration, these judgments are likely
reactively influenced by the test and the explicit phrasing of the question (cf. Kuhlmann
et al., 2012). Indeed, mean contingency estimates were near .50, even in conditions for
which the true source-item contingency greatly deviated from .50 (Bayen & Kuhlmann,
2011). A less explicit, online measure of contingency perception directly after study and
during the test would thus be desirable and might reveal age differences. Alternatively,
older adults in the encoding condition may have accurately perceived the contingency
but still stuck to their strong stereotype knowledge. Indeed, older adults’ stereotype bias
in the retrieval condition was the most pronounced, in line with several other findings of
stronger knowledge effects in older adults (see Umanath & Marsh, 2014, for a review).
While this study contributes to the understanding of the complex nature of source
guessing, the present findings should be reviewed in the light of some limitations. First,
our conclusions mainly rely on null effects. These, however, may result from a generally
weak age-stereotype bias in all experimental conditions which mirrors the rather weak
explicit typicality ratings for this stereotype domain (compared to more pronounced
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expectations in other knowledge domains; e.g. Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang,
2000; Küppers & Bayen, 2014). Furthermore, the interpretation of the results is
conditional on the scaling of source guessing. That is, the baseline stereotype-based
guessing that needed to be counteracted through individuating contingency knowledge
was much more pronounced in older than in younger adults. Descriptively, older adults
reduced their stereotype-based guessing, though not statistically reliable, but given
their strong initial bias, their counteracted guessing was still biased. Note, however,
that younger adults were able to counteract even comparably strong biases in previous
studies (e.g., Arnold, Bayen, Kuhlmann, & Vaterrodt, 2013; Kuhlmann et al., 2012).
Second, studying the nature of source guessing only with a 50:50% item-source
contingency at encoding can be challenged. Even though we think that the use of this
contingency mirrors the ambiguity in the perception of different person (groups) best,
future studies should test other contingencies. Of particular interest may be a condition
in which the majority of items are presented by the atypical source leading to
counter-stereotype based source guessing under full attention (Bayen & Kuhlmann,
2011). Does counter-stereotype based guessing remain possible even under cognitive
load? And would older adults adjust source guessing to such a strong
counter-stereotype contingency?
Third, the transfer and value of our results for stereotype application in real life
awaits further research. In terms of future source attributions and impression
formations, the automatic stereotype application in source guessing and thus a lack of
individuation may severely affect the stereotyped person group (e.g., false accusations in
eyewitness testimony). The good news, however, is that at least in younger adults the
contingency-based counteraction succeeds even under cognitive load (e.g., from stress;
cf. Sherman, Groom, Ehrenberg, & Klauer, 2003). This underpins the necessity for
unimpaired encoding of information and its contextual details as a prerequisite for
unbiased guessing later on. Whether the beneficial effect for source guessing in these
encoding conditions is actually traced back to contingency detection cannot be assert
with reasonable certainty from this study and remains to be determined. With regards
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to older adults, merely revealing stereotype-relevant information at encoding may not
be enough to foster contingency learning. Future research should determine, under
which (if any) conditions older adults can counteract stereotype-based guessing.
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Footnotes
1More details about the reasoning for the proposed hypotheses can be retrieved from the preregistra-
tion on OSF: https://osf.io/2ezrn/?viewonly = ce2d6ad3949c4ed39e0ca664423ebe21.
2Although Klauer and Ehrenberg (2005) did not observe differences in the item and/or source-memory
performance at test, our pretested dual-task manipulation (20 participants, 10 with full and 10 with
divided attention with the specific source-age information provided at test) pointed to poorer item
memory under divided attention (Pr = hits − false alarms; YA_ret_full: Pr = .64, SD = .12;
YA_ret_div: Pr = .52, SD = .16).
3In addition to the preregistered n of 36 per condition, we were able to collect two additional older
participants—one per condition.
4One older adult did not indicate years of formal education and was thus removed from this analysis.
5We also applied the least parsimonious submodel 4 (D
T
= D
A
= D
N
; d
T
= d
A
; g = a) to our
data but obtained a substantial misfit in the mean structure for older adults who were informed about
the specific source’ ages only at test (OA_ret_full; T1 = .024 and T2 = .223). Therefore, we fitted all
submodels that explained the data with five parameters and submodel 5d revealed the best model fit
for the respective OA_ret_full condition (as indicted by the non-significant p-values of T1 = .102 and
T2 = .139).
6Even though other submodels indicated descriptively larger posterior predictive p-values for the
covariance structure, none of the other submodels exceeded the one for the means (which was of main
interest to test the proposed hypotheses).
7Descriptively, source guessing exceeded chance level for YA_ret_div and substantially so when we
excluded one participant with the most pronounced counter-stereotype guessing parameter of. 30 in an
exploratory analysis, △g − .50 = .08 [.001, .15].
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Table 3
Contingency Judgment
Participant group
Perceived Contingency
Mean Judgment Correlation with Source Guessing
YA_enc_full .50 (.06), BF10 = .20 -.06 [-.33, .21]
YA_ret_full .50 (.06), BF10 = .18 -.14 [-.34, .07]
YA_enc_div .49 (.04), BF10 = .97 -.01 [-.30, .29]
YA_ret_div .49 (.07), BF10 = .25 .14 [-.08, .37]
OA_enc_full .52 (.07), BF10 = .66 .07 [-.15, .31]
OA_ret_full .51 (.09), BF10 = .23 .09 [-.08, .26]
Note. Contingency judgment per experimental condition: YA = younger adults, OA = older adults;
enc = source information (age) was revealed before encoding, ret = source information (age) was
revealed before retrieval; full = full attention at test (no dual task), div = divided attention at test
(dual task). Contingency judgements were averaged for typically-young and typically-old statements
and their difference to chance level of .50 was tested. Bayes factors refer to the test against .50.
Following the Bayes-factor classification from Lee & Wagenmakers (2013), we interpreted these test
results as anecdotal to moderate evidence for a lack of a difference to .50 in either condition.
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Figure 1 . Submodel 5d of the 2HTSM adapted from Bayen et al. (1996). The three
trees represent the respective item types, source-attribution responses are displayed in
quotation marks. D = probability of recognizing a statement that had either been
presented by the typical or atypical source or was known to be new; d
T
= probability of
correctly remembering the source of a statement that had been presented by the typical
source; d
A
= probability of correctly remembering the source of a statement that had
been presented by the atypical source; b = probability of guessing that an unrecognized
statement is old; g = probability of guessing that a recognized or unrecognized
statement had been presented by the typical source.
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Figure 2 . Mean source guessing per experimental condition: YA = younger adults, OA
= older adults; enc = source information (age) was revealed before encoding, ret =
source information (age) was revealed before retrieval; full = full attention at test (no
dual task), div = divided attention at test (dual task). The dashed (red) line represents
chance-level guessing of .50 (also representing the experiment’s item-source
contingency), values above .50 indicate stereotype-based source guessing, values below
.50 indicate counter-stereotype-based source guessing. Group-level parameter means are
displayed as bars, individual parameter estimates are displayed as dots. The error bars
represent the 95%-BCI.
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Appendix
Schematic Illustration of Experimental Procedure
Figure A1 . Conceptual illustration of the procedure. Dashed lines represent
condition-specific adjustments of the general procedures (see Procedure section). Icons
made by Smashicons from https://www.flaticon.com/.
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Abstract
The probability-matching account (Spaniol & Bayen, 2002) states that source guessing is
matched to experimental contingencies of item types and sources. However, recently
Bell, Mieth, and Buchner (2020) provided first evidence that this account may only
apply to source attributions for previously-encountered contextual information. For
source attributions about novel information, which participants detected as new, source
guessing did not match the contingency knowledge perceived during encoding. In this
case, source guessing continued to follow generic knowledge as the default thus
neglecting past on-line contingency knowledge as a cue for prospective source
attributions. The focus of the present study was to test whether this schema reliance
for detected-new items could be explained by the lack of constant, individuating
descriptions about the person sources in Bell et al. (2020). We accounted for this by
presenting two specific persons with profession labels during encoding. Replicating Bell
et al. (2020), source guessing for detected-old items was based on the item-source
contingency and source guessing for detected-new items was based on schematic
expectations about the professions—notwithstanding the constant use of specific source
exemplars across previously-processed and novel contextual information. The present
study thus adds evidence for persistent schema-based source guessing for detected-new
items, even when novel information is attributed to known sources.
Keywords: source monitoring, schemas, source guessing, probability-matching
account, Bayesian-hierarchical multinomial modeling
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Guess What?! Different Source-Guessing Mechanisms for Old Versus New Information
How do we determine the origin of information? For instance, when to decide who
told you about a recently-released movie in the theatre or where you read the latest
news, which cues can we make use of to infer the source? Of course, it would be best if
we can retrieve contextual details about the past situation in which we initially
processed the information itself. But, for example due to the similarity of different
sources that we usually process, we sometimes may fail to retrieve the distinct source
(e.g., Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996). In this case, a promising cue for source
attributions lacking source memory may be simply guessing, for instance, based on our
experiences from the past. That is, when looking back at the example from above, we
may simply guess that our best friend told us about the movie as they are film fans and,
therefore, most likely have told us about it.
Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993) conceptualized this dissociation between
memory- and judgment-based source attributions and proposed an overarching
theoretical framework according to which source attributions can be influenced by
contextual memory processes for episodic, perceptual, or affective details about the
origin of information. When source memory is absent, source attributions can be based
on judgment processes based on pre-experimental knowledge (e.g., schemas,
stereotypes) and metacognitive beliefs. A large body of evidence highlighted that,
indeed, pre-experimental knowledge is used to infer the source when no explicit memory
for the source is available (see Kuhlmann & Bayen, 2016, for an overview). One of the
first knowledge domains in which this finding has been observed is the schema about
different social groups, examined specifically for professional groups. In a
source-monitoring experiment relying on the doctor-lawyer paradigm (e.g., Bayen,
Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang, 2000, Experiment 2), two person sources, a doctor (i.e.,
physician) and a lawyer, are shown with everyday statements reflecting activities and
attitudes that are either expected for a doctor or a lawyer. Both sources present the
same amount of statements from each item type (expected-doctor vs. expected-lawyer)
such that there is a null contingency between the item type and the sources’ professional
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groups. In a later memory test, individuals are asked to attribute the previously-learned
and new statements, that have not been encountered before, to either source or classify
them as new. Using multinomial modeling (Bayen et al., 1996), memory and guessing
processes underlying individuals’ source attributions could be disentangled revealing
that source guessing was predominantly biased towards the schematically-expected
source (i.e., neglecting the null contingency reflected in the experiment’s item material)
if veridical source information could not be retrieved from memory.
Importantly, source guessing is not always based on pre-experimental knowledge
structures. Source guessing can be also influenced by peri-experimental knowledge that
is acquired during the course of encoding of the item-source combinations. That is,
source guessing can be adjusted based on the contingencies reflected in the item
material (e.g., Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Bell, Mieth, & Buchner, 2015; Ehrenberg &
Klauer, 2005; Kuhlmann, Vaterrodt, & Bayen, 2012). Contingency-based source
guessing is typically examined using sources about which participants have no prior
knowledge (e.g., two unfamiliar male persons; Ehrenberg & Klauer, 2005). During the
encoding of item-source pairings, the ratio of certain item types (e.g., positive or
negative behaviors reflected in the descriptions of the two men) presented by either
source is typically varied. More specifically, one source is associated with more items of
a particular type (e.g., 75% negative behavior, 25% positive behavior), whereas this
ratio is reversed for the other source (25% positive behaviors, 75% negative behaviors).
In the test phase, participants can then rely on this previously learned item-source
contingency in source attributions when source memory is absent.
The question under which conditions individuals make use of these different kinds
of knowledge structures (e.g., pre- vs. peri-experimental) in source guessing has
attracted the interest of researchers in the source-monitoring literature and ultimately
led to the development of a theoretical account that formalized the use of different cues
for source guessing and which is described in the next section.
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The Probability-Matching Account and Its Extension to New Items
According to the probability-matching account of source guessing by Spaniol and
Bayen (2002), individuals’ source guessing should be based on probability matching in
the first place (i.e., guessing in line with the peri-experimentally perceived proportion of
outcome frequencies, for instance, different item types; cf. Schulze, James, Koehler, &
Newell, 2019; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). When speaking of probability matching in the
context of source attributions, it refers to source guessing following the perceived
distribution of item types (e.g., expected vs. unexpected for a certain source
characteristic) to each source (cf. Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). Source guessing based on
pre-experimental general world knowledge (such as schemas and stereotypes) only sets
in if the situational conditions at encoding (e.g., divided attention; fast presentation
time) hinder an accurate perception of the item-source contingency (e.g., Bayen &
Kuhlmann, 2011; Kuhlmann et al., 2012). While, until recently, the interpretation of
probability matching was limited to detected-old items, Bell et al. (2020) have since
argued that individuals may, nonetheless, infer the source even for information of which
they know it is new. The content itself may serve as a cue for the most likely source even
though the information was previously not encountered and associated with a source.
For this reason, Bell et al. (2020) recently posed the question whether the
probability-matching account could be extended to situations where source attributions
are made for novel information for which individuals may have an intuition about what
kind of source such an information may originate from (e.g., based on plausibility
considerations)? In a series of studies, the authors demonstrated a clear distinction for
source guessing between detected-old and detected-new items. More specifically
(illustration from Experiment 1), participants performed a source-monitoring task in
which multiple faces (each only once thus serving as the items) were shown with a
profession label (farmer or lawyer) and behavior descriptions that were either expected
for a farmer, a lawyer, or neutral (irrelevant for the distinction between the professions;
serving as the sources). Each type of behavior description was paired equally often with
each profession label. Thus, during the encoding phase, participants should have
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learned that there was a null contingency between a face’s professional label and the
type of behavior description provided. In the test phase, participants were first asked to
decide whether a face (presented with the profession labels of farmer or lawyer) among
new, distractor faces (labeled either farmer or lawyer) was old or new. After
participants provided their old-new decision, they were asked to attribute each face to
either of the three behavior descriptions (as the sources). That is, they attributed the
faces (with profession labels) to behaviors either expected for a farmer, a lawyer, or
neutral behavior. Importantly, participants attributed the faces to the behaviors
irrespective of whether they initially classified the face as old or new. By this, the
authors showed that the recognition status of an item (i.e., face) was incorporated into
source guessing (see also Meiser, Sattler, & von Hecker, 2007): Individuals based their
source guessing on the peri-experimental item-source contingency perceived during
encoding when they had to infer the expectancy of the behavior description for items
that they had previously detected to be old (i.e., unbiased guessing in line with the null
contingency reflected in the stimulus material). Individuals, however, based their source
guessing on pre-experimental schematic beliefs when they had to infer the expectancy of
the behavior description for faces that they had detected to be new (i.e., bias towards
the profession-expected behavior).
Research Question and Overview of Experiment
In summary, guessing for detected-old items is based on probability matching;
guessing for detected-new items is based on schematic expectations about sources (Bell
et al., 2020). Hence, the empirical evidence recently provided by Bell et al. (2020)
implies that the probability-matching account only holds for previously-encountered,
and not novel, information.
However, in the experimental paradigm used by Bell et al. (2020), the only cue
that individuals could make use of when inferring the profession expectancy for
detected-new faces was the accompanying label indicating the profession of the source.
Except for the profession label, no further information connected the new faces to the
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studied faces. The rather unspecific face exemplars and their labels may activate the
mental concept of the respective professional category but did not elicit an individual
representation of this person nor trigger transfer of the previously-learned information
about other individual faces. In our everyday life, however, we often interact with a
finite number of specific persons in our social network (Dunbar, 2010, e.g., at the
workplace or among our peer group) that we uniquely identify as those and who
constitute of multifaceted attributes and behaviors. Therefore, one potential
explanation for the schema reliance (instead of contingency reliance) for detected-new
items in source guessing could be the lack of specific and constant individuating source
information during encoding which is usually given in recurring social interactions in
real life. This missing cue may prompt individuals to rely on schematic knowledge as
default when performing a source-attribution attempt as they cannot draw on a
learning history of the distribution of item types to the sources during the encoding
process. Alternatively, a replication of the distinction between source guessing for
detected-old and detected-new information with constant, known (from the encoding
phase) sources would provide strong evidence that source guessing for detected-new
items indeed is governed by different mechanisms than the well-studied source guessing
for detected-old items.
The goal of the present study was to extend the findings on the
probability-matching account for detected-old and detected-new items (Bell et al., 2020)
using constant and distinct exemplars of two sources (i.e., persons) who present various
information (i.e., more akin to the original doctor-lawyer paradigm; Bayen et al., 2000).
More specifically, we aim to answer the question, whether people are capable to
generalize their source guessing based on the item-source contingency perceived during
encoding to an unrelated new decision context for the same, previously-encountered,
sources uniquely identified by their profession and name? We, first, hypothesized that
participants’ source guessing for detected-old items should be determined by probability
matching according to the proposed framework by Spaniol and Bayen (2002). That is,
given that participants correctly perceive the true null contingency between item types
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and source professions at encoding, source guessing should be based on exactly this
probability matching resulting in equal guessing of either source. Second, we
hypothesized that participants apply the previously-experienced item-source
contingency with already-familiar and specific source exemplars to detected-new items
in their source guessing. This prediction is in contrast to Bell et al. (2020). As
explained earlier, we predicted that we considered contingency-based source guessing for
detected-new items as possible here due to our constant use of two specific source
exemplars only across source attributions for detected-old and -new items.
Method
Design and Participants
The design was a 2 (statement profession expectancy [items]: statements expected
vs. unexpected for the respective source’s profession; within-subjects) × 2 (professional
group [sources]: doctor vs. lawyer; within-subjects) factorial. The sources were
presented by two male faces, each consistently accompanied by the same name and
profession label. Furthermore, we counterbalanced source labels, corresponding images,
and the order of the sources presented on the test screen between-subjects.
Sixty undergraduates (age range = 18−30 years; M = 21.90, SD = 3) were
recruited via an electronic system or ads from the University of Mannheim (refer to the
Statistical Model section for the sample-size reasoning). We excluded individuals whose
native language (i.e., learned before the age of six) was not German.
Materials
The item set consisted of 108 German statements reflecting behaviors and
attitudes to be expected for the profession of a doctor (= physician) or a lawyer
(adapted from a German norming study by Kuhlmann et al., 2012, based on Bayen et
al., 2000). The statements were initially rated with regard to their expectancy for both
professional groups on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “very unexpected”, 2 =
“unexpected”, 3 = “neither expected nor unexpected”, 4 = “expected”, 5 = “very
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expected”) by 60 German undergraduates. We selected statements that were rated as
expected (M ≥ 3.5) for either a doctor (e.g., “Your blood pressure is too high.”) or a
lawyer (e.g., “I have to be in court at 9 am.”) while at the same time rated as
unexpected (M < 2.5) for the other profession such that only unambiguous statements
remained from which we randomly selected 54 statements per profession.1
Black-and-white images showing two similarly-looking adult men (taken from Bayen et
al., 1996) labeled with the two German first names "Ralf" or "Uwe" (as in Kuhlmann et
al., 2012) served as sources. The experiment was programmed with the open-source
software program OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012).
Procedure
Participants were tested in groups up to four persons in separate computer
cubicles. After they provided written informed consent, the computerized experiment
started and participants performed a source-monitoring task with verbal item material
reflecting profession-related attitudes and behaviors.
We informed participants about that we would present them with everyday
statements that were said by either a doctor or a lawyer ("Ralf" or "Uwe"; assignment of
names to sources counterbalanced between-subjects) accompanied by an image of the
respective person or statements that were not assigned to either person and thus
presented without a profession label, name, and an image. Thus, statements could
originate from three sources, two persons presented with different
professions/names/images and one person that we did not describe in any further
detail. We provided an explicit source-memory instruction already before encoding. In
the encoding phase, participants learned 54 statements (preceded and followed by three
buffer statements of equal expectancy for both professional groups, respectively).
Twenty-seven statements were expected to be said by a doctor and 27 statements were
expected to be said by a lawyer. Each source was associated with 18 statements from
which nine were expected for a doctor and nine were expected for a lawyer such that
there was a null contingency between item types and sources. Statements were
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randomly selected from the item pool for each participant. Each statement—and, if
applicable the face, name, and profession label—was displayed for four seconds until the
next trial followed.
During the retention interval, participants performed a working-memory task in
which they were instructed to monitor and remember digits in a subsequent free recall
(serial-reproduction task). Participants were informed that they should remember eight
subsequently-presented digits that they needed to reproduce within 10 seconds
immediately afterwards (enter via keyboard). Digits varied from one to nine and were
presented in random order. Each digit lasted on the screen for one second with an ISI of
250 ms. Participants received performance and detailed error feedback after each trial.
Performance feedback was either “Your response was correct.” or “Your response was
incorrect”. Error feedback would emerge if participants either entered too few digits
than required (“Incorrect! You entered too few digits.”), too many digits than required
(“Incorrect! You entered too many digits.”), or did not enter any digit (“You did not
enter any digit. Please respond faster during the next trial.”). The distractor task lasted
10 minutes in total.
Next, we instructed participants for the upcoming self-paced (source-) memory
test. They should indicate whether the statements were shown before ("old") or not
("new"). In addition, participants should indicate whether the statement (content) was
associated with either of the three sources from the study phase: the doctor, the lawyer,
or the third, unknown source (to the participants introduced as an unspecific person
without a name and an image; referred to as "irrelevant" throughout the now following
description, as this source did not contain any profession-related information). To be
explicit, a source attribution needed to be made for all statements irrespective of
whether they were judged to be old or new to continue with the next test trial after a
250 ms ISI. If participants could not retrieve the statement and/or source, they were
instructed to simply guess for the old-new and/or source decision. The old-new decision
was placed on the upper part of the screen and the three source response options were
placed underneath (with the corresponding label name and image adjacent to them for
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the doctor and lawyer). In total, source attributions were made for 54 target and 54
distractor statements in random order. Participants made their responses via mouse
clicks just as to proceed to the next trial.
In the end, we asked for participants’ judgment of the item-source contingency
perceived during encoding. That is, they estimated the number of statements of each
profession expectancy associated with each of the three sources (e.g., “How many
expected-doctor statements have been presented by the doctor, lawyer, and neither of
them?”). Following this, personal information (age, gender, and subject of study) were
collected before we debriefed, compensated (with course credit or monetary
compensation), and dismissed participants.
Statistical Model
We applied a multinomial model to our data in order to disentangle memory and
guessing processes underlying the individuals’ categorical response data. Specifically, we
employed the three-sources model variant of the two-high threshold multinomial model
of source monitoring (Bayen et al., 1996; Keefe et al., 2002) from Bell et al. (2020, see
also Bell, Mieth, & Buchner, 2017). This model accounts for source attributions judged
to be old and, with the extension from Bell et al. (2020), also those judged to be new
and is thereby well suited to test the proposed hypothesis as it estimates different
source-guessing parameters based on the recognition status of the item.
We planned our sample size based on the experiments by Bell et al. (2020) but
increased it to N = 60 participants to fulfill our counterbalance constraints. As our
experimental paradigm and, associated therewith, the interpretation of parameters
differed from Bell et al. (2020), parameter values from their study were not diagnostic
with regard to an a priori power analysis. To nonetheless estimate the power for the
difference test of source guessing for detected-old and detected-new items, we ran a
post-hoc power analysis for an appropriate equivalent analysis on an aggregate group
level using multiTree (Moshagen, 2010). Source guessing was set to .50 (indicating
contingency-based guessing) for detected-old items (a
E
) and to .70 (indicating
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schema-based guessing; parameter value identified as a benchmark for a schema bias in
the literature on source monitoring using the doctor-lawyer paradigm e.g. Bayen &
Kuhlmann, 2011; Bayen et al., 2000; Kuhlmann et al., 2012) for detected-new items
(e
E
). The analysis revealed that we had sufficient power (1− β > .99) to detect
substantial differences of .20 between source guessing for detected-old and detected-new
items with N = 60 and α = .05.
Exemplar model trees are illustrated in Figure 1. The following parameters
representing underlying cognitive processes in source attributions are modeled with the
MPT model for detected old and new items (adapted from Bell et al., 2020): Parameter
D reflects the probability of recognizing an item that was either presented with the
expected (D
E
), unexpected (D
U
), or irrelevant source (D
I
) or was detected to be new
(D
N
). The respective complementary probability (1−D) mirrors that an item was not
recognized or detected as new. The old-new status of an item is then guessed to be
either old with probability b or new with its complementary probability (1− b). If an
item was recognized as old, parameter d reflects the probability of remembering the
respective source (d
E
, d
U
, or d
I
). The respective complementary probability (1− d)
mirrors that the source was not remembered. In this case or if an item was guessed to
be old, the source must be guessed. Two parameters allow source guessing to
potentially vary between the recognition status of items. That is, parameter a
I
reflects
the probability of guessing the irrelevant source if the item was recognized before (but
source memory failed). If the irrelevant source was not guessed, the expected source was
guessed with probability a
E
or the unexpected source was guessed with its
complementary probability 1− a
E
. If the item was not recognized in the first place,
parameter g
OI
measures the probability of guessing the irrelevant source given that the
item was guessed to be old before. If the irrelevant source was not guessed, the expected
source is guessed with probability g
OE
or the unexpected source with its complementary
probability 1− g
OE
. If the item was not recognized and the status of the item was
guessed to be new, parameter g
NI
reflects the probability to guess the irrelevant source.
If the irrelevant source was not guessed, the expected source is guessed with probability
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g
NE
or the unexpected source with its complementary probability 1− g
NE
.
Furthermore, the model includes an additional parameter e that reflects source guessing
for detected-new items. If a distractor item was detected as new in the first place,
parameter e
I
measures the probability of guessing the irrelevant source. If the irrelevant
source was not guessed, the expected source was guessed with probability e
E
and the
unexpected source was guessed with its complementary probability 1− e
E
.
Thus, the multinomial model estimated its parameters based on test responses to
four types of item-source combinations: statements either originating from the
"expected" source (i.e., expected-doctor statements associated with the doctor and
expected-lawyer statements associated with the lawyer), from the "unexpected" source
(i.e., expected-doctor statements associated with the lawyer and expected-lawyer
statements associated with the doctor), from the irrelevant source (i.e., expected-doctor
and expected-lawyer statements presented without any label or image), or new
(distractor) statements never presented during encoding (i.e., expected-doctor and
expected-lawyer statements without any source).
Multinomial modeling traditionally relies on maximum-likelihood estimation of
data (i.e., test response frequencies) aggregated across participants and thus neglect
(potential) differences between individuals (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Lee, 2011;
Matzke, 2015). We implemented a Bayesian-hierarchical approach of multinomial
modeling, specifically the latent trait approach (Klauer, 2010), to consider individual
differences and potential covariates which may explain variability in memory and
guessing parameters. This approach enables researchers to model group-level and
individual-level parameters jointly. The implemented latent-trait approach assumes that
individual parameters are constrained by an overarching population-level distribution
(multivariate normal distribution) thereby accounting for individual differences and
parameter correlations. Parameter values can be derived through sampling from the
resulting posterior distribution based on the Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm. The parameters of most interest to test our hypothesis were a
E
and e
E
, as
they reflect the probability to guess the expected, schema-based, source for detected-old
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and detected-new items.
Results
All analyses were conducted using R (R Core Team, 2020) and JASP (JASP
Team, 2019). The hierarchical MPT model analyses were conducted with the
TreeBUGS package (Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2018), figures were created with the
ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2016).
As we did not expect item-memory differences between item types a priori, the
baseline MPT model was restricted to just one item-memory parameter D (= D
E
= D
U
= D
I
= D
N
) assuming equality in the memorability between item types. We assessed
model fit with Bayesian posterior predictive p-values for the mean (T1 statistic;
difference between observed and expected mean frequencies) and covariance structure
(T2 statistic; summed difference between observed and expected covariance;
standardized by expected SD) of the data as proposed by Klauer (2010) and
implemented in Heck et al. (2018). Both model-fit indices were estimated
non-significant (T1 = .446, T2 = .401). Thus, the model and imposed restrictions on the
item-memory parameters explained the data well. Sampled mean parameter estimates,
parameter differences (also against .50) in source guessing, and parameter correlations,
as well as parameter correlations with the contingency judgments included as external
covariate as implemented in TreeBUGS (Heck et al., 2018) are reported with respective
95%-Bayesian Credibility Intervals (BCI) of the posterior distribution. If the BCI
excluded 0, parameter differences and correlations were considered statistically
meaningful. An overview of mean parameter estimates (and correlations with
contingency judgments) is given in Table 1. Estimates of source-guessing parameters
are graphically illustrated in Figure 2.
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Source Guessing for Detected-Old and Detected-New Items
To test the probability-matching account for items remembered as old or detected
as new, we, first, compared the respective guessing parameters against chance level of
.50. We did so because the null contingency between item types presented by each
source at encoding should lead to an indifference in the reliance on the profession
schema in source guessing among expected and unexpected item-source combinations.
If, in contrast, source guessing exceeds .50, items expected for either professional group
were guessed to stem from the expected source more often than from the unexpected
source, indicating reliance on the profession schema. Source guessing for expected items
recognized as old was equal to .50 (and thus perfectly matched to the factual
contingency) as indicated by a non-credible difference, △a
E
− .50 = −0.002 [−.19, .17].
In contrast, source guessing for expected items detected to be new largely
exceeded the actual .50 contingency as indicated by a credible positive difference,
△e
E
− .50 = .40 [.06, .50]. Thus, participants’ source guessing was reset to a pronounced
reliance on schematic knowledge as default when source attributions for new items
needed to be made. The divergence between source guessing for items detected as old
and those detected as new was also mirrored in the direct comparison between both
parameters. The sampled difference revealed credibility, △a
E
− e
E
= −.40 [−.63,−.06].
Source Guessing for Guessed-Old and Guessed-New Items
By means of source guessing for items for which the old-new status needed to be
guessed in the first place (parameter g; for old and new items, respectively),
contingency knowledge perceived during encoding could not be taken into account. In a
state of complete uncertainty with regard to the item status and its origin, participants
based their source guessing predominantly on schematic knowledge for guessed-old
items, △g
OE
− .50 = .18 [.09, .27], and did so even more if the item status was guessed
to be new, △g
NE
− .50 = .42 [.29, .49], as indicated by a credible difference of both
parameters, △g
OE
− g
NE
= −.24 [−.36,−.09].
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Contingency Judgment
The explicit post-judgments of perceived contingencies during encoding revealed
that individuals estimated the contingency (percentage of expected-doctor and
expected-lawyer statements presented by each of the three sources), although
descriptively close to the actual contingency (M = .41, SD = .10), biased in favor of
expected source, t(59) = 5.79, p < .001, BF10 = 50100.33, tested two-sided against .33.
Individuals thus stated that more expected-doctor items were presented by the doctor
and more expected-lawyer items were presented by the lawyer than each source actually
presented. The correlation of the contingency judgment and source guessing for
detected-old items reached statistical credibility as indicated by .40 [.22, .54]. Further,
we observed a positive correlation coefficient of comparable size for detected-new items.
Here, again, the contingency judgments were linked to source guessing to a credible
extent (.30 [.03, .48]). That is, at least to some extent as indicated by medium-sized
correlation coefficients, individuals who estimated the item-source contingency in a
rather schema-biased manner, tended to show a more pronounced schema bias in source
guessing for both detected-old and detected-new items. Note, however, that only the
correlation of source guessing and the contingency judgments for detected-old items
remained credible [.08, .62] when controlling for the sampling error of the estimated
population correlation according to the sample size. This was not true for detected-new
items [−.08, .56].
Discussion
Is peoples’ source guessing guided by probability matching generalized to
detected-new items when processing information from two distinct person sources? The
present research aimed to answer this question by implementing a source-monitoring
task based on the doctor-lawyer paradigm and by modeling the respective cognitive
processes at play during source attributions for old and new items. In line with Bell et
al. (2020), the present results replicate the recent evidence on probability matching for
detected-old items but did not hold for detected-new items using a modified
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source-monitoring task of the doctor-lawyer paradigm with two constant, distinct source
exemplars. That is, instead of applying the previously-encountered item-source
contingencies as done for detected-old items to a new decision context without source
information available, participants rather relied on pre-experimental generic schematic
knowledge about the professions of a doctor and a lawyer as guessing heuristic for new
items.
In source attributions for detected-old and guessed-old items, participants
considered the recognition status of the specific item in their source decision based on
guessing. When participants detected an item as old, they used the
previously-encountered item-source contingencies during encoding as a cue for
attributing the information to its origin. Particularly, on average, participants’ source
guessing was based on the factual contingency presented during encoding for those
items that were detected to be old. This findings adds evidence in favor of the
probability-matching account (developed for within the scope of information detected
and believed to be old; Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Bell et al., 2020; Kuhlmann et al.,
2012; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). When participants, however, guessed an item to be old,
they refrained from using the previously-encountered item-source contingencies and,
instead, based their source guessing on pre-experimental generic schematic knowledge
about the doctor and the lawyer (in line with Bell et al., 2020).
How can the dissociation in the use of knowledge cues, which was
peri-experimental knowledge for detected-old items and pre-experimental knowledge for
guessed-old items, in source guessing be explained? Based on the empirical evidence
reported here, one can only speculate about the potential candidates that drive this
dissociation between detected and non-detected items. Participants’ metacognitive
reasoning could be one such candidate as judgment processes in source monitoring have
been shown to be influenced by the subjective beliefs about source inference (see e.g.,
Batchelder & Batchelder, 2008; Kuhlmann & Touron, 2011; Meiser et al., 2007). Thus,
participants’ source inference for old items could be guided by their metacognitive
beliefs about the expected difference in the recognition status of an item. That is, for
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source attributions based on a state of uncertainty for guessed-old items, contingency
knowledge acquired during the course of encoding is not applied to source guessing.
Based on the null contingency reflected in the stimulus material (i.e., balanced ratio of
expected-doctor and expected-lawyer items presented by either source) unbiased source
guessing for both types of old items seems likely but participants’ source guessing indeed
varied as a function of their belief about the recognition status of old items which was
valued as an additional cue for the judgment processes during source attributions.
In source attributions for detected-new and guessed-new items, participants did
not consider the recognition status of the specific item in their source decision based on
guessing. Irrespective of whether an item was detected as or guessed to be new, they
relied on their generic, pre-experimental schema knowledge about the professions.
Previously-learned associations between the items and distinct sources were not
transferred to a new decision context for the very same person sources. That is, the
contingency knowledge acquired during encoding of information from distinct sources
could not be generalized to source guessing for novel information (presented without
any source information) of these specific persons.
As Bell et al. (2020) already discussed, the schema bias in source guessing for
detected-new items may serve the purpose of the most logical decision criterion as the
reliance on pre-experimental knowledge can lead to correct source attributions in many
instances—especially compared to contingency representations that may fluctuate
considerably across contexts. In contrast to the present study, participants in the study
by Bell et al. (2020) processed information that was associated with multiple persons,
which is why a schema reliance in source guessing thereby seemed (more) logical. But
the validity of pre-existing knowledge such as schemas and stereotypes can, of course,
be questioned particularly whenever these attitudes and associated behaviors do not
precisely reflect features of an individual’s personality. This holds particularly true in
the present experiment as participants learned unique information about two constant
sources, which renders the reliance on the profession schema unreasonable here as the
sources did not behave schema-conform. Even more so, it can be described as nothing
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less than bad news when it comes to the practical implications of the present finding for
detected-new items. Namely, this study clearly demonstrated that even though
inferences for novel information could be drawn for the exact same and distinct source
exemplars from whom individuals have learned expected and unexpected behavioral
descriptions before, they draw on non-individualized, generic knowledge about the
professions. More precisely, irrespective of past behaviors that were associated with the
sources, and therefore also encompassed unexpected behaviors for the sources’
professions, sources were nonetheless associated with their respective prototypical
profession behavior. The acquired knowledge about specific person sources from a past
learning episode was not transferred to novel information from these already-known
sources. This finding is particularly remarkable against the background of the potential
persistence of attitudes towards certain person groups inaccurately conforming schemas
and stereotypes in society. However, we can only speculate about how source guessing
for detected-new items would evolve given, for instance, more detailed background
knowledge about the sources in an experimental setting or increased degrees of
familiarity with the sources in real life. An interesting and fruitful avenue for
prospective research foci could be to further examine the persistence of
pre-experimental knowledge reliance under decisional uncertainty for new information,
its disproportionate application, and interventions to overcome such biases.
In order to conclusively claim that source guessing is generally biased by
pre-experimental knowledge for detected-new items with reasonable confidence, we
propose to, first, disqualify other limitations as potential explanations. For instance, the
null contingency may have been difficult to detect for participants, as evident in the, on
average, biased contingency judgments and marked individual difference in
source-guessing parameter for detected-old items (a
E
)—despite unbiased probability
matching on the group level. One potential explanation for schema-biased guessing for
detected-new items could be that the contingency detection renders more difficult with
the increase in complexity due to including the third rather abstract source. We would,
therefore, suggest to replicate the study with more pronounced, unbalanced, item-source
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contingencies (e.g., as done in Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011) and place a greater emphasis
on the unaffected integration of item (types) and sources during intentional learning
(e.g., due to explicitly informing about the contingency and instructing participants to
pay attention to it). As a consequence, a generalization and application of this mental
representation to source attributions for detected-new items may become more likely.
Nonetheless, the preconditions have indeed been ideal detect the accurate contingency
(based on the implemented source-memory instruction, Kuhlmann et al., 2012, and full
attention during encoding, Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011). In the same vein, effective
encoding provides a basis for probability matching, at least for sources who were
associated with a specific context, and turned out to be one promising candidate to
counteract schematic and stereotypical influences on source guessing in the past
(Kuhlmann, Bayen, Meuser, & Kornadt, 2016; Wulff & Kuhlmann, 2020b). The
particular conditions under which source guessing for novel information most likely also
benefits from accurate contingency perception is still to be examined, as well as the
challenging issue of how to address individual differences in prospective interventions.
The recent statistical advances that made the measurement of individual difference
possible and found their legitimate application in an increasing number of studies (e.g.,
Arnold, Bayen, & Smith, 2015; Lee, Bock, Cushman, & Shankle, 2020; Schaper,
Kuhlmann, & Bayen, 2019; Wulff & Kuhlmann, 2020a) should be used to examine the
interplay and dependencies of source guessing for old and new items (also on an
individual level) in prospective research.
It should be noted, however, that individuals dissociated in their source guessing,
depending on the recognition status of the item, between items presented by the
expected/unexpected sources and items presented without specific source information.
That is, participants were most inclined to guess the third, unspecific source, for
detected-new items but were more hesitant to do so for detected-old items. The
recognition status of an item thus affected source guessing also for the irrelevant source
for which no specific source characteristic was provided. The same pattern emerged for
guessed-old and -new items with an increased probability to attribute guessed-new
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items to the non-specified source reflecting their general decisional uncertainty. When
participants were in a state of lacking memory, they were, nonetheless, forced to make a
source attribution in the present paradigm. In such cases, the recognition status of the
item seemed to be used as a cue to make inferences about the origin of information such
that new items for which no adequate source attributions could be made were more
often associated with the least informative source for the decision criterion based on the
profession. This observation, in addition to the recognition-status specificity of guessing
of schema-expected/-unexpected exemplars, further underpins that individuals
potentially rely on various cues when judging the source (cf. Bell et al., 2020).
In conclusion, the scope of application of the probability-matching account
appears to be restricted to items that were detected as or believed to be old. Albeit
participants learned information about distinct source exemplars of a doctor and a
lawyer (unlike in Bell et al., 2020) and used the contingency knowledge reflected in the
item material to adjust their source guessing for previously-encountered information
detected as such, they nonetheless refrained from generalizing this knowledge
application to novel stimuli and based their source guessing on a schema acquired prior
to the experiment. This divergence in the use of knowledge cues in source guessing
between detected-old and detected-new items goes beyond the explanatory power of the
probability-matching account.
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Footnotes
1Marginal differences between the expectancy of professions were inherent to the ratings and were
kept at a minimum in the item composition. Due to the construction of the original item set of parallel
statements (e.g., “I have to be in court at 9 am.” vs. “I have to be in court at 12 pm.”), item selection
was limited to either of both parallel statements to reduce the likelihood of confusion. We did our very
best to, nonetheless, create a sample of statements expected for each professional group that did not
differ between professions. The incongruent ratings did not differ between professions, p ≥ .623, but we
were, unfortunately, not able to achieve this for the congruent ratings, p < .001. Descriptively, the mean
ratings between professions were, nonetheless, in a comparable range of the scale: M
doctor
= 4.64 and
M
lawyer
= 4.37.
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Table 1
Group-Level Mean Parameter Estimates and Correlations With Contingency Judgment
Mean
Correlation with
Contingency Judgments
Parameter Estimate SD 2.5%-BCI 97.5%-BCI Estimate SD 2.5%-BCI 97.5%-BCI
D .42 .02 .38 .47 -.05 .07 -.18 .08
d
I
.32 .12 .09 .55 -.16 .10 -.36 .05
d
E
.39 .09 .20 .53 -.26 .14 -.47 .11
d
U
.39 .11 .15 .60 -.16 .16 -.42 .19
b .37 .03 .31 .44 -.13 .05 -.22 -.03
a
I
.24 .05 .15 .33 .18 .13 -.09 .41
a
E
.50 .09 .31 .67 .40 .08 .22 .54
e
I
.81 .13 .47 .98 -.30 .04 -.38 -.21
e
E
.90 .12 .56 >.99 .30 .12 .03 .48
g
OI
.32 .04 .25 .40 -.16 .08 -.33 .003
g
OE
.68 .05 .59 .77 .32 .08 .15 .47
g
NI
.80 .09 .60 .94 -.34 .04 -.40 -.27
g
NE
.92 .05 .79 .99 .23 .12 -.03 .43
Note. Mean parameter estimates and their correlation with the item-source contingency judgments
requested at the end of the experiment. Parameters: D = probability of recognizing an item that was
presented by any source or was new (assuming that item memory does not differ between item
types/trees); d
E
/ d
U
/ d
I
= probability of remembering the source of an item that was presented by
the expected (E), unexpected (U), or irrelevant (I) source; b = probability of guessing that an
unrecognized item was old; a
E
/ a
I
= probability of guessing the expected (E) or irrelevant (I) source
given that the item was recognized in the first place; e
E
/ e
I
= probability of guessing the expected (E)
or irrelevant (I) source given that the item was detected to be new; g
O E
/ g
O I
= probability of
guessing the expected (E) or irrelevant (I) source given that the item was guessed to be old; g
N E
/ g
N I
= probability of guessing the expected (E) or irrelevant (I) source given that the item was guessed to
be new. SD = Standard Deviation, BCI = Bayesian Credibility Interval. Contingency judgements were
averaged for expected-doctor and expected-lawyer items and included in the Bayesian-hierarchical
MPT model as covariate.
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Figure 1 . Graphical illustration of the source monitoring MPT model (adapted from
Bell et al., 2020). One exemplar tree for items for a respective profession and one for
new items are presented. [X] refers to the respective item type: items are either
expected, unexpected, or irrelevant for the sources’ profession. In total, the model thus
consists of four trees. The trees for items that are expected, unexpected, or irrelevant
for the sources’ profession can be differentiated by the respective source-memory
parameter d; the general structure and all other parameters are equivalent across trees.
Parameters represent the following source-monitoring processes that were estimated
based on individuals’ source-attribution responses (in quotation marks): D =
probability of recognizing an item that was presented by any source or was new
(assuming that item memory does not differ between item types/trees); d
[X]
=
probability of remembering the source of an item that was presented by the expected
(E), unexpected (U), or irrelevant (I) source; b = probability of guessing that an
unrecognized item was old; a
E
/ a
I
= probability of guessing the expected (E) or
irrelevant (I) source given that the item was recognized in the first place; g
OE
/ g
OI
=
probability of guessing the expected (E) or irrelevant (I) source given that the item was
guessed to be old; g
NE
/ g
NI
= probability of guessing the expected (E) or irrelevant (I)
source given that the item was guessed to be new; e
E
/ e
I
= probability of guessing the
expected (E) or irrelevant (I) source given that the item was detected to be new.
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Figure 2 . Source-guessing parameters of the source monitoring MPT model (adapted
from Bell et al., 2020) for the expected (E) source depending on the recognition status
(old vs. new) of items that were either detected or guessed. a
E
= probability of
guessing the expected source given that the item was recognized in the first place; g
OE
= probability of guessing the expected source given that the item was guessed to be old;
e
E
= probability of guessing the expected source given that the item was detected to be
new; g
NE
= probability of guessing the expected source given that the item was guessed
to be new. Red dashed line = chance-level, unbiased source guessing, parameters > .50
indicate schema-based source guessing, parameters < .50 indicate counter schema-based
source guessing. Group-level parameter means are displayed as bars, individual
parameter estimates are displayed as dots. The error bars represent the 95%-BCI.
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